CHAPTER FIVE

In the next two chapters I present the results of the data collection and briefly analyze the results. This chapter will cover Iraq and chapter six will cover North Korea. Chapter seven will discuss the data as it pertains to the hypotheses. The data I present focuses on the information relevant to the hypotheses, so not all nodes of the image indicator are reflected in the following results. In each chapter, I test the hypotheses by first considering the relevance of the dependent of the enemy image and the policy preferences of the policy makers in the subsequent crisis situation to observe whether the perceived image relates to the observed policy preferences. Next, the emerging rogue state image and the policy preferences of the ensuing crisis situation are considered. Finally, each chapter reports on the data collected for the last time period where I hope to view a strengthening of the rogue state image and related policy preferences. Chapter seven discusses how the data supports or disaffirms the hypotheses.

The time period used to obtain the image indicators for the perceived image U.S. policy makers held of Iraq during the Cold War was the years prior to the Arab-Israeli War and after the inauguration of Nixon as President in January of 1969. The differences between the dependent of the enemy and rogue state images focus on those image indicators that, in the first image, show a relationship between the perceived state and the enemy, especially in the area of military assistance, in order to create deterrence.

The involvement of the Soviet Union in Iraq specifically, and with Arab states more generally, was abundant. President Nixon[1] often commented on the involvement of the Soviet Union in the Middle East and how that affected U.S. policy options towards Mideast states. Mixed in with the images perceived of Iraq and other Arab states was the image of the U.S.S.R. While not actively recorded for this research project, the image of the enemy was prevalent throughout recorded statements of policy makers, especially in the comparison between the intent of the Soviet Union and that of the U.S. Nixon saw the interaction between the Soviets, Iraq, and other Mideast states as a Soviet attempt to provide “money, men, and material” in exchange for access to “land, oil, power, and the warm waters of the Mediterranean” (Nixon, 1978a:477). Unlike that of the U.S., Nixon saw Soviet influence in the Middle East as a self-interested move to gain power, while the U.S. simply desired peace (Nixon, 1978a:477). It appeared that Nixon perceived the influx of Soviet aid to Iraq and other Arab states as a means to gain influence over the states and as a way to access their natural resources.

Kissinger also perceived Soviet military influence in the Middle East, specifically in Iraq, with the latter state a client of the Soviet Union, but not quite a “satellite” state like those countries in Eastern Europe. In this role, Iraq used Soviet weapons to further the Soviet goal of “intimidating pro-Western governments” (Kissinger, 1982:674-675). Kissinger perceived the Soviets as having supplied the means for Iraq to bully other Arab states that had shown favoritism to “pro-Western” states (read U.S.), an act that provided a level of offensive potential for the Soviets in the region. This statement also reflected Kissinger’s belief that Iraq used its Soviet weaponry to forcefully achieve its goals. Thus, clearly Kissinger perceived Soviet influence in the military capability of Iraq, who then supported the expansionist intentions of the Soviet Union counter to the goals of the U.S. While the data suggested that Kissinger perceived an Iraq less than completely reliant upon the Soviet Union, a dependent military relationship emerged of Iraq on the Soviet Union, and Iraq naturally fit with Soviet policy in the Middle East.

In the Congress, Senate members also perceived a relationship between Arab states and Soviet militarily influence. Senator Jacob Javits was by far the most prolific with his views on this relationship. Javits also perceived “Arab clients” dependent on the U.S.S.R. for military weaponry in their position against Israel, and Javits specifically outlined the capability of these states. Furthermore, Javits pointed out how Soviet arms supported Iraqi atrocities, as with the hangings of individuals wrongly convicted of being spies in 1969 (Congressional Record (CR): January 29, 1969). The public executions of Iraqis of Jewish decent and others observed in Iraq as threats to the state produced statements by other Senate members that showed how U.S. Legislators perceived the Soviet Union as having supplied Iraq with arms. Senator Thomas Dodd stated that the Soviet Union had provided Iraq over a 10 year period with $200 million in economic aid and $250 million in military assistance. Dodