CHAPTER SEVEN

The first hypothesis proposed that a change from the dependent of enemy image to the rogue state image will produce a change in policy preferences towards the perceived state. In considering the images perceived by policy makers of Iraq before the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, policy makers indeed perceived a state dependent in many ways on the Soviet Union. The perception by policy makers of Iraq was that military and economic benefits derived from the enemy state, and while the Soviets may not have controlled Iraqi domestic and foreign policy making, actions taken by Iraq fell in line with the perceived desires of the Soviets. In addition, U.S. policy makers perceived the culture and intent of Iraq at this time as following below that of the U.S., placing it in a dependent position. Iraq was not strong enough nor perceived as socially or politically developed enough to stand as an equal to the Soviet Union, and so was not perceived as an ally of the enemy. The deterrent capabilities of the Soviet Union extended over its satellite state, making the use of force by the U.S. directly upon Iraq unlikely as the threat of a possible nuclear exchange between the two superpowers existed in the minds of policy makers. The U.S. instead would likely seek other means of influencing Iraq, most likely through the U.S.’s own dependents or satellites, or through diplomacy. The policy preferences sought by policy makers during the 1973-1974 Arab-Israeli War supported the perception of a dependent state as the U.S. preferred to send military aid to Israel rather than attack contributing Arab states themselves. In addition, once oil, through the embargo, became a weapon to be used against the U.S. and the unity of the international community, the U.S. looked inward at how it could outlast the embargo and outward towards diplomatic efforts. Furthermore, U.S. efforts focused on the Soviet influence in the crisis, first seeking to offset the military support of the Soviet Union towards the Arab states and then through diplomatic efforts to force a cease fire. The high point of the crisis centered on the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviets rather than the war between the Middle Eastern states. Thus, the perceived dependent of the enemy image for Iraq was supported.

During the pre-Gulf War years, there was a mix of perceptions on Iraq. While most policy makers promoted caution when dealing with Iraq, some (mostly Republican) policy makers saw an opportunity within the state for U.S. influence. Both the Bush administration and Congressional members understood the negative aspects of the Hussein regime, but some perceived that, through U.S. guidance and economic and military opportunity, Iraq could stand as a force for peace in the Middle East. On the other hand, many other Congressional members, both Republican and Democrat, voiced intense dislike for Hussein and his regime, citing human rights abuses of the past. Cultural, political and economic levels ranked lower than that of the U.S., and many policy makers perceived a less than righteous intent on the part of the Iraqi leadership. The state garnered emotionally laden epithets, such as a “terrorist” or “gangster” state and “the darkest place in hell.” Saddam Hussein himself was a “madman,” “murderer,” “butcher of Baghdad,” and the “Mad Dog of the Middle East.” Furthermore, supporting the hallmark of a rogue state, Iraq sought weapons of mass destruction. Thus, while some policy makers hoped for the opportunity to influence change in Iraq and gain access to this important oil producing state, others perceived a rogue state whose leadership must end. In a crisis situation, those perceiving opportunity may take more rehabilitative actions towards the state, while those holding more extreme views would take retributive action. As a result of the Gulf crisis, policy makers tended to seek retributive actions, calling for economic sanctions and a blockade and/or the use of military force. Those who had once sought opportunity in Iraq stood on the side of those voicing the most retributive policies, while many who had originally held rogue state images tended to support the less deadly policy choices of economic sanctions combined with deterrent military positioning. Yet, the extreme change of view from opportunity to retribution is consistent with a forced dramatic change in image produced by an intense, emotional event. Those policy makers calling for military action felt betrayed by Iraq as the U.S. had sought to nurture Iraq into acceptance into the international community, and so some U.S. policy makers desired to strike back with actions supporting an embarrassed “parent” who must put an unruly child in its place. Obviously, in the back of the minds of these policy makers was the view that Iraq was not an ally or a dependent of the U.S., despite hopes to the contrary, otherwise actions to rationalize Iraq’s actions to the world community would have occurred with real diplomatic efforts to cajole Iraq into leaving Kuwait. Instead, Iraq failed to be civilized by U.S. efforts, suggesting a failed U.S. effort in the region, which provoked retributive actions to prove U.S. dominance in the world. In addition, Iraq was not perceived as a dependent of the enemy and very little attention was given to allowing Soviet involvement in the crisis situation. Not only is the perceived image of a rogue state upheld as are the policy preferences as a response, but the rogue state image prototype emerges through Iraq.

