CHAPTER SIX

In this section, an analysis of North Korea seeks to uncover the movement of a perceived image from that of a dependent of the enemy to that of a rogue state. To assess the three hypotheses, I analyze data from three time periods—at a time when North Korea was thought to have been a dependent of the Soviet Union and China, a selection of time thought to show the developing rogue state image, and during the latter 1990s when the rogue state image should have been well developed in policy makers conceptualizations of North Korea. In each time period I first observed the image of North Korea perceived by policy makers and then viewed the policy preferences of U.S. policy makers in a subsequent crisis situation. Chapter seven discusses the results as they relate to the specific hypotheses.

The difficulty of determining the image held by policy makers of North Korea in this time period centers on the lack of public data that reflected U.S. policy makers’ perceived images of North Korea. While an extensive search of the Congressional Records, Vital Speeches of the Day, Public Papers of the President, and various memoirs ensued, only a limited number of policy makers’ views on North Korea emerged prior to the crisis event. Nevertheless, there was enough data to suggest a generally held image of the North Korean state for this research agenda.

For the dependent of the enemy image, the variables focused on reflect the relationship of North Korea with the enemy as perceived by U.S. policy makers. In this case, the enemy is primarily the Soviet Union, but also China.[1] President Lyndon B. Johnson, who often reflected on the situation in Vietnam but also brought in the example of North Korea, implied there was a united communist agenda to overcome other states in Asia through aggressive action. Johnson commented that “The Communist masters in the world tonight can get no comfort from what they see in Malaysia, from where I have just come, from what they see here in Korea, and what they see in other parts of Asia.” Johnson’s additional reflections on the Korean War compared the “Communist aggression in Asia” and the need to combat it with the threat of Communism in Europe (Public Papers: November 2, 1966). Johnson observed a group of “Communist strategists” who sought to aggressively overtake weaker countries, Asian countries under the “shadow of Communist China,” and that a “peaceful mainland China [was] central to a peaceful Asia” (Public Papers: November 2, 1966). Thus, in Johnson’s mind, a link to China through a Communist alliance for expanding power and influence was at the heart of smaller state action against the U.S. in Asia, including the possible actions on the part of North Korea.

Vice President Hubert Humphrey saw China as exerting its “sphere of influence” in Asia, with the U.S. as the only guard against Communist expansion (Vital Speeches, July 15, 1966). Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara[2] perceived some differences between the internal structure of Soviet Communism and Chinese Communism, but observed unity within each state’s desire to fight “modernization” through the spread of Communism to developing countries (Vital Speeches, June 1, 1966).

Dean Rusk, Johnson’s Secretary of State, made the most direct connection between North Korea and the Soviet Union and China in military policy making. In discussing the Korean War, Rusk believed that the only reason why South Korean forces were not completely pushed off the Korean peninsula was due to Korean solders stopping “presumably to consult with Pyongyang, Moscow and perhaps Peking on what to do next” when U.S. servicemen entered the war (As I Saw It, p. 163). In addition, Rusk connected Soviet influence to North Korea’s decision to invade South Korea when he questions whether the North Korean leadership invaded because “they and the Soviets misinterpreted U.S. intentions” on Korea (p. 164). Not only was the military equipment for the invasion supplied by the Soviets, but the entire plan to invade South Korea was not simply the decision of the North Koreans to unify the peninsula, but was the plan of the Soviets and likely the Chinese:

Nor do I believe that only the North Koreans and the Soviets conspired in the attack. While the Soviets clearly supported the North Koreans politically and supplied arms and equipment as well as observers in the field, the Chinese may have helped plan the original attack as well. (165)

In addition, Rusk perceived that Stalin “gave the green light for the North Koreans to go after South Korea” (364). While this data centers on the Korean War, 18 years prior to the Pueblo incident, it does show a perception by U.S. policy makers that both the Soviets and the Chinese wielded great influence over North Korea in its formative years.

Senator Thruston B. Morton,[3] a congressional member through 1968, saw a dynamic relationship between the Soviets and the North Koreans. In comparing the Vietnam War to the Korean War, with the intent of showing how the U.S. must get out of Vietnam, Morton revealed an understanding of how influential the Soviets were in North Korea: “In Korea, the Soviet Union ruled over a monolithic Communist empire, and had a common cause with China to blunt the efforts of the United States and the United Nations” (Congressional Records, May 22, 1967). Thus, this “monolithic” Communism united both the Soviet Union and China in an effort against the U.S. with smaller states as their pawns in the process. While Morton believed that this monolith no longer existed as a united effort by the Soviets and the Chinese, and that an opening to the end of Soviet influence in Vietnam could occur if the U.S. acted with similar “restraint,” there was no lessening of the perception that the Soviet Union was influential in North Korea.

Thus, from the consideration of the data available prior to 1968, the perception of policy makers was that the Soviet Union and China influenced policy making in North Korea. There was a perception that, at a minimum, a past Communist monolith existed, and that Communist leaders still exerted influence in Asia. Some comment more on the influence of China, or of the Soviets, but it was likely that there was a mixture of both. Therefore, there was support for a perceived image of a North Korean state dependent upon an enemy.

In viewing the cultural level and intent of North Korea, policy makers perceive a state that does not equal the U.S. Johnson sees Communists as “ruthless invaders,” “task masters,” “aggressive” forces that would not let other states live in peace (Public Papers, October 31, 1966 & November 1, 1966). According to Johnson, North Koreans acted on the DMZ in ways to undermine the armistice between the U.S. and North Korea (Public Papers, November 4, 1966). McNamara saw the possibility Communists taking advantage of “underdeveloped” countries: “What is often misunderstood is that communists are capable of subverting, manipulating, and finally, directing for their own ends, the wholly legitimate grievances of a developing society” (Vital Speeches, June 1, 1966). Humphrey believed that the communist agenda was to infiltrate other countries, with the U.S. as the only guard against this force (Vital Speeches, July 15, 1966). North Koreans were underhanded (Dodd, Congressional Records: March 6, 1967), sought to create dissonance, violate agreements and assassinate the South Korean leadership (U.N. Representative of the U.S., Arthur Goldberg, cited in Department of State Bulletin, January, 1968). In the available data, it was apparent that policy makers did not perceive the cultural level of North Korea as equal to that of the U.S., and that the intent of the North Koreans was to disrupt regional peace, an act of a lesser state. A cultural level perceived as lower than that of the U.S., and an intent that did not equal the lofty intent behind U.S. policies, supported the image of a dependent of the enemy.

When viewing the types of response alternatives promoted by U.S. policy makers regarding North Korea, a general perception of having to stop aggressive action and the spread of communism appeared. Johnson believed that the U.S. must act as a “conciliation” force between Communist states and their neighbors and “prove” that aggression against neighboring states would not bring benefits (Vital Speeches, August 1, 1966). Only by insuring a “peaceful” China would a peaceful Asia become possible (Vital Speeches, August 1, 1966). McNamara cautioned against involving the U.S. in every altercation that included communists. He would rather have seen the U.S. only acting to support those regimes willing to act in their own behalf (Vital Speeches, June 1, 1966). Humphrey had a four point plan for combating Communism: 1. help states who would help themselves in fighting aggression by other states, 2. help in nation-building where states were actively seeking to advance themselves, 3. nurture regional cooperation, and 4. act to “build bridges” between the U.S. and Communist states. Ultimately, the outcome of said policies would illuminate the error of Communist ways (Vital Speeches, June 15, 1966). Thus, most policy makers observed at this time suggested policies that sought to change the ways of perceived lesser states. The U.S. was to act as a parent who could nurture and help develop those states that desired to develop and grow. In addition, attention must be paid to the larger Communist states if the smaller Communist states or even developing “free” states in the region were to achieve peace. Therefore, response alternatives also suggested a perception of North Korea that, as a member of the smaller states, was under the control of other larger states and was to be addressed in this context.

While the above analysis was far from extensive and complete, it did provide some insight into policy makers’ perceptions of North Korea. Fortunately, the data reflected the perceptions of some of the major policy makers of this time, the President and his advisors. The overall perception gleaned from the data was that policy makers had perceived North Korea as a dependent of the enemy state. This suggested policies by U.S. policy makers in the future that considered the extended deterrent capabilities of the enemy. It was unlikely that direct action would be taken by the U.S. against North Korea in a crisis situation as could have provoked conflict with the parent state(s): the Soviet Union and China. The next section will explore the policy preferences of policy makers during the USS Pueblo incident in 1968.

Throughout 1966 and 1967, North Korea increased its activities against South Korea in and around the demilitarized zone (DMZ), the no-man’s-land separating North and South Korea along the 38^th parallel. From testing the extent of the U.S. and South Korean forces to attempts on political leaders’ lives, U.S. intelligence observed numerous occasions when North Korea acted against the terms of the 1953 armistice. On January 23, 1968, North Korea escalated the situation between the “Communists” and “The West” when North Korea seized the USS Pueblo, an United States intelligence gathering ship, and its crew, killing one crewmember.

The Pueblo was a “state of the art” ship meant to eavesdrop on North Korean preparedness for a possible invasion of South Korea. As such, the Pueblo’s mission took it within miles of the North Korean coastline. Just how close the ship actually came to the mainland is still uncertain, as the ship was out of contact with U.S. military sources (supposedly) for more than two weeks and any documentation of the ship’s activities during that time remain in North Korean hands if not destroyed prior to the Pueblo’s taking. North Korea stated that the Pueblo had entered North Korean waters (generally considered 12 miles beyond land, although some argue a three mile barrier), while the Commander of the ship announced that he was (at the time of the incident) in international waters. After circling the ship for an hour and waiting for additional warships to arrive, the North Koreans stopped and boarded the Pueblo with little resistance, taking custody of the crew and towing the ship to Wonson Harbor.

While the United States claimed that the ship was taken in international waters, policy makers and intelligence personnel couldn’t verify that the Pueblo had never entered North Korean water “accidentally.” Nevertheless, even if the intelligence gathering ship had entered North Korean waters, countries don’t have the right to seize the ships of other countries. Furthermore, some policy makers voiced concern that events at that time suggested that the North Koreans might have acted with aggression against South Korea in the near future. While South Korea could defend itself in a ground war, the large extent of Soviet MiGs in North Korea appeared to contribute to a hesitancy in both the defensive actions of U.S. forces when the Pueblo was seized and in subsequent military actions.

Diplomatic talks ensued, with the Soviet Union the first country President Johnson contacted in trying to set up communications with the North Koreans. Eventually, diplomatic talks proceeded over several months at Pomonjon. The crew found itself part of the North Korean propaganda promoting North Korean defiance over the great Imperialist America. Pictures taken of the sailors appeared world-wide, showing extended middle fingers to the cameramen. Having been told this was a symbol for peace, captors beat the men when North Korean embarrassment developed from the truth. Some sailors also signed documents stating that the Pueblo had been spying on North Korea and had entered North Korean waters, but policy makers and intelligence personnel considered these false statements as they had obviously been signed under duress.

The crisis came to and end when U.S. officials signed a document acknowledging that the ship had been on a spy mission and had entered North Korean waters, but the following line was added to the bottom of the statement: “We are instructed to inform you that there is not one truth in the above” (Rusk, 395). North Korea accepted the statement and released the crew by at the end of December 1968; yet the ship remains to this day a trophy in Wonson harbor.

In an attempt to place blame for the incident, U.S. military officials convicted the Commander of the Pueblo, Lloyd Bucher, of having given up his ship without a fight. Eventually, with the conviction overturned, the responsibility for the Puebo’s seizure fell on several aspects of military unpreparedness for such situations. The Johnson administration investigated and determined that intelligence gathering ships collected important data for the U.S.’s understanding of North Korean capability and should continue their operations, but with added defensive capabilities and protections. Thus, destroyers developed into the intelligence gathering ship of choice, with adequate military support close by. Eventually, new technology (satellites, etc.) made such missions obsolete and unnecessary, ending the crisis possibilities “intelligence gathering” ships risked in the execution of their missions.[4]

As a precursor to considering the policy preferences of the policy makers, it is insightful to consider why the crisis occurred and who was responsible for instigating the crisis. While Johnson saw North Korean belligerence as an attempt to “intimidate” South Korea (Public Papers, January 27, 1968), he also believed that there existed some connection between the North Korean incident and U.S. actions in Vietnam as a larger “Communist” agenda to “divert” U.S. and South Korean resources (“Address by President Johnson,” January 26, 1968 in Department of State Bulletin; Public Papers, February 2, 1968).[5] The advisors to the President did not make directly the same connection, but did imply that the Soviets could have influenced the release of the ship and crew (Department of State Bulletin: January 23, 1968, “Statement by Department of State Spokesman,” p. 190, and “Secretary Rusk News Briefing” January 24, 1968, p. 191).

Various Senators viewed the Communist connection in varying degrees of importance. While more Republicans tended to have strong feelings on a connection between North Korean actions and a larger Communist agenda, some Democrats also supported this view. Republican Senator Wallace Bennett believed that North Korean actions supported an act in “WWIII, Communist style” that sought to “win” the war through small conflicts in order to eventually eliminate all freedom in the world (CR: January 24, 1968). Senator Karl Mundt considered the act as part of an effort to reduce the status (soft power) of the United States world-wide (CR: January 29, 1968). The ever-present Strom Thurmond took a strong view, as he claimed that the Communists planned to take over the world and the U.S. was the only force that could stop them

(CR: January 23, 1968). British withdrawal from Asia, says Thurmond, suggested an opportunity for the Soviet and North Koreans to pressure a U.S. departure from Asia as well (CR: January 23, 1968). Democrat Senator Russell Long considered the actions of North Korea to be part of a larger agenda by the Communist bloc, especially the Soviet Union and China, and that the Soviets supported North Korean desires not to find a solution to the crisis (CR: January 29, 1968). Other Congressmen believed the Soviets to be an important influence on North Korea and an end to the crisis, while others sought to have U.S. policy makers consider Soviet reactions to acts against the North Koreans before taking action (Mansfield, January 29, 1968). On the other hand, some U.S. policy makers voiced their desire that any U.S. response be strong enough to send a message to the “Communist world” (Stennis, CR: January 24, 1968)

Congressional Representatives also supported the perception that the Soviets, and possibly the Chinese, influenced North Korean actions. Some House members believed that the crisis was the fault of the Soviets and that policy makers should not seek the assistance of the Soviet Union:

It is surprising to me that the administration would attempt to have Communist Russia intercede in our behalf with the North Koreans. Everyone should realize and know that Communist Russia is not our friend. They are not going to do anything that would help resolve the situation as no doubt they are agitating and encouraging the North Koreans in their action if, in fact, they did not advise that it be done. (CR: January 25, 1968)

While some saw the demon aspect of the Soviets at fault, John Rarick considered that North Korea was in the hands of the Soviets due to deals made with the Soviet Union near the end of WWII, and now actions of “appeasement” by U.S. political leaders strengthen Soviet intentions to reduce U.S. influence abroad (CR: March 11, 1968). Other Representatives agreed that observed actions of the North Koreans suggested a larger plan to weaken U.S. influence in Asia, connecting North Korean actions to the Vietnam War (Abbitt, CR: January 25, 1968). The crisis suggested “Communist mischief making” (Kuykendall, CR: January 29, 1968), the progression of the Cold War (Findley, CR: January 29, 1968), and revealed the Soviet Union’s intentions to extend the crisis when they declined to mediate the situation (Edwards, CR: February 1, 1968; Gurney, CR: January 25, 1968). While there failed to occur a unanimous perception that the Soviets and possibly the Chinese influenced North Korean decisions to take and hold U.S. property and personnel, the propensity for policy makers to link the crisis with the Soviet Union and Asia suggested that policy makers tended to perceive a dependent North Korea.

Policy makers’ policy preferences ranged widely in determining the best possible solution to the crisis situation. While Johnson stated that “our military forces are prepared for any contingency that might arise” (Burk, CR: January 26, 1968), he publicly supported diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis (Public Papers, February 2, 1968). Both the executive branch and Congressional members who supported diplomacy looked to Soviet intervention and the United Nations for ending the crisis without resorting to military intervention (Johnson, Department of State Bulletin: “Address by President Johnson,” January 26, 1968; McNamara, Department of State Bulletin: “Defense Department Statement,” January 23, 1968; Rusk, Department of State Bulletin: “Statement by the Department of State,” January 23, 1968; Rusk, Department of State Bulletin: “Secretary Rusk News Briefing,” January 24, 1968; Pell, CR: January 25, 1968; Hart, CR: January 25, 1968; Kuchel, CR: January 25, 1968; Mansfield, CR: January 29, 1968). The reasoning for diplomatic solutions to the crisis ranged from the desire not to provoke a situation that would result in the deaths of the sailors (Tydings, CR: January 25, 1968), to the perceived responsibility of a superpower like the United States not to take “hasty” or unneeded action that could have intensified the already charged situation (Byrd, CR: January 26, 1968; McGee, CR: January 26, 1968).

However, for some policy makers, limitations on diplomacy existed. On the less aggressive end, policy makers called for “brief, firm diplomatic attempts” and threatened to take more forceful actions if diplomatic efforts failed (Kuchel, CR: January 25, 1968; Tower, CR: January 26, 1968; Findley, CR: January 29, 1968; Whitener, CR: January 29, 1968). In other words used, the U.S. should “walk softly and carry a big stick” (Stennis, CR: January 24, 1968). On the other extreme sat policy makers viewing North Korean actions as an affront to U.S. superiority, and the remedy to the problem was to incorporate “any means necessary,” which included military action that penetrated into North Korea and forcefully recaptured the ship and men, with that priority (Stanton, CR: January 23, 1968; Bennett, CR: January 24, 1968; Talmadge, CR: January 24, 1968; Brinkely, CR: January 25, 1968; Gurney, CR: January 25, 1968 ). Not to take action would have hurt U.S. prestige (Long, CR: January 29, 1968) and may have reduced morale with solders in Vietnam (Dirksen, CR: January 29, 1968). The U.S. was not a “paper tiger” and would not allow such acts to go unchallenged (Stennis, CR: January 24, 1968). Therefore, some U.S. policy makers sought to send a message of strength (Edwards, CR: February 1, 1968) so that other states observing the crisis would not act in similar ways (Abbitt, CR: January 25, 1968). Some Congressmen extended the use of force to the Soviet Union as well if they wanted to “get in on it” as the U.S. wouldn’t be “bullied” by “small or great powers” (Long, CR: January 29, 1968). Thus, plenty of sentiment existed towards forceful action that upheld U.S. prestige and power internationally, without real consideration of what the outcome would have been for those sailors held by the North Korean authority.

A few interesting policy preferences emerged that suggested the extent to which U.S. policy makers perceived the influence of the Soviets over North Korea. Representative Kuykendall suggested forcing “free states” trading with North Korea to stop and that the U.S. would review its own trade policies with those states that continued to do business with North Korea as a focused attempt to limit burgeoning trade with the Soviet Union (CR: January 29, 1968). Others sought to arm third parties, either through the distribution of arms to other countries, such as South Korea and, for some reason, South Africa (Eastland, CR: February 28, 1968), or to increase the number of U.S. military personnel in South Korea. Representative Pelly considered a blockade of North Korea the best solution for the return of the Pueblo (CR: January 25, 1968). Domestically, many Congressional members questioned why the Pueblo had been on such a mission without backup in the first place (Talmadge, CR: January 24, 1968; Gruening, CR: January 26, 1968; Edwards, CR: February 1, 1968; Rarick, CR: March 11, 1968) and called for a review of U.S. policy in this matter (Mundt, CR: January 29, 1968). Some policy makers suggested that U.S. policies that promoted spy missions provoked crisis situations and should be reconsidered (Hart, CR: January 25 & 29, 1968; Mundt, CR: January 29, 1968). Along this same line, those that considered changing the policy of limited support for intelligence ships cautioned against increasing naval and air presence in the oceans as the Soviets would do the same, possibly increasing the degree of threat such actions would pose to the U.S. (CR: Young, April 29, 1968).

It is apparent that many policy makers at this time perceived Soviet influence on North Korean actions. Indeed, some Congressional members believed that the North Koreans would never have come up with such a plan on their own, and that the crisis was another act in the Cold War between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Thus, many policy makers perceived a dependent status of North Korea on the Soviet Union. In policy preferences considered by policy makers, the vast majority of policy makers sought diplomatic measures as their first priority. Whether they wanted to insure the safety of the crew or refrain from instigating a nuclear war with the Soviet Union, the desire not to use force was the policy preference most often considered by policy makers. However, policy makers did call for the threat to use force if North Korean non-compliance prevailed. On the one hand, some policy makers professed that under no circumstances should the U.S. use force to obtain the release of the ship and crew, while others demanded swift and decisive action.

The threat to use force as a back up to diplomacy does not necessarily fall counter to the policy preferences of a perceived dependent of the enemy under the extended deterrence of the enemy state, but calls to use force may. Yet, throughout the Cold War, some policy makers called for directly confronting the Soviet Union rather than seeking a containment policy. Others understood that the ultimate outcome of such confrontations was a nuclear war. Cries for action against the enemy reflected the emotional effect other states’ actions had on U.S. policy makers, especially if the policy maker held a nationalistic fervor for U.S. power and might. On the other hand, such threats to use force may have forced states to question their own actions that may have provoked the U.S. if such irrational behavior appeared possible. Finally, policy makers that called for the immediate use of force could have been partaking in a bolstering and swaggering effort for his own constituents who may also have held a strong view of American nationalism and feared an attack if weakness was portrayed. Ultimately, some policy makers’ comments reflected an independent or self-serving North Korea, but most policy makers called for actions that reflected a consideration of how the enemy may respond to acts against its dependent.

Policy makers in 1992 viewed security threats through the lens of emerging rogue states and the diminishing Soviet Union. Gorbachev had ended the Soviet Union the previous year, and actions to privatize industry and develop Democracy appeared in Russia. The major security threat relating to Russia surrounded the security of the nuclear weapons held in Russia and the other former Soviet states. The great Cold Warrior was gone, having imploded on its over-extension of assets towards the development of nuclear and conventional forces. The United States had won the Cold War by being able to outspend and obtain more credit than the Soviet empire. Now the focus moved towards economic expansion, environmental concerns, terrorism and rogue states.

The difficulty with determining the image of North Korea and whether policy makers perceived its placement as a prototypical rogue state centered on the lack of data available and the time frame prior to the crisis. As the crisis surrounding North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) began in March 1993, considering North Korea’s image prior to the crisis situated the time frame between two different administrations. While this was not as important of a hurdle for obtaining the perceived image of Congressional members, there was very little data reflecting the perceptions of the Clinton administration prior to the crisis. Yet, there was enough data to obtain a good understanding of the image of North Korea as perceived by policy makers up to March 1993.

In determining whether a state was perceived as a rogue, how policy makers perceived that state’s military capability as it pertains to the desire to obtain nuclear weapons was important. For Congressional members, there was no doubt that North Korea sought to develop or acquire nuclear arms. Some members cited intelligence information that uncovered a North Korean nuclear program anywhere from “a few months to a couple of years away” from having nuclear weapons (D’Amato, CR: March 2, 1992). Others considered that North Korea worked covertly to develop “weapons of mass destruction (Cranston, Senate Hearing: January 14, 1992; Reid, CR: February 27, 1992). Yet, as Senator Cranston stated, the international community knew of North Korea’s development aspirations: “Mr. Secretary, you know the North Koreans are building a bomb or intend to, I know it, the world knows it” (Senate Hearing, March 13, 1992). Even after diplomatic efforts with North Korea ensued, “uncertainties” and “concerns” lingered over North Korean nuclear intentions (Mr. Solomon relayed to Representative Lagomarsino in House Hearing, July 7, 1992; Solarz, House Hearing: July 22, 1992). Others simply failed to believe North Korean assurances that they were not seeking to acquiring nuclear weapons (Solarz, CR: February 2, 1992).

The threat of a nuclear North Korea also reflected the possible chain reaction of nuclear development in the region, another potential threat to the U.S. If North Korea continued its nuclear program despite outward actions to the contrary, South Korea and Japan may have determined it necessary to develop nuclear capabilities in their own countries (Solarz, House Hearing: July 22, 1992). Furthermore, with the end of the Soviet Union, U.S. policy makers believed that some scientists from that country may seek jobs in other countries, such as North Korea, where they could continue to develop nuclear weapons (Sims, CR: February 3, 1992). Policy makers also considered that Russian leaders may find financial benefit in selling nuclear technology to North Korea (Broomfield, CR: March 5, 1992)

As added support to the view of a North Korea closing in on nuclear capability, Robert Gates merits inclusion as CIA directors often cross party lines. Gates relayed intelligence showing that North Korea had its own natural uranium mines, two reactors that could produce plutonium, and a nearly completed reprocessing reactor, making nuclear weapons capability available within two years (Senate Hearing: March 12, 1992). Woolsey, Gate’s predecessor, asserted that North Korea was developing nuclear weapons (Senate Hearing: February 2, 1992). Along with the fission material needed for nuclear weapons, policy makers believed that North Korea sought to develop a missile capable of delivering nuclear weapons to regional, if not other, countries (Mr. Clarke relayed intelligence information to Senator Bingaman during a Senate Hearing, March 13, 1992).

Interestingly, Representative Les Aspin used Iraq as a prototype to weigh the degree of threat North Korea posed to the U.S., and questioned whether North Korea was more or less of a threat (CR: January 6, 1992). Senator Cranston also compared North Korea to Iraq, and perceived the Asian country much more of a threat to nuclear development than Iraq as North Korea used “clandestine” activities to a larger degree (CR: February 6, 1992). Indeed, some policy makers considered North Korea “the greatest threat in Northeast Asia” (Biden, Senate Hearing: March 13, 1992). James Woolsey, CIA Director under Clinton the first two years of his administration, believed North Korea was “probably our most grave current concern” (Senate Hearing, February 24, 1993), while Secretary of State Warren Christopher perceived North Korea as a continuing threat to South Korea (CR: January 13, 1993). However, only Representative Solarz was willing to go as far as to say that North Korea could not be trusted with nuclear weapons as it had attempted to harm South Korean officials in the past, a reflected belief that North Korea would use nuclear weapons against South Korea (CR: February 4, 1992).

Yet, not all policy makers equated North Korea to Iraq. In contemplating the necessary force for countering threats world-wide, Representative James delineated that while a nuclear North Korea would definitely threaten the security of the U.S., it was Iraq that was the “renegade state:” “Such cuts would profoundly limit our ability to respond to threats from a hard line Russian Government, a nuclear North Korea, renegade states like Iraq, or terrorists” (CR: March 4, 1992). Representative Solarz contemplated the threat of North Korea selling nuclear material or weapons to “rogue regimes” (House Hearing: July 22, 1992). Metzenbaum didn’t observe much of a threat from any of the new security threats when he contemplated new military weaponry and wondered who would the U.S. use the weapons against, “Saddam Hussein? Castro? North Korea? Come on, who are you kidding? With the military might we currently have in our arsenal, we could whip all three of those countries at the same time with one arm tied behind our back” (Metzenbaum, CR: May 21, 1992). If rank order was important, North Korea concerned U.S. policy makers only after Iraq and Libya (Roth, CR: February 16, 1993).

U.S. policy makers perceived some linkage between the Soviet Union and North Korea, or even Russia and the North. Kyl asked that “Russia no longer provide assistance to Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, or Afghanistan,” which suggested that North Korea had still obtained economic and/or military benefits from Russia into the 1990s (CR: August 6, 1992). Representative Soloman considered that any relationship between Russia and North Korea was in its “last days,” while closer ties to China might be forthcoming (House Hearing: July 8, 1992).

When looking at the relative cultural image of North Korea, a state that held values lower than that of the perceivers (U.S. policy makers) developed. In comparison to the U.S. or the international community, North Korea failed to support political trappings that reflected a “civilized” society. Representative Porter stated that countries existing under a “rule of law” supported freedom of expression, freedom of religion, freedom of conscience, and freedom of movement, human rights that were “repressed” by North Korea (CR: March 31, 1992). Senator Orin Hatch supported this view: “This regime possesses the most egregious human rights record in Asia,” (CR: September 8, 1992). North Korean leaders provided illusions to their citizens of what occurs internationally as a way to obfuscate North Korea’s limited standing(CR: Bently, March 31, 1992). Furthermore, there was a “bamboo curtain” that kept North Koreans in this disillusioned state (Bently, CR: March 31, 1992). Power was held “tenaciously” by a “dictator” (Campbell, CR: March 31, 1992) who supported an “oppressive Communist system” that must be eliminated from the last remaining Communist countries (Campbell, CR: March 31, 1992). Only a change in government would bring stability in the region (Solarz, House Hearing: July 8, 1992). Against all this oppression and darkness, U.S. policy makers perceived the U.S. as a beacon of light that would “stand with the forces of liberty” in North Korea and other Communist countries (Helms, Senate Hearing: January 13, 1993) and bring democracy and freedom to the world.

U.S. policy makers also perceived that the North Koreans lacked reliability and virtue, which supported the image of a less than developed society. “Wary” politicians considered how far to trust “malevolent” North Korean leaders who acted with “malice” in their assurances that the North would abide by the NPT agreement while at the same time they “clandestinely” sought nuclear weapons (Cranston, CR: February 6, 1992; Cranston, CR: March 31, 1992;). U.S. policy makers perceived a sly North Korean leadership that had viewed the situation with Iraq and sought to use this knowledge to its own advantage, an act that made nuclear weapons monitoring in North Korea more difficult than it was in Iraq (Cranston, CR: January 14, 1992). U.S. policy makers considered that North Korean leaders furthered a dual plan of adhering to safeguard agreements, yet sought WMD, reflecting a North Korean belief that it has some kind of bargaining tool. Policy makers saw this belief as a reflection of how North Korea failed to understand the international community (Leach, CR: July 22, 1992).

U.S. policy makers also perceived a North Korea that rejected adherence to international norms. North Korea, along with China, partook in the “evil” business of selling arms to other countries (Cranston, CR: February 6, 1992).[6] Senator McCain suggested that North Korean leaders desired a conflictual international system: “The merchants of death, such as North Korea, must be stopped . . . The North Korean authorities are the last of a dying breed. They are contemptuous of the freedom of man and are contemptuous of international stability (CR: January 1, 1992). North Korean leaders acted with “aggression” that enforced their “repressive policies” (D’Amato, CR: March 3, 1992) through an “authoritarian rule at home” (Cranston, CR: January 14, 1992). North Koreans utilized “brutal repression” (Fascell, CR: February 6, 1992) through “secret police” that “[held] power by force and fear” (Wirth, CR: October 2, 1992). Thus, the North Korean government was perceived as authoritarian and brutal, and limited the freedoms of its people that the international community held dear.

The sophistication of the people in North Korea, as perceived by U.S. policy makers, was not at the same level as that of the United States. North Korean’s were “famous tunnel diggers” (Cranston, CR: February 26, 1992), and were “one of the most burrowed and burrowing societies in the world” (Leach, House Hearing: July 22, 1992). Their economy was so poor that they rarely ate meat and only partook in one meal a day (Cranston, CR: January 14, 1992). The

North Korean people failed to live up to the same standards of cultural development as that of the U.S., and the economic level of North Korea limited cultural growth in the future.

There were many short word combinations used to describe North Korea that placed it squarely in the rogue state image category. North Korean leaders were “Merchants of death” (McCain, CR: January 30, 1992), “dangerous” (Roth CR: February 16, 1993) “tightfisted totalitarians” (Helen Bently, CR: March 31, 1992), and “despotic” (Pell, CR: October 5, 1992). The state of North Korea epitomized a “hardline (sic) Communist state” (Kerry, CR: January 21, 1993), a “renegade” (Cranston, CR: February 26, 1992), “rogue” (Biden, CR: June 30, 1992; Solarz, CR: February 4, 1992), “captive nation” (Nowak, CR: July 22, 1992) suggestive of a “modern day hermit kingdom” (Hatch, CR: September 8, 1992) in the “Third World” (Fascell, CR: February 6, 1992).

Yet, not all sentiments reflected negative perceptions of North Korea. Some remarks suggested that some policy makers were open to the possibility that North Korea sought change and opportunity within the international community. Senator Nunn relayed that North and South Korea actively worked together “towards reducing tension on the peninsula” (CR: January 22, 1992). Representative Fascell expressed his hope that the peace agreement between the North and South would bring a successful lessening of tensions (CR: February 6, 1992). Gore, soon to be vice-president, suggested that while North Korea was one of the “last bastions of communism,” there was hope as international events could influence such states to adopt aspects of democracy, reflected in North Korea’s experiment with a successful free trade zone (CR: May 7, 1992).

Interestingly, there were few direct comments observed on Kim Il Sung. Senator Orin Hatch voiced his perception of a “paranoid” and “xenophobic” leader that used a “cult of personality” to support his isolationist regime. Kim restricted radio stations to only three, yet sought nuclear weapons technology (CR: September 8, 1992). On the other hand, Representative Richardson cautiously considered that at least Kim was moving towards dialogue with the west, while others, such as Castro, were not. Even Representative Solarz who, after having met with Kim and related the huge gold statue in his image outside a prominent museum, discussed his “remarkably good condition” for someone “his age” (CR: February 4, 1992).

When viewing the perceived intent behind North Korean action, an image of a state with a hidden agenda emerged. North Koreans acted “clandestinely” to trick the international community, especially the U.S., into thinking that they were not pursuing nuclear weapons, while all the time they sought to develop their nuclear program (Cranston, CR: February 2, 1992). In addition, North Korea’s observation of international failure to curb Iraq’s WMD development encouraged North Korean leaders to act with a dual agenda (Cranston, House Hearing: February 6, 1992). Furthermore, North Korean leaders sought to keep their population uninformed and utilized domestic media for their own aggrandizement (Pressler, CR: January 30, 1992). In relation to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, North Korea appeared to often change its mind on what it was willing to concede to (Solarz, CR: February 4, 1992). Ultimately, North Korea’s intent centered on the desire to obtain nuclear weapons and probably use these weapons for an economic advantage either through “diplomacy” or trade (Solarz, CR: February 4, 1992). However, not all comments on North Korea’s intentions reflected a negative perception of the state. Fascell guardedly suggested that North Korea appeared to seek peace on the Korean peninsula (House Hearing: February 6, 1992). Representative Richardson also observed some intent of more open relationships with the west by Kim Il Sung, albeit very slow movement (News Conference: February 5, 1992). Gore suggested that North Korean leaders may have sought to include capitalist structures in some areas of the country as a “free trade zone” showed some success (CR: May 7, 1992). Thus, while many policy makers perceived a deliberate effort by North Korea to obfuscate and manipulate international efforts in North Korea, other policy makers observed a possibility that North Korea sought improved relations with international actors. However, any such observation was guarded and reflected a continued distrust of North Korean intent.

The response alternatives suggested by U.S. policy makers for North Korea centered on promoting democracy, openness and peace. Several Congressional leaders perceived a success in the past employment of The Voice of America and sought the use of a Radio Free Asia to propagandize democracy and freedom. Some policy makers considered this action a means for providing information to closed societies and a better way to create connections with citizens of Communist countries than through direct approaches to leaders (Bently, CR: March 31, 1992; Campbell, CR: March 31, 1992; Hatch, CR: September 8, 1992). U.S. agencies were also counseled to find “other” means for developing relationships with the North Korean people that reduced Kim Il Sung’s “stranglehold” on them (Hatch, CR: September 8, 1992). However, most Congressional members who voiced their response alternatives preferred diplomatic efforts to draw North Korea into the international community. The first step in diplomatic efforts centered on the use of safeguard and IAEA inspectors to monitor North Korean nuclear activities (Cranston, CR: February 6, 1992), which included “snap” or “challenge” inspections that would allow inspectors to go where they pleased in North Korea (Solarz, CR: February 4, 1992; Leach, House Hearing: July 7, 1992). Some questions arose on whether IAEA inspections were stringent enough to uncover all nuclear weapons programs and material in North Korea (Cranston, House Hearing: March 31, 1992), but no alternatives developed except the threat to use force if North Korea was found to be less than fully cooperative. In addition, policy makers believed that the U.S. must take actions that sought to limit the North Korean arms trade (Cranston, CR: February 6, 1992). Broad statements on containment occurred, which likely suggested the desire for coercive and invasive actions similar to those employed in Iraq (Cranston, House Hearing: January 14, 1992). On the flip side, Congressmen Biden and Pell agreed that the use of “pre-emptive military action if necessary” was an acceptable policy option to limit North Korean arms distribution, especially in relation to nuclear weapons, if containment failed (Biden, CR: June 30, 1992; Pell, CR: May 6, 1992). Finally, Woolsey suggested that the U.S. should act multilaterally with other states, and called for a combined intelligence effort to determine the best possible actions against North Korea (Senate Hearing: February 24, 1992).

Policy makers also suggested a variety of domestic issues to address when dealing with North Korea—from calls to support the military with increased defense funding (or at least not to cut extensively) in order that the U.S. could fulfill its role as the world’s police force (Aspin, CR: January 6, 1992) to the development of an SDI program (James, CR: March 4, 1992; CR: Hamilton, January 22, 1992). Warren Christopher brought in Clinton’s perspective on foreign policy stating that there were three “pillars” to the administration’s position: 1. U.S. economic security, 2. military strength, and 3. the spread of democracy and free markets abroad. These three policy points were to further American security and promote freedom in countries like North Korea (Senate Hearing: January 13, 1993).

In viewing the results from 1992 to 1993 on the image perception of policy makers, a perceived state that threatened the U.S. was observed. Yet, at this time, the threat was limited. North Korea sought nuclear weapons, but it did not have them yet, and there was the possibility that North Korea might reverse its nuclear development if the right incentives and precautions occurred. In addition, the perceived willingness of North Korea to use WMD largely failed to appear. While policy makers perceived an Iraq quite willing to use WMD on other states and on “its own people,” the same perception was not prevalent in the minds of U.S. policy makers with North Korea. While Representative Solarz did delineate the danger of a North Korea with nuclear weapons, as it had used violence against the South in the past, and there were numerous remarks on the threat and danger a nuclear North Korea posed to the region, there were very few remarks on the likelihood of a North Korean use of nuclear weapons based on recent past history. Even when the intent of the North Korean leadership came under scrutiny, it was discussed in terms of a “dictatorship,” a “despotic” or “totalitarian” regime, and other terms used to describe a closed society and one that kept apart from the western world. There was little that reflected a perception that North Korea intended to dominate the region or expand its position as an enemy would (except for possibly a reunification of the peninsula). In addition, and very important to the perceived threat from North Korea, there were no comments on a necessary natural resource for security purposes held within North Korea that the North Korean leaders sought to control, thus controlling the military and economic power of the U.S.

When policy makers discussed Kim Il Sung himself, he was described as “paranoid” and “xenophobic,” and as promoting himself through cultural structures, but the animosity level was relatively low. In only one place in all the documents viewed was the word “evil” used in relation to North Korea, and that was towards the “evil” act of arms trade by North Korea and China. When the cultural level of the country was considered, North Korea was perceived as a state at a lower level of cultural development than the U.S. Yet, North Korea sought WMD, specifically nuclear weapons, which, when combined with its anti-western stance, was enough to put it in the rogue state image category. In addition, as an arms dealer, there was some degree of economic development; yet, as can be seen today, low level arms dealing that supported one’s own more technologically advanced weapons development was (and is) a sign of the times for developing countries. Thus, while North Korea fell into the rogue state image category, and policy makers did perceive it as such, the image of it was not as prototypically stringent as that of Iraq and Saddam Hussein. Thus, it was likely that policy preferences in a crisis situation would not be as limited to retributive acts as the prototype suggests but also include rehabilitative policies promoted by an “enlightened” parent seeking to coerce its child into proper behavior.

The crisis situation between North Korea and the U.S. (in conjunction with the international community) involved a long-drawn out “cat and mouse” relationship typical of a rogue state and a dominating power. Reacting against intrusive IAEA inspections and the continuation of Team Spirit war games between the U.S. and South Korea, North Korea threatened to further block inspections and withdraw from the NPT agreement. The U.S. stated that if North Korea found itself in trouble, it was their own fault due to their failure to allow complete access to IAEA inspectors. On April 7, 1993, the UN Security Council passed a censure against North Korea for blocking access to questioned sites. On May 11, 1993, the UN Security Council requested access to seven designated sites to which North Korea refused.

On June 7, 1993, the U.S. began direct talks with North Korea that continued for many months. During this time, North Korea suspended its decision to withdraw from the NPT (July 1993). Yet, contentions still arose. North Korea continued to block access to the seven designated sites and two new challenged sites possibly used for nuclear waste storage, while the U.S. and South Korea participated in Team Spirit games as a preparedness measure (November 1993). However, by January 1994, North Korea had announced that it would allow IAEA inspections at some sites. Yet, the progress of the inspectors failed to advance according to U.S. and international desires, and in February 1994, the Clinton administration announced that it would seek UN economic sanctions against North Korea, an act that some regional actors feared would provoke a military response by North Korea. On February 16, 1994, one week prior to the IAEA board meeting where members were likely to have produced a statement for the UN Security Council asking for UN intervention, North Korea announced that it would allow inspectors access to the seven disputed nuclear sites but not to the two possible nuclear waste sites.

Yet, North Korea hesitated to allow full access to IAEA inspectors and by March 1994, the Clinton administration began to signal that it may take military or economic action against the North Korean threat. In addition, South Korea called for the resumption of Team Spirit war games halted in an effort to promote rapprochement between North Korea and regional actors. The above actions apparently had no affect on the North Korean government in coercing them to adhere to U.S. demands as North Korean leaders announced that they planned to expunge IAEA inspectors on June 13, 1994. Shortly thereafter, former President Carter met with Clinton and traveled to North Korea on a “personal” trip to the country, an unofficial diplomat that sought to negotiate an end to the standoff. On June 23, 1994, Carter succeeded in arranging a compromise solution that was subsequently taken up by the UN and developed into the Framework Agreement. Finally, on October 21, 1994, the agreement was signed.[7]

From early on, President Clinton and his advisors publicly supported diplomatic efforts to gain entry of IAEA inspectors to North Korea, but they also asserted that diplomacy was not

unlimited. On a trip to South Korea where Clinton walked out onto the DMZ bridge, he spoke of the futility North Korea faced by producing a nuclear weapon as it could never be used without the assured destruction of North Korea. Facing this, North Korea should allow inspections. Hopefully, relayed Clinton, those military men watching him with binoculars as he strolled in the DMZ would then cross over into South Korea in peace. The earlier change in U.S. policy towards North Korea was the result of past North Korean actions that sought to adhere to international norms, and if the U.S. was to continue its course of diplomacy, North Korea would continue to “thaw” (Q&A: July 11, 1993). Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, however, mentioned that while administration efforts focused on diplomacy, “our patience is not unlimited” (CBS News: November 4, 1993). CIA Director James Woolsey, who hesitated to offer any policy preferences as that was not within his job description, did suggest that an opening in working with North Korea occurred through the North’s admitted desire to move to light water reactors. Yet, Woolsey qualified, negotiators continued to reiterate that negative results would likely develop if a different course was taken by the North Korea (House Hearing: July 28, 1993).

Even into November 1993 and beyond, executive branch members still promoted diplomacy as the means for solving the crisis situation. Christopher stated that diplomacy continued to be the administration’s top policy preference and that North Korea must adhere to the NPT, but he did not suggest any alternatives should North Korea fail to follow the Clinton administration’s demands (Speech at the University of Washington: November 17, 1993). In February 1994, Christopher continued his promotion of diplomacy, acknowledged that it may take time, and stated the importance of IAEA inspections throughout the ongoing negotiation efforts in order to insure that North Korea refrained from processing the questioned fuel rods (NPR: February 16, 1994). Yet, Christopher reiterated that diplomacy and negotiations provided the best means for obtaining entry into North Korea (ABC News: November 21, 1993). Successful negotiations would result in inspectors’ access to the seven original sites (ABC News: January 9, 1994). However, Clinton admonished North Korea and stated that if leaders failed to make efforts towards honoring the non-proliferations agreements, the international community would act against it (White House News Conference: November 23, 1993). At the same time, Clinton promoted a reconsideration of the demands made by the U.S. and South Korea if North Korea moved towards acceptance of IAEA inspections (White House News Conference: November 23, 1993). National Security Advisor Anthony Lake continued to hold out hope for negotiation efforts. He offered to reconsider issues related to North Korea’s inclusion into the international community if North Korea allowed inspectors into the disputed sites and resumed talks with the South. The key to successful negotiations with concessions, however, was continued efforts on North Korea’s part towards progress after the first agreements were made (CR: March 8, 1994—see Hamilton). Secretary of Defense Perry, looking back from November 1994, suggested that there had been three possible actions to take: 1. Do nothing—the U.S. didn’t choose this option, as simply ignoring the situation would allow North Korea to grow in strength, 2. take pre-emptive strikes against the reactors—but this could possibly lead to a full-blown war,[8] and 3. promote diplomatic efforts—first preventive diplomacy to move North Korea into compliance with IAEA inspections and, if that failed, coercive diplomacy backed by the threat of military force (Defense Department Briefing: November 10, 1994) .[9]

At first, Congressional members limited their comments urging the U.S. to take forceful measures against North Korea. Senator Lugar laid out that while the U.S. could not allow North Korea to advance a nuclear program, peace must prevail on the peninsula. Fear of “confrontation” could not restrict U.S. actions, yet actions must not create a “catastrophic” result for other regional actors. When pressed by MacNeil of the PBS news program on whether the U.S. should take forceful action, Lugar felt compelled not to suggest such actions and to allow the President and negotiators to set the time table, but also suggests that the President reiterate that the U.S. would stand firm in its desire to achieve the relayed goals (The MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour: January 27, 1994). As Representative Hamilton suggested, isolating North Korea would only create problems for the future. The goal must include bringing North Korea into the international community (CR: July 22, 1993). Yet, policy makers also reiterated that if North Korean failed to make forward steps of its own accord, the U.S. response should promote “increasing isolation, pressure, and pain” (Mitchell, CR: November 7, 1993).

As the crisis progressed, the vast majority of Congressional members responded to the crisis with extended remarks that voicing frustration with North Korea and the apparent failure of Clinton’s policies. Most of these remarks came from Republican members and questioned exactly how diplomatic efforts were to proceed. There were vague calls for “strong action” (Bond, CR: November 22, 1993) and the “unacceptability” of North Korea possibly hiding nuclear weapons and keeping inspectors out (Nunn, Senate Hearing: February 23, 1994). Senator Frank Murkowski questioned whether the U.S. should negotiate directly with North Korea at all, a state that had only recently come out of its isolation and yet desired equal status by directly talking with the U.S., and who used the threat of nuclear capability to direct and influence negotiations to boot (News Conference: December 9, 1993). In response to diplomatic efforts by Carter, some Republicans voiced agitated responses. D’Amato questioned the authority of such an act and called it unconstitutional and a threat to the foreign policy making process of the U.S. (CR: June 24, 1994). In addition, Senator John McCain brought up the metaphor of the carrot and the stick and called on negotiators to take a hard stance against the North in upcoming talks in Vienna. McCain suggested that negotiators continue to demand further concessions from North Korea and not just limit the success to agreements made by Carter (CR: June 7, 1994). In those observed, Republican members tended to disagree on the policy preferences put forth by the Democrat administration.

Diplomatic efforts also included bilateral and multilateral efforts with other regional actors. Clinton reaffirmed a U.S. presence in South Korea and sought an end to nuclear testing internationally (News Conference in Japan shown on the MacNeil/Lehrer News Hours: February 24, 1993). Representative Ira McCollum called on Japan to revisit its constitution, changing it to allow offensive forces in regional conflicts in order to fight for its own security (CR: June 14, 1994). Furthermore, some policy makers believed that any actions taken by the U.S. should include other regional actors, including China, Japan and Russia (Nunn, The MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour: January 27, 1994; McCain, CR: February 22, 1994; McInnis, CR: March 22, 1994). Yet, U.S. policy makers considered the U.S. to be the superpower of the world any multi-lateral action should have U.S. leadership (Hamilton, CR: July 22, 1993). In addition, U.S. efforts were to include the support of China and Russia for economic sanctions if they became necessary (Mitchell, CR: November 7, 1993; McInnis, CR: March 22, 1994). Indeed, Perry implied in retrospect that the Chinese were instrumental in persuading North Korea to eventually consent to U.S. offers (Defense Department Briefing: November 10, 1994).

Other rehabilitative measures included possible economic benefits to North Korea if it moved towards accepting U.S. goals of IAEA inspections and a halt to the North’s nuclear program. CIA Director Woolsey suggested that any threat of sanctions should also include the offer of benefits (House Hearing: July 28, 1993). National Security Advisor Anthony Lake stated that if North Korea allowed inspection and resumed talks with the South on nuclear matters, the U.S. should respond with diplomatic and economic benefits (Speech inserted into the Congressional Record: March 8, 1994—see Hamilton). While Senator Dole believed that the Framework Agreement went too far in helping the North, he did support negotiation on economic benefits as long as any movement by the U.S. was precipitated by North Korean actions first (CR: September 12, 1994). Yet, Representative Bereuter saw this as giving in to blackmail, a pay off to an insurgent in order to make the problem “go away.” He suggested that no real solution appeared; the Clinton administration simply acted as a “sucker” to North Korean scamming (CR: August 24, 1994).

Some policy makers considered the need to take military action in North Korea or, at least, an increased U.S. deterrent and defensive capability in the region. President Clinton, in response to a question on what would happen if North Korea attacked the South, reiterated his position that the U.S. and South Korea would win, and that the North would likely end up as non-existent (White House News Briefing: November 23, 1993). Christopher stated that no option was removed from the consideration of the administration, but, due to North Korea’s isolation from the economic benefits of the international community and its large standing army, negotiations to bring it into the international realm offered the best solutions. A pre-emptive strike against nuclear reactors, such as that undertaken by Israel against Iraq in 1981, would have had limited effect in North Korea due to a variety of reasons (ABC News: November 21, 1993). Nunn agreed with this assessment and suggested that an “imminent” threat of military action against North Korea should not occur as it could result in South Korean losses (ABC News: November 21, 1993). Several policy makers stood behind offering benefits in response to positive actions by North Korea while threatening negative responses if the North failed to comply (Mitchell, CR: November 7, 1993). On the other hand, policy makers also believed that every effort should be taken to reinforce the military presence in South Korea and the continued unity between the U.S. and South Korea in order to deter North Korean military advances and coerce the leaders into adhering to international and U.S. requests (Lugar, The MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour: January 27, 1994). For some Congressional members, the use of military force stood as the basic tool necessary for North Korean compliance to laid out terms (Gilman, CR: November 15, 1993). In other words, some policy makers believed that the U.S. should take “whatever steps necessary” to insure compliance (Lazio, CR: March 26, 1993; Gingrich, CNN: November 27, 1993). Others only implied the use of force but neglected to delineate what form it should take (Hamilton, CR: March 16, 1994). Even those who, at the beginning, supported a stick and carrot policy preference though threatened North Korea with the use of military force while offering economic benefits (McCain, CR: March 3, 1993) got fed up with the waffling of the Clinton administration and admonished it to take a firmer stance (McCain, CR: January 25, 1994; McInnis, CR: March 22, 1994; McCain, CR: June 7, 1994; McCollum, CR: June 14, 1994). One policy maker even suggested that it may be necessary for U.S. citizens to countenance the use of nuclear weapons in response to North Korean actions (McCollum, CR: June 14, 1994).

Policy makers also considered several less threatening actions the administration could take in response to North Korean inaction. Several Congressional members called for the deployment of Patriot missiles to South Korea in case of an attack and to increase the U.S.’s ability to negotiate with force. Policy makers believed that by showing North Korea the futility in responding militarily to retributive actions by the U.S. as North Korea would fail to seriously harm South Korean and U.S. forces, North Korea would acquiesce to U.S. demands (D’Amato, CR: January 25, 1994; McCain, CR: January 25, 1994; Dole, CR: February 22, 1994). Other Policy makers submitted that Team Spirit games should proceed as they increased the preparedness of the forces in the region and promoted a position of strength (Dole, CR: February 22, 1994; McCain, CR: February 22, 1994).

Economic sanctions also fall within the realm of retributive actions against a rogue state and often go hand in hand with the threat to use force. Several policy makers suggested the threat to enact economic sanctions and/or a blockade to enforce sanctions if diplomacy failed (Woolsey, House Hearing: July 28, 1993; Gilman, CR: November 15, 1993; Christopher, State Department Briefing: November 17, 1993; Cohen, Republican Response to President Clinton’s Saturday Radio Address: January 22, 1994; Nunn, MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour: January 27, 1994). However, President Clinton stated that he and South Korean leader Kim determined that economic sanctions were not an “attractive” position and would seek diplomatic means of compliance (White House News Conference: November 23, 1993). Furthermore, a joint effort by the U.S., China, Japan, South Korea and Russia was imperative in order to gain the most benefit from economic sanctions (Bond, CR: November 22, 1993). After the beginning of 1994, Republican Congressional members voiced frustration with the lack of advancement and more strongly insisted on economic sanctions and a regionally supported blockade (McCain, CR: February 22, 1994; McCollum, CR: June 14, 1994).

Interestingly, in the documents viewed there was no direct call for the elimination of Kim Il Sung’s rule or a change in government. Very little of the discussion focused on the leader himself, with comments directed mostly towards North Korea as a state. Voiced concerns revolved around the threat posed by the large conventional army close to the DMZ, the threat that nuclear weapons would have on regional nuclear development, and the possibility that North Korea would sell nuclear weapons or technology to other states or terrorists. The consideration that North Korea may use nuclear weapons on the South or on U.S. forces was usually waived aside as North Korean leaders were believed to understand that any such action meant their demise.

The fascinating aspect of policy preferences towards North Korea was policy makers’ support for a less than prototypical rogue state view of the country. While the desire to coerce North Korea into following international and U.S. demands fell within the rogue state category, the hesitancy to use force and the desire to act with real diplomacy suggests a perceived high cost for aggressive actions when weighed against the possible benefits. The possible high cost of life for both the South and the U.S. made military action and rigid stance undesirable, while the economic damage to South Korea could affect the world’s economy. Furthermore, while the threat of a nuclear North Korea would change the make up of nuclear capable states in the region, and concerned policy makers voiced the possibility of the trade in nuclear material and technology, the perceived threat was not as high as that of a nuclear Iraq which could then control the power of oil. Thus, it behooved the Clinton administration to have patience and continue its efforts on the diplomatic front for an extended period of time. In addition, if a “carrot and stick” opportunity is put forth, it wouldn’t help to spank the child at the same time one hands it a cookie. That would only teach the child that rewards hurt. Considerable patience is necessary for a paradigm shift in handling wayward states, showing that their efforts toward interaction with the international community hold benefits unattainable without such interaction. Thus, as suggested by the image development in the prior section, North Korea did fall into the rogue state category, but was not perceived as prototypically rogue as Iraq.

The data on North Korea for the period leading up to the missile crisis, beginning in August 1998, uncovered a perceived rogue state image, but one where the leaders desired entry into the international community and appear to act towards that goal. The capability of North Korea centered on its conventional capability, possible nuclear material, missile development and arms trade. North Korea employed “the world’s fourth largest army,” amassed along the DMZ (Inouye, CR: April 11, 1997; Goss, CR: September 3, 1997; Thurmond, CR: March 3, 1998[10]). Representative Thomas suggested that this army was the largest in the world relative to the size of North Korea, although it lacked current technological advancement (Thomas, House Hearing: June 8, 1997). As for North Korea’s nuclear capability, at a minimum, policy makers perceived North Korea as possessing “some rough crude nuclear capability” (Baucus, CR: June 5, 1997). North Korea had hidden its nuclear development program in the past and appeared to possess enough material for at least one or two bombs (CR: March 4, 1998). Yet, Clinton suggested that through U.S. and Chinese efforts North Korea’s nuclear program was frozen (October 24, 1997).