The hypothesis promotes that a change in the image from the dependent of the enemy to the rogue state would show a change in policy preferences. Indeed, policy preferences during the Arab-Israeli war focused on the U.S. arming its own satellite or ally, diplomacy that included the enemy, and domestic policy changes towards oil production and consumption. On the other hand, policy preferences during the Gulf War sought direct action against Iraq. No longer was there a concern over the possible intervention by the enemy state. Iraq was open to direct and severe acts to coerce it into leaving Kuwait. Even less harsh retributive actions, such as sanctions and a blockade, were only given limited time for success before some policy makers sought the use of force. Extended deterrence from the enemy no longer existed, and direct deterrence of Iraq failed to halt direct actions against the state. Thus, the first hypothesis is supported in the case of Iraq.

For North Korea, during the years prior to the Pueblo crisis, most policy makers perceived a state very much a part of the Communist Monolith led by the Soviet Union. In addition, China, to some degree, was also perceived as an influence on North Korea. Smaller Communist states like North Korea were pawns in the Cold War games between the superpowers. The cultural, political and economic levels of North Korea were perceived as lower than those of the U.S. and influenced by the Soviets, while the North obtained its military capability from the U.S.S.R. Response alternatives ranged from attempts to help those emerging states battling Communism to building bridges through cultural exchange that would eventually cause the destruction of Communism as people perceived the wrongness of their beliefs. The actual policy preferences of policy makers in response to the taking of the Pueblo and the crew in 1968 ranged widely. The Johnson administration, which would make the primary decisions over what immediate actions to take, sought diplomatic avenues for the ship and crew’s return. Furthermore, the first action of the administration was to contact the Soviet Union and request they force North Korea to return the crew and ship. Many Congressional Members supported the decision to act through diplomatic channels, fearing that an invasion would cause the death of the crew or instigate a larger Communist altercation. Others wanted to take military action, go into Wonson harbor, take or sink the ship, and hopefully find the crew; and if the Soviets wanted in on the fight, well “bring it on.” Some perceived the Pueblo incident as an act in a much larger East Asian game, believing the Soviets had orchestrated the incident in retribution for South Korean forces entering the Vietnam War and to force the U.S. to start a withdrawal. Policy preferences reflect this sentiment as policy makers called not only to continue efforts in Vietnam, but to insure South Korea’s capability to defend against and to deter North Korean actions. While some policy makers did call for the use of military force, an act not supporting a dependent of the enemy image, many of theses same policy makers voiced the desire to not be pushed around by the Communists and taking strong action, even if it meant direct conflict with the Soviet Union. This call for action in the waning months of the Johnson administration, during the Vietnam War, likely suggests more of a blustering and swaggering effort by mostly Republican Congressional Members seeking to influence the upcoming elections by calling to task the foreign policy failures of the administration and displaying a strong stance against the enemy through nationalistic pride. With little other than words by discontent policy makers, as the actual policies undertaken by the administration focused on diplomatic efforts to insure the return of the men, the image of a dependent of the enemy state is supported.

Jumping forward to the years prior to the 1993-1994 NPT crisis with North Korea, the influence of the Soviets, now Russia, really no longer existed. North Korea controlled a large conventional force and sought nuclear weapons. The perceived cultural level of the people in North Korea by U.S. policy makers suggested a view of a less advanced society, while the seeming political and economic systems relayed values unacceptable to the international community. Policy makers were wary of North Korean intent and perceived a government that acted clandestinely to achieve its goals and whose officials may say one thing and do another in this process. North Korea was the Hermit Kingdom, lived in isolation, and one of the last Stalinist states. Very few comments discuss Kim Il Sung himself at this time, except that he’s paranoid, xenophobic and seeks to promote his own worth. Response alternatives suggested a focus on rehabilitative efforts through inspections, backed by the threat of force. The image of North Korea as perceived by policy makers supports a rogue state image, but one that is not as prototypically “bad” as Iraq. While North Korea failed to adhere completely to international norms, the leadership apparently sought more open relationships with other countries. Thus, policy preferences in a crisis situation would likely fall on the side of rehabilitative measures with the threat to use force a support in order to coerce proper behavior. Indeed, in the crisis situation stemming from North Korea’s threat to remove itself from the NPT, policy preferences suggested by policy makers tended to focus on diplomacy, with the threat of economic sanctions if North Korea continued with non-compliance. The use of the military only came up as a response if North Korea took action first. Calls for increasing the military support and defensive capabilities of South Korea emerged, a containment strategy, as well as increased funding domestically for the U.S. military. While some policy makers demanded the administration act with strength and power, calls tended to fall short of taking preemptive action against nuclear sites in North Korea, although policy makers did voice the threat to take more forceful action if North Korea failed to comply. Policy makers did tend to agree that a nuclear North Korea threatened the security and safety of the U.S. and the region and must not be allowed. One way or another, North Korea’s nuclear program must be stopped. Thus, policy preferences support the perception of a rogue state that falls short of the prototypical image, a state that may change its course through rehabilitative measures but backed up with the threat of retributive force.