In addition, North Korea also possessed chemical and biological weapons capability (Helms, CR: April 24, 1997; Gregg, CR: March 31, 1998; Thurmond, CR: March 3, 1998;

Skelton, CR: April 30, 1998), which could allow North Korea to compel a military withdrawal of U.S. forces (Helms, CR: April 24, 1997). Policy makers also voiced a concern about North Korea’s potential to strike distant targets through its missile development program. North Korea could already target Japan and other regional actors (Thomas, House Hearing: June 8, 1997; Hunter, CR: June 18, 1997; Thurmond, CR: March 3, 1998) and may have procured the ability to strike with chemical laden weapons (Helms, CR: April 24, 1997; Cochran, Senate Hearing: October 21, 1997). Policy makers perceived that North Korea could produce long range nuclear weapons “sooner than we expect” (Spence, CR: February 12, 1998) or as early as 2000 (Gibbons, CR: July 29, 1998). Indeed, to Senator Inhofe, North Korea sat with China and Russia as a threat to the U.S. through an accidental or renegade launch (CR: June 19, 1997).

Furthermore, North Korea traded its missile technology and “exports terrorism,” which supported a perceived threat of terrorists obtaining nuclear, chemical or biological weapons capability through trade with North Korea (Bereuter, CR: February 26, 1997). The ability of “rogue states” to obtain WMD and missile technology developed as a major concern for policy makers (Inouye, CR: April 11, 1997; Goss, CR: September 3, 1997; Thurmond, CR: March 3, 1998; Murkowski, CR: June 25, 1998; Cochran, Senate Hearing: October 21, 1997). U.S. policy makers perceived a North Korean membership to the list of those who partake in state sponsored terrorism (Skelton, CR: April 30, 1998). Furthermore, North Korea acted with impunity and was involved in limited acts against South Korea (Gingrich, CR: April 10, 1997), despite international efforts to bring North Korea into the world community. As North Korean leaders sometimes acted against the South, more advanced technology in North Korean hands could escalate their opportunistic advances. On the other hand, Senator Baucus relayed that the North Koreans had held up their side of the Agreed Framework (CR: June 5, 1997), possibly implying that he perceived some ability in the North Korean leadership to adhere to international accords.

During this period, policy makers perceived that North Korea’s domestic capability was deteriorating rapidly due to North Korea’s leadership and observed through their need for food aid. Representative Bereuter considered the internal breakdown a security threat to the region as “North Korea’s unstable domestic situation—the threat of starvation, implosion, or external belligerence” could provide the opportunity for even more radical groups within North Korea to take power or a last gasp act by those currently in office (CR: February 26, 1997). Policy makers perceived an unstable situation of which they had no understanding could not predict the outcome (Dingell, CR: April 10, 1997). The “infrastructure is crumbling; power shortages are routine, propaganda is rampant. . .The North Korean regime is dying” and the U.S. policy makers perceived that they must protect the security of the region or allies would be threatened (Goss, CR: September 3, 1997). At the same time, the leadership was “unpredictable” (Thomas, House Hearing: June 8, 1997), and, although the U.S. had studied North Korea for forty years, the U.S. still did “not know very much about this dictatorship” (Gingrich, CR: April 10, 1997).

Policy makers perceived the failure of the North Korean state as the leadership’s inability to advance good domestic policy while the North Koreans, as per U.S. policy makers, considered the famine and dire situation to be a product of external and environmental factors (Goss, CR: September 3, 1997). When North Korea sought to accept nuclear waste from Taiwan, U.S. policy makers cringed, claiming that North Korea had “no ability to manage its nuclear waste. . .so God knows what they are going to do with it. Perhaps they might contaminate our [South Korea’s] groundwater system” (Representative Kim, CR: April 10, 1997). Some policy makers still perceived a North Korean reliance on China for domestic policy formation but considered that such close relations may no longer exist (Baucus, CR: June 5, 1997).

North Korea’s economy, as understood by policy makers, appeared almost non-existent. Congressional members visiting North Korea described a country where the agricultural regions seemed in need of development and basic technology, and which appeared deserted, city streets that were empty and unwelcoming, and a people that failed to exhibit any energy (Baucus, CR: June 5, 1997; Baucus, CR: October 22, 1997). A vast number of the North Korean people faced starvation (Biden, CR: July 31, 1997; Hall, CR: March 30, 1998), and by 1998, estimates showed that possibly as many as one million people had already died (Hall, CR: March 30, 1998). The agricultural technology in place lacked high yield capability (Stevens, News Conference: April 11, 1997). The imminent demise of the North Korean economy and government presented a security dilemma for the South which the U.S. must address (Berger, CR: April 22, 1997; Leahy, CR: September 19, 1997; Cohen, Defense Department Briefing: July 9, 1998). However, the situation could have been worse had North Korea’s nuclear program not been frozen since 1994 (Clinton, CNNFN: October 24, 1997). On the other hand, North Korea’s economic capability relied to some extent on missile and arms trade in the past (Murkowski, CR: June 25, 1998), and the economic instability observed by policy makers could have produced an increased need to trade in missile and WMD technology and material, resulting in an increased threat to U.S. interests (Levine, Senate Hearing: October 21, 1997).

The cultural level of North Korea as perceived by policy makers placed it lower than that of the U.S., who often portrayed a society living in a period of ancient standards. Due to the famine, people lived in sub-standard conditions without electricity and the ability to travel and with a dying agriculture and a government that failed to address the needs of the people (Hall, CR: April 9, 1997; Goss, CR: September 3, 1997; Baucus, CR: October 22, 1997). Congressional members visiting North Korea relayed the horrible conditions, especially those of children who were mal-nutritioned and near death (Hall, CR: April 9, 1997; Biden, CR: July 31, 1997). Many people collected grass and bark to eat (Hall, CR: April 9, 1997). Yet, though North Korean people were dying, the military appeared to have plenty to eat (Thomas, House Hearing: June 8, 1997). After returning from North Korea, Representative Goss imparted his experience as having “felt after our 48 hours there that I had really been away from Earth for 48 hours” (CR: August 12, 1997). No life or happiness appeared in the faces of the North Korean people, while road blocks and road checks limited travel (Goss, CR: August 12, 1997). Representative Gibbons observed on his evening walk through the city that “we would often see street after street of people walking in the dark. Their only entertainment was to get outside of their homes or whatever apartments that they had and stroll down a dark street” (CR: August 12, 1997). Representative Jan Harman perceived the people as zombies: “What I came away from that job feeling was that no eye contact; no ability to relate to anyone around us. They were looking down, they were walking quickly. Even the kids didn’t connect. And it was as though they were in a trance” (CR: August 12, 1997). These policy makers perceived that the life led by North Koreans was so bad that they lived like zombies, not enjoying any aspect of their world.

Additional comments reflected the perceived development level of government itself. North Korea existed behind a “veil of secrecy” (Goss, CR: September 3, 1997), was run by an “elite band of leaders” (Goss, CR: September 3, 1997), existed in “another era,” and was “not the friend of Western democracy” (Goss, CR: October 7, 1997). Furthermore, Representative Pitts relayed the experiences of two defectors and their ordeal in a North Korean prison. Their torture was extreme and lengthy, and one victim had been only a child at the time, collected by the North Korean authorities based on the law that not only were anti-government perpetrators taken, but their family for three generations as well, including children (CR: May 6, 1998). The level of North Korean agriculture technology failed to produce the high yield found in “developed countries,” and Koreans appeared to lack computers, modern machinery, fertilizer, etc. The North Koreans couldn’t even figure out how to remove a large crane from atop a building once the job was completed. Furthermore, children resided in a community home from age 9 months to six years with little family contact (CR: Stevens, April 11, 1997). U.S. policy makers perceived a government that controlled every aspect of people’s lives, yet couldn’t figure out the simplest solutions for economic advancement.

On the other hand, some policy makers also perceived a country that held values that could be looked up to. North Korea, a “proud” country that attempted to actualize the philosophy of juche, or self-reliance, still acted to find food for its people (Senators, News Conference: April 11, 1997; Baucus, CR: June 5, 1997). Also, the “veil” was lifting and North Korea appeared to desire more open relationships (Goss, CR: September 3, 1997). Senate members visiting in April 1997, described civilian officials willing to talk and find solutions to the barriers keeping North Korea from accessing needed aid and trade (Stevens, CR: April 11, 1997). These Senators also observed beautifully dressed participants preparing for the birthday celebration of Kim Jong Il (News Conference: April 11, 1997). Others described their experience at events in North Korea as based on “fine hospitality” (Goss, CR: September 3, 1997). Thus, many policy makers also perceived hope and beauty in North Korea.

The perceived intentions of the North Korean leadership relayed a divided perception of what motivates and what goals were held by officials. North Koreans had acted “clandestinely” in the past (Hamilton, CR: June 18, 1998) while North Korean officials continued to hold suspicious views of the U.S. and demanded benefits without offering anything in return (Goss, CR: September 3, 1997). North Korea persisted as a threat to South Korea and the region, and U.S. policy makers lacked the information needed to really know what the North Korean leadership really wanted (Gingrich, CR: April 10, 1997). Ultimately, based on past history, U.S. policy makers perceived that North Korea does in public what is necessary to gain economic benefits, while at the same time, acting privately to continue its efforts towards self-reliance economically and militarily (Murkowski, CR: June 25, 1998). Due to the end of the Cold War and the elimination of constraints imposed on smaller states by superpower conflicts, rogue states perceived an opportunity to emerge as important regional actors (Spence, CR: February 12, 1998). Representative Traficant, a Democrat, seemed to imply that the North Koreans perceived a weakness in the Clinton administration’s efforts, stating, “North Korea would never say in-your-face threats to Ronald Reagan” (CR: June 17, 1998).

On the other hand, National Security Advisor Samuel Berger believed that North Korea sought to enter the international community and, although “reluctant” in the past, he hoped that the Koreans would fully participate in current talks that advanced this desire (National Public Radio: April 22, 1997). North Korea continued to move with progressive efforts towards lessening tensions in the region and sought direct interaction with the U.S. (Thomas, House Hearing: June 8, 1997). Representative Hamilton viewed the current situation as promising as North Korea’s nuclear program had been frozen by past negotiations and future agreements could eliminate completely the security threat on the Korean peninsula (CR: June 18, 1998). Other Congressional Members believed that, at a minimum, civilian officials sought a genuine opportunity to overcome the restrictions placed on North Korea’s ability to access needed economic enhancement (Stevens, CR: April 7, 1997).

The names and phrases used to describe North Korea depicted both the perceived cultural level and the possible intent of the leadership. North Korea was the “Hermit Kingdom” (Bereuter, CR: February 26, 1997), “secretive” (Bereuter, CR: February 26, 1997), “isolated” (Bereuter, CR: February 26, 1997), and “desperate” (Foley, CR: April 10, 1997), an “outlaw” (Berger, National Public Radio: April 22, 1997), and a “renegade” (Gregg, CR: March 31, 1998), and an “enigma” (Thomas, House Hearing: June 8, 1997), a “third world” eccentric country (Thomas, House Hearing: June 8, 1997), the “last Stalinist regime” (Royce, CR: April 10, 1997) that was “reclusive and anachronistic” (CR: Goss, September 3, 1997), and of course, a “rogue” (Helms, CR: April 24, 1997; Spence, CR: February 12, 1998; Thomas, CR: June 14, 1998). The state “remains perhaps the most volatile, belligerent, and dangerously unstable nation in Asia, and perhaps the world” (Bereuter, CR: February 26, 1997). North Korea was “an accident. . .happening today” (Goss, CR: October 7, 1997). Yet, National Security Advisor Samuel Berger did not list North Korea with the rogue states, instead, calling it “isolated” (Berger, National Public Radio: April 22, 1997).

Congressional Members tended to perceive Kim Jong Il himself in a less than equal way. Commenting on his attempt to obtain a meeting with Kim, Senator Baucus related how, believing Kim to be a movie buff, Baucus sent Kim a movie on Wyatt Earp. They all had a good laugh about it, but the act failed to bring the desired results (CR: June 5, 1997). Kim was perceived as “erratic and irrational” (Bereuter, CR: February 26, 1997) and a leader lacking complete control over the country (Bereuter, CR: February 26, 1997). Yet, while not directly saying so himself, President Clinton agreed with “President Kim’s [South Korea] assessment of the leadership in North Korea” after Kim stated that “it’s very difficult to say you can trust a communist,” but that the regime appeared stable and must be nurtured into moving towards cooperating with regional and international actors (White House Briefing, June 9, 1998).

Finally, in viewing the response alternatives offered by policy makers, a variety of possible actions developed. While most policy makers considered necessary humanitarian aid to North Korea for the famine problem (Hall, CR: April 9, 1997; Stevens, CR: April 11, 1997; Biden, CR: July 31, 1997), additional economic benefits would first have to be met with North Korean efforts towards eliminating security threats in the region and promoting the four-party talks as a good starting point (Baucus, CR: June 5, 1997). Policy makers also sought to consult with regional actors so U.S. policies did not conflict with other states’ goals, another advantage to the four-party talks (Baucus, CR: October 22, 1997; Clinton, White House News Briefing, October 24, 1997). Furthermore, aid provided to North Korea should come with strict inspection and insurance measures that insured the aid reached needy populations (Goss, CR: September 3, 1997). In addition, the some policy makers observed limited adherence by the U.S. to the Framework Agreement and reiterated that the U.S. must take action to abide by the agreement and provide North Korea with heavy fuel oil (Clinton, White House News Briefing, June 9, 1998).[11] More generally, policy makers felt that U.S. policy in Asia must include the spread of American ideals reflecting “the rule of law, a democracy, free and fair elections, and human rights, as well as . . .economic freedom” (Bereuter, CR: April 10, 1997). Other policy alternatives promoted included more money for the military (Gingrich, CR: April 10, 1997), and, of course, advancement on a strategic defense initiative (Gingrich, CR: April 10, 1997; Spence,

CR: March 30, 1998; Murkowski, CR: June 25, 1998). Some policy makers sought to reduce Agreed Framework assistance due to North Korean incursions against the South and not to allow the administration to eliminate any sanctions against the North (Murkowski, CR: June 25, 1998). Indeed, the Agreed Framework effectively made some of these sanctions unenforceable (Murkowski, CR: June 25, 1998). Others would have liked to have opened trade to North Korea to provide an opportunity to American growers, especially the wheat farmers (Moran, CR: May 19, 1998). Continued support for South Korea, especially in the form of a U.S. military presence was a must (Clinton, White House Briefing: June 9, 1998).

Thus, the image collection data suggests the perception of a rogue state, but one that may not last and, to some, a state that sought international interaction. The military capability provided insight into a perceived high cost if military interaction occurred. The desire and possible possession of nuclear material placed North Korea squarely in the rogue state category. The large conventional army located in the DMZ suggested high costs. In addition, the perception that North Korea may provide rogue states or terrorists with WMD or missile technology supported the rogue state requirements. The economic and domestic capabilities perceived by policy makers suggest a dying regime. Policy makers questioned the hold on power by Kim Jong Il and the ability of the regime to survive economically. This lessened the strictness of the perception of the country as a rogue as the leader of a rogue state typically controls the state with an iron fist. The cultural level perceived by policy makers supported a state less developed; indeed, North Korea was not even in this century, or even on this earth, based on some policy makers’ remarks. In addition, comments on the state itself portrayed a wayward state, isolated from the world community. Here again, there was some relaxing of the rogue state image. While many remarks did place North Korea in the rogue state category, some implied that it was simply backward or isolated and had just not yet grown up enough. The perception by some policy makers was that North Korea, while untrustworthy, should be rewarded for positive behavior. In addition, while North Korea was a threat to regional actors, the level of animosity was not as high as that towards Iraq. Therefore, based on the perceived image of a rogue state that was somewhat less than the prototype, policy preferences in a crisis situation would likely include the flexibility of rehabilitative measures with the threat to use further force if desired goals were not met.

From 1994 to 1998, the United States and North Korea each sought to support its side of the Agreed Framework. At the same time, internal events within both states caused lapses in judgment, desires to assert national pride and strength, and acts not within the “spirit” of the agreement. Officials within the U.S. and North Korean governments pointed at each other and claimed the other was the problem. By mid-1998, very little progress on the two light water reactors had occurred and heavy oil fuel shipments to North Korea did not fulfill promised amounts. Nevertheless, the framework held, while the policy of diplomacy and dialogue continued.

In a surprise move, on August 31, 1998, North Korea tested its Taepo Dong II Missile over Japan, with parts landing in the ocean in a trajectory close to Alaska. While North Korea claimed they were only placing a satellite in space, the U.S. and other regional actors saw this as a threat by North Korea and an act counter to the spirit of the agreement (although missile technology was not covered in the agreement itself). Japan threatened to withdraw funding for KEDO, the organization set up to facilitate the heavy oil procurement and the development of the 2 light water reactors promised in the agreement. In addition, U.S. officials sought assurances that an underground facility in North Korea was not a secret nuclear weapons development site. The Clinton administration sought and maintained diplomatic talks with North Korea, reaching an agreement on September 12, 1999 for North Korea to abstain from further testing and to allow inspections of the underground facility in exchange for a reduction of the sanctions against food and medicine imports.

Throughout the talks, North Korea, the U.S., and regional actors experienced tense moments. In June 1999, North Korea and South Korea exchanged fire in the sea off the coast of the peninsula. Information hinting at continued missile testing by the North reached policy makers in the summer of 1999. In an apparent response, the U.S. and South Korea resumed Team Spirit war games in August 1999, ratcheting up North Korea’s rhetoric on the threat posed by U.S. and South Korean forces to North Korea’s security. Despite the agreement in September 1999, the Clinton administration waited almost a year before actualizing the sanction reductions to see if North Korea would comply with U.S. demands. In June 2000, South Korean President Kim successfully promoted his “Sunshine Agreement” –for which he later received a Nobel Peace Prize—that sought closer ties with North Korea through relationship building efforts. President Clinton supported this policy, and removed the sanctions against North Korea June 19, 2000. In October 2000, Secretary of State Madeline Albright visited North Korea to shore up the relationship and announced that both sides would seek to formally end hostilities with a peace agreement.

Policy preferences considered by policy makers during the crisis centered on diplomatic efforts and changes in domestic policy. Mostly Democrats, based on those viewed, tended to support rehabilitative measures that sought to promote the positive aspects of dialogue and relationship building. Within the administration, Madeline Albright considered diplomatic measures that supported the agreed framework, brought North Korea into four-party talks with the U.S., South Korea and China, and addressed the humanitarian needs of the North, productive means for insuring U.S. security (Media Opportunity: September 11, 1998). National Security Advisor Sandy Berger asserted the necessity to deal with the security threat posed by North Korea and set out three paths: 1. continued efforts towards holding the four-party talks, 2. access to the disputed underground sites, and 3. continued talks on North Korea’s missile technology (White House Briefing: November 21, 1998). Defense Secretary Cohen believed another important aspect of diplomacy included cooperation with regional actors, especially Japan (Defense Department Briefing: September 14, 1998), and that Japan was the “cornerstone” in regional security (Defense Department Briefing: November 23, 1998). Furthermore, South Korea stood as part of the deterrent capability in the region and the support behind diplomatic efforts (Defense Department Briefing: November 23, 1998). Cohen stated in a January 1999 briefing that policies towards North Korea centered on “deterrence…defense…dialogue…[and] determination” to “contain” WMD (Defense Department Briefing: January 14, 1999).

Some (Democrat) members of Congress supported the administration’s policies towards North Korea. Representative Hall believed that the Korean officials were “committed” to the four-party talks and continued diplomatic efforts (News Conference: November 17, 1998), and he suggested the U.S. go a step further and follow through with the Perry Commission[12] recommendation for placing a diplomatic representative in Pyongyang to create a more stable atmosphere (CR: September 21, 1999). Hall also believed that the administration could find new opportunities for building relationships with the Korean people (CR: June 15, 2000).

Senator Akaka saw the diplomatic efforts of the administration as supportive of U.S. security interests by limiting the development of missile technology, not as a bribe to North Korean demands as perceived by other policy makers (CR: October 1, 1999). Senator Biden considered diplomacy necessary to further the three points for regional security: the preservation of “peace and stability,” continued efforts towards non-proliferation, and the promotion of “international norms in the areas of human rights and the environment” (CR: June 22, 2000). Biden reflected that diplomacy had brought successful relationship building between the U.S. and North Korea with successful talks and the imminent trip of Secretary Albright to North Korea. By creating relationships and dialogue with the North, new information about the world would provide opportunities for change, just as it did in the former Soviet Union (CR: October 19, 2000). Furthermore, the Clinton administration had proven diplomacy can be successful in reducing tensions in the region (Robert Kerrey, CR: February 24, 2000). Senator Bingaman perceived the opportunities for successful diplomatic efforts “brighter than ever before” as represented by Secretary Albright’s visit (October 25, 2000).

The Clinton administration’s approach to resolving the crisis through diplomacy prompted calls of foreign policy mismanagement. Clinton’s accusers perceived the administration’s strategy towards North Korea as incoherent and lacking a comprehensive view (Bereuter, CR: June 22, 1999). Representative Gilman saw a need for stronger efforts: “Only hard-nosed, well-considered diplomacy and US military superiority will ensure continued peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula” (House Hearing: September 24, 1998). North Korean officials’ signatures on agreements were worthless, and other means for addressing the North Korean problem must be found as “present methods seem . . .highly questionable” (Thomas, CR: September 10, 1998). Representative Pitts would have liked to have seen more discussion on human rights issues and reminded fellow members of the horrendous prisons in North Korea (CR: May 18, 1999). Once success appeared in hand for the Clinton administration and a possible visit by the President to North Korea was voiced, Senator Murkowski relayed his concern that such a visit may undermine North-South relationship building, was only a “legacy” building effort by the President due to failed policies in the Middle East, and would give too much legitimacy to a lying, deceitful, double-talking regime (CR: October 27, 2000).

Diplomatic efforts often called for the acquiescence of North Korea to inspections that could insure adherence to U.S. demands. Secretary of State Albright hailed an agreement to talks, but asserted that all North Korean claims must be verifiable (Media Opportunity: September 11, 1998). National Security Advisor Berger explained the necessity for U.S. inspections of the underground site (White House News Briefing: November 21, 1998) and was supported by Defense Secretary Cohen (National Public Radio: January 14, 1999). In addition, humanitarian and economic aid required adequate monitoring to insure it was not diverted to the military (Gilman, CR: May 19, 1999).