The focus on diplomacy for both the dependent of the enemy and the rogue state image may appear as a failure to support the hypothesis that a change in image will produce a change in policy. Yet, the diplomatic efforts of the U.S. during the NPT crisis centered on enforcing the acceptance of IAEA inspections within the country to insure that North Korea did not develop nuclear weapons. In addition, threats of economic sanctions or more forceful measures supported the diplomatic efforts of the U.S. The U.S. government decided that it could not allow a nuclear North Korea, and would take action to stop said development with direct action if necessary. Furthermore, the U.S. had the support of Russia and China in this instance as both states could also find themselves threatened by North Korea’s nuclear development. Thus, for a state perceived as a rogue, yet not as far along the spectrum to sit with the prototypical Iraq, rehabilitative measures with the threat of retributive acts, combined with containment measures and invasive inspections, do support the hypothesis.

Hypothesis two proposes that the closer the held image of a state moves over time towards the prototypical rogue state image, the more policy preferences of decision makers move towards expected rogue state policies. This hypothesis suggests that, as time progresses and the perception of a state as a rogue strengthens, then policy preferences of the perceiving state will fall even more along the lines of those towards a rogue state. For Iraq, in the years prior to the Desert Fox in action in 1998, the perceived image of a rogue state strengthened. Focusing mostly on the actions and intent of Saddam Hussein, policy makers perceived a state continuing to seek WMD development despite international efforts to the contrary. It was viewed that if weapons of mass destruction ever fell into the hands of Hussein, he would either use them or provide them to terrorists to use against the U.S. Iraqi leaders were inhumane and uncivilized, with Iraq a pariah, outlaw, rogue state. Hussein failed to understand the international world and its complexities, cared little about the people within his borders, and even less about the environment. He was as evil as Hitler, murderous, stupid, needed constant watching and would destroy the Gulf region if allowed. There was no one worse in the post-cold war era than Saddam Hussein. While many of these terms and implications appeared prior to the Gulf war, their universal use by policy makers on both sides of the isle and the venomness and vehemence of their use increased. Saddam Hussein knew only one thing: the raw use of power, and that was how he should be treated. The prototypical image of Iraq as a rogue state only strengthened by the end of 1998, making retributive policy preferences the most likely choice of action for policy makers.

By the time the Clinton administration approached the 1998 crisis, they’d had it with Saddam Hussein. As he appeared not to comply with UN resolutions and international requirements, policy makers tended to support the use of military force to compel compliance. The few policy makers against military use saw political interests of the President involved, stemming from the impeachment process underway, and were vehemently against using the military to further the personal political gains of the President. Others wondered why the use of force hadn’t come sooner, and whether the few days of bombing would really do the job. Numerous law makers took the opportunity to rise in support of Clinton’s use of force against Iraq. Only a few considered the detrimental effects the bombing would have on the civilian population as well as the devastating effects already felt through sanctions. Ultimately, the goal emerged to eliminate Hussein as the leader of Iraq either through bombing, undermining the government, supporting oppositional groups, or implosion.

Incredible as it may seem, the perceived image of Iraq as a rogue state did increase from pre-Gulf War to pre-Desert Fox. The policy preferences of policy makers support the hypothesis that such an image strengthening promotes stronger adherence to policies fitting that image. For Iraq, the prototype rogue state, immediate and retributive action must occur. Little discussion occurred over whether or not to use force, just whether or not it was going to be enough to do the job. Therefore, support exists for the hypothesis that as policy makers’ perceptions of a rogue state strengthen, their policy preferences increasingly move toward actions that reflect that image.