Other rehabilitative policy preferences included the lessening of sanctions against North Korea in exchange for efforts towards adherence to U.S. objectives. If the U.S. removed some sanctions put in place by the Trading With The Enemy Act, the Defense Production Act, and the Department of Commerce’s Export Administration regulations, offered further reductions once goals were met, and promoted the subsequent normalization of relations, North Korea would have the incentive to stop all missile testing and end (not just freeze) its nuclear program (Senator Akaka, CR: October 1, 1999). Berger implied that the “carrot” of easing sanctions could induce North Korean compliance for halting missile testing and “unequivocally” end its nuclear program (White House News Briefing: November 21, 1998). Representative Hall believed that lifting sanctions could help the regular people in North Korea who were suffering and dying (November 17, 1998). Furthermore, Clinton acknowledged North Korea’s adherence to the agreement of not partaking in missile testing while talks continued and offered the carrot of future sanction reductions (Messages from the President: November 10, 1999). Senator Dorgan believed any sanctions limiting the import of food or medicine into needful countries, including North Korea, immoral and desired all such sanctions to be removed (CR: June 12, 2000). The one, lone Republican observed that called for the elimination of sanctions on food and medicine on all states under sanctions, Representative George Nethercutt, based his view on the benefits possible for American farmers if these markets were opened up (CR: May 5, 1999).[13]

Some Congressional Members perceived positive steps by North Korea in response to Clinton lifting sanctions (Biden, CR: June 22, 2000). The lifting of sanctions created an “opportunity” in the region that could lead to “lasting peace” (Hall, CR: September 21, 1999; June 15, 2000). Other members of Congress, mostly Republican, perceived the reduction of sanctions improper policy or not reasonable until the U.S. was sure North Korea sought positive actions towards compliance. Only once “convincing evidence” was obtained showing North Korean adherence to the Agreed Framework should sanctions be lifted or economic aid offered (Knollenberg, CR: June 9 1999). To some, the North had simply been successful in “wearing down” the negotiators who gave in to North Korean demands (Gilman, CR: July 19, 2000).

Policy makers also tended to follow party lines voicing their opinions on whether or not economic assistance should develop as a negotiating carrot. As some Republicans observed,

North Korea already stood at the top of the list of those who received U.S. aid in Asia, and any further increases lacked warrant (Gilman, CR: September 24, 1998). North Korean requests for economic benefits in exchange for “concessions” were really only blackmail (Murkowski, CR: October 27, 2000). Others that perceived the needs of the Korean people suggested greater means of insurance that the aid reached needy populations (Hall, CR: November 3, 1999).

Interestingly, domestic policy preferences offered the most comprehensive and radical change in foreign policy direction. Due in large part to the missile testing of North Korea, as well as events in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, China and Russia, Congressional Members took considerable time to debate and pass the National Missile Defense Bill. Developed from Ronald Reagan’s SDI and George Bush’s Brilliant Pebbles programs, the National Missile Defense Bill called for the development of a missile defense system and its earliest possible deployment to protect the United States from rogue or accidental ICBM missile launches. Funding for an NMD system was not non-existent in 1998, just not funded to the satisfaction of some Congressional members, and deployment was based on determining a threat and then deploying on a three year system. At first, the discussion and vote ran mostly along party lines, falling short in the Senate by one vote in September, 1998. However, by March 17, 1999, the bill garnered bi-partisan support and passed 97 to 3. The House passed a slightly different version of the bill, but voted to support the Senate bill on May 21, 1999 by a 345 to 71 vote. The support for the bill changed in part based on the perceived possible capability by rogue states, including that of North Korea. Once the National Missile Defense bill passed, the ABM treaty, considered the cornerstone of nuclear arms agreements, came under fire as limiting security measures, non-effective, and in need of revision or elimination.

Comments made by policy makers revealed that North Korean actions of missile testing and nuclear weapons development made the NMD bill a necessity (not every comment by all Congressional members was provided here as they were too numerous; therefore, examples were provided only). Congressional members cite the threat of a missile attack by a rogue or terrorist state as necessitating the need for a NMD system (Burns, CR: February 22, 1999; Kerrey, CR: February 24, 2000). North Korea also prevailed as one of those states who threatened the U.S. with a possible nuclear missile strike (Gilman, CR: September 24, 1998; Thurmond, CR: October 2, 1998; Burns, CR: February 22, 1999; Chabot, CR: March 3, 1999; Schaffer, CR: May 12, 1999; Gilman, CR: May 19, 1999; Chabot, CR: September 15, 1999) as signified by the Taepo Dong missile test (Allard, CR: September 9, 1998; Gibbons, CR: October 20, 1998; Bereuter, CR: March 2, 1999; Cochran, CR: March 15, 1999; Royce, CR: March 18, 1999). Indeed, the lack of such a system allowed North Korean generals to perceive a U.S. weakness and seek nuclear and missile development as the only means to “beat” the U.S. (Hunter, CR: September 24, 1998). Even Clinton acceded to the missile defense system and called for a “system to defend against new missile threats while working to preserve our ABM missile treaty with Russia” (State of the Union Address: January 27, 2000).

Secretary of Defense Cohen suggested that the inclusion of Japan in research and development of a theatre-based missile protection system would benefit any anti-ballistic missile system program meant for regional protection (News Conference: November 23, 1998). Additionally, policy makers called for increased funding for the military (Weldon, CR: October 6, 1998; Hunter, CR: February 2, 1999; Weldon, CR: September 15, 1999), as well as a review and reconsideration of the current spending and military focus at that time (Cohen, Defense Department Briefing: September 23, 1998). As nuclear development information was stolen from the U.S. by China and subsequently sold to North Korea, a review of who stood as friends or foes must be reconsidered (Hayworth, CR: June 15, 1999).

Very few policy makers considered retributive actions toward the North Korean missile crisis. Policy preferences incorporating military use tended to center on defensive or deterrent capabilities. National Security Advisor Berger reiterated that the U.S. would meet any offensive action by North Korea towards the South with force (White House Briefing: November 21, 1998). Secretary of Defense Cohen insured listeners that the U.S. continued a dual approach to North Korea: economic stability and military deterrence (Defense Department Briefing: November 23, 1998). Two months later, Cohen continued to support military enforcement of policies towards North Korea with a policy of 1. deterrence based on a large U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, 2. defense through theater missile defense systems, 3. dialogue based on four party talks and South Korean engagement, and 4. a determination to contain WMD (National Public Radio: January 14, 1999). Furthermore, General Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asserted that any engagement of forces must first go through a thorough cost-benefit analysis and then obtain the necessary funding (Senate Hearing: October 6, 1998). Congressional members also supported continued cooperation with regional actors and a military presence for deterrent capabilities (Gilman, CR: May 19, 1999) and to prove American military dominance (CR: Gilman, September 24, 1998).

Policy preferences of policy makers supported a perceived rogue state image, but not one “bad” enough to necessitate retributive actions. For the most part, North Korea appeared to desire the economic benefits available to states seeking to adhere to the norms of the international system. Yet, North Korea still struggled with its national identity, attempting to limit the amount of pushing around it received from the U.S. Policy makers did not trust North Korea, but some sought to draw the state out from its isolation to become a member of the world community. The President, administration advisors, and some Congressional members supported diplomatic efforts, while others considered such efforts useless and unlikely to bring real change as North Korea lied and was deceitful. Some members of Congress sought to lessen economic sanctions while others sought to keep them in place. No one observed in this analysis called for direct military intervention or a pre-emptive strike. Military use only came under consideration if North Korea was found to have taken aggressive action first. However, intrusive inspections, coercive diplomacy, and extensive containment measures were called for by policy makers, supporting the view of a state that was untrustworthy and in need of close watching. In no way was North Korea going to be allowed free reign to develop nuclear weapons, and the United States was there to insure it didn’t happen. Yet, good behavior by the North Korean government was to be rewarded as well. Thus, those in charge of determining immediate foreign policy action, members of the Executive, proceed with diplomatic measures supported by the threat to take more forceful action, while those in charge of long-term foreign policy sought their own means for insuring the security of the state by passing the National Missile Defense Bill. The policy preferences of the policy makers supported a perceived image of a rogue state, but one located to the right of the prototype.

In this chapter, the transition of North Korea from the dependent of the enemy to the rogue state image, as perceived by U.S. policy makers, was observed. North Korea was perceived as being influenced by the Soviet Union in the late 1960s, and secured the extended deterrence of the perceived enemy. Policy preferences in a crisis situation reflected this image. After the end of the cold war, a more independent North Korea emerged, one that sought WMD and often appeared to go against the wishes of the western states and the international community. Yet, the perceived image portrayed by the words of policy makers did not fit the prototype rogue state image. Instead, there was some opportunity for change observed in North Korea, and the threat was not as high as the prototype rogue, Iraq. However, many policy makers still considered North Korea to be untrustworthy, totalitarian, backwards and conniving. Policies towards this state supported a rogue image that fell to the right of the prototype, rewarding good behavior that appeared to show a North Korean desire to enter into the international community. While some policy preferences fell into the rehabilitation category, retributive policies supported rehabilitative acts, while containment, intrusive inspections and coercive diplomacy really set the agenda for U.S.-North Korean interactions. While good behavior was rewarded, retribution was still within the arsenal for use against North Korean bad behavior.

The next chapter will further explain the results as they relate to the hypotheses and the location of both Iraq and North Korea in their image categories.

[1] Some may question China as part of the “enemy” image category. This would be another interesting research program as China was part of the perceived “Communist Monolith” (as mentioned later in the text) and was perceived comparably in some aspects of threat, but did not have an equal level of economic development.

[2] Robert McNamara was Secretary of Defense until February, 1968, after the onset of the Pueblo incident used in the policy preferences section of the analysis, and so was used in the formation of the image perceived by policy makers.

[3] Possibly a typographical error on the Congressional Members web page and was supposed to be Thurston B. Morton.

[4] The story of the Pueblo as told above derives from Dean Rusk’s book, As I Saw It.

[5] South Korea had recently sent military personnel to the Vietnam conflict in support of the United States.

[6] As the senator stated that North Korea and China sold long range missiles and technology, this must be less of a killing tool than the multitude of weapons the U.S. sells daily, being the largest weapons dealer in the world today.

[7] See chapter four for agreement results.

[8] A preemptive strike on nuclear reactors could also have allowed nuclear material to spread throughout the region, including over South Korea and Japan, not a welcome possibility by the U.S., the South or Japan.

[9] On Lexus-Nexus this news briefing can be found on 11/10/93, but is obviously dated in error as it mentions acceptance and is in support of the Framework Agreement.

[10] Strom Thurmond suggested, however, that North Korea’s military was the fifth largest in the world.

[11] Interestingly, in the debate on whether the U.S. or North Korea failed first in holding up its end of the bargain of the Framework Agreement, ultimately causing its demise, a Senate Hearing on June 14, 1998, headed by Republican Craig Thomas, appeared to concede that the U.S. had not provided heavy oil fuel to North Korea in the amount promised, blaming the lack of international support and administrative mishandling in creating the problem.

[12] A commission mandated to gain access to the disputed underground facility and to promote further missile talks, led by former Secretary of Defense, Perry.

[13] George Nethercutt was a Representative from the Palouse region of Eastern Washington known for its wheat and lentil fields.