North Korea, in the years prior to the missile crisis in 1998 still retained its rogue state image, but the degree to which policy makers perceive it as a rogue state varies, often with Republicans holding stronger views than Democrats. While some policy makers perceived a state just as untrustworthy and as threatening as Iraq, others perceived an opportunity for change within the state. North Korea appeared to adhere to the Agreed Framework and sought economic inclusion in the international system. Yet, policy makers perceived North Korea as a state that continued to seek nuclear weapons, continued its missile development, and continued its belligerence towards South Korea. North Korea also exported missile and arms technology to rogue states and terrorists, perceived as a direct threat to U.S. interests and security. Policy makers perceived that only the eminent failure of North Korea’s political and economic systems had forced its leaders to seek outside help, yet they neglected to understand that the source of their country’s demise rested on the Communist system they employed. Some U.S. policy makers’ comments reflected the view that the people in North Korea didn’t live in the 20^th century, or even on earth for that matter. The elite leadership continued, however, to support a large military contingency, and, according to many Congressional Members, to have a dual intent of appearing to comply with Agreed Framework requirements while clandestinely furthering its nuclear weapons program. Ultimately, Congressional Members found it difficult to understand the motives and intents of North Korea as little information escaped the country. While North Korea was a rogue, an outlaw and a Stalinist State, it was equally viewed as a Hermit country, isolated, and desperate, and Kim Jong Il as a paranoid and eccentric man; negative terms certainly, but without the same venom as those applied to Saddam Hussein and Iraq. However, intelligence suggested that North Korea retained enough plutonium for one or more weapons and the missile technology to threaten the region, with continued advancement in technology likely to produce an ability for North Korea to strike portions of the U.S. within years. Thus, although policy makers perceived North Korea as a rogue state, the degree to which it had increased its position as a rogue state varies between policy makers, often along party lines.

The policy preferences of policy makers during the missile crisis, beginning in August 1998, tended to support the use of rehabilitative measures that sought less violent means for compliance. Not only did the missile capability of North Korea develop as a concern, but also the possibility of a secret, underground nuclear weapons program. In seeking access to the questioned site and continued talks on missile technology and export, the Clinton administration offered reduced sanctions on one hand and the threat to take stronger action on the other. This approach tended to garner support from the Democrats in Congress, while Republicans tended to criticize a failing and weak regional policy. The administration, so say some members of Congress, must take a firmer stance against North Korea. Yet, as General Shelton suggests, any consideration of the use of force must first undergo a cost-benefit analysis of the situation. A 1 million man army and the possibility of a couple of nukes is enough to put a halt on anyone’s parade. Ultimately, the best option for Congressional Members was to pass the Missile Defense System Bill, forcing the Clinton administration to develop and deploy as soon as possible a national anti-ballistic missile system to protect the country from rogue or accidental launches. While North Korea was not the only cause for this bill, it certainly ranked high on the list of reasons for putting the system in place and changing the basis of U.S. foreign policy.

In addressing the hypothesis asserting that a perceived strengthening of a rogue state image will produce policies increasingly supportive of that view, the outcome is vague for North Korea. First, it is difficult to ascertain if the rogue state image did indeed strengthen during this time. For some policy makers, it appears that they may have considered North Korea as adhering to the Agreed Framework requirements. After all, missile development was not covered by the agreement, nor uranium mining and enrichment, although both could have been seen as going against the “spirit” of the agreement. On the other hand, many policy makers perceived a state just as untrustworthy as Iraq, undergoing the same cat and mouse game with a state that had observed the ineffectiveness of the U.S. in Iraq and was employing similar strategies at home. So the strengthening of the image varies, at least until after the missile testing, when policy makers considered what the threat of a nuclear tipped North Korean missile might mean for U.S. security. Yet, the costs of taking military action in North Korea were so high as to make diplomacy a worthwhile effort to pursue. Thus, based on the costs associated with military action, the increased use of rehabilitative measures is understandable, especially when supported with invasive inspections and containment strategies. Diplomatic talks that offered reduced sanctions on one hand, and the threat to take harsher actions on the other, appeared to offer the best solution to a state in desperate need of economic and humanitarian aid. After all, a starving, unruly child, living in isolation will, with patience, care, food, and warmth, develop into a strong friend ready to come to your aid when needed.[1] In addition, the U.S. took measures to increase its protection at home, an act meant to take responsibility for the country’s security and not allow rogue states to directly threaten the U.S. Rather than only punishing the child, the adult removes

the perceived weakness that the child may act against. Not only acting to show the child the benefits associated with not attempting to hit the adult, but also showing how the child will be unable to make contact if he/she indeed tries, the adult eliminates both the intent and the motive for violence. Therefore, if consideration is given for an “enlightened” approach to child rearing, then increased efforts towards the use of rehabilitative measures emerge, supporting the hypothesis.

The final hypothesis seeks to understand why the difference in policy preferences between Iraq and North Korea by asserting that a rogue state image observed as less threatening will result in rehabilitative policy preferences while a rogue state image observed as more threatening will result in retributive policy preferences. As shown in the discussions of the prior two hypotheses, the perception of Iraq as a rogue state placed that state in the prototype position. Indeed, Iraq is the prototype often used in the minds of policy makers when they subconsciously consider the placement of other states. As time went by, that image appeared to strengthen. When taking action against the Iraq, diplomacy wasn’t really offered. Iraq was told to comply or else face sanctions and/or military action. When Iraq failed to go along with U.S. and international demands, it was bombed into submission and contained through coercive means.

On the other hand, the above discussions on North Korea unveil a perception of a state placed at a point less than that of the prototype. While not a consensus, policy makers tended to perceive some opportunity for change and compliance in the state, or at least the belief that “good” action should be rewarded. The invectives against North Korea never reached the magnitude of those used against Iraq. North Korea appeared to many policy makers as more of an isolated, backwards child that didn’t know any better, but could be cajoled into changing its behavior or, at least, watched constantly to insure compliance. Other policy makers perceived a North Korea that took a dual stance, adhering to international norms when benefits were possible while secretly furthering its own policy agenda. In addition, as part of the capability node for the independent image variable, North Korea’s military strength and possible nuclear capability made it more costly to take against it military action. That level of capability, however, is not enough to place it in the enemy image, as the political, economic, and cultural levels perceived by policy makers place it at a much lower level of development. It’s just that this wayward child has found a gun. Now how do you deal with her. It doesn’t mean that the child is any more or less wayward, just that the gun exists in the hands of the child. A more destructive child could create devastating harm with a knife, while the child with the gun simply needs time and understanding for him to put the gun down. Yet, U.S. policy makers perceived both Iraq and North Korea similarly on several points. Both states sought nuclear weapons, were anti-western, were economically, militarily and culturally inferior to the U.S., supported a leadership with unclear intent, that was untrustworthy, and that was likely to take “bad” actions if an opening was allowed. It is only that policy makers tended not to view North Korea quite as prototypically “rogue” as Iraq. Thus, with North Korea, the perceived placement of the state within the rogue state category fell to the right of the prototype.

The perceived differences between Iraq and North Korea in their placement as rogue states led to different policy preferences, supporting the third hypothesis. Iraq was bombed with impunity while diplomatic efforts were used to engage North Korea. Yet, there were similarities between the two states as well. Policy makers threatened both states with the use of force in cases of non-compliance, enacted containment strategies, demanded invasive inspections, and sought treaties or regulations that limited the sovereignty of each state. Only, in the case of North Korea, the perception of a state moving towards compliance suggested a carrot offering along with the stick. Furthermore, much of the perceived differences were the result of the threat offered by each state. Iraq, although less of a military threat than North Korea due to its location, did have WMD capability and a large, capable army at the time of the Gulf War, yet bombing still occurred. It also sat on billions of barrels of oil and threatened billions more. This threat to control the flow of oil, a source of economic and military power throughout the world, dominated the perception of the Iraqi threat. On the other hand, although North Korea might have had one or two nuclear weapons and had a large military contingent close to the DMZ and only miles from U.S. and South Korean forces, there was no direct threat to U.S. global dominance, only to U.S. prestige. Thus, North Korea was not as much of a threat, not as insolent and not as evil as Hussein and Iraq, and offered greater costs in the use of force, resulting in different policy preferences: retribution for Iraq and rehabilitation for North Korea.

[1] This is not meant in a derogatory way towards North Korea, but rather, to support the rationale for how policy makers tend to perceive states in the rogue state image category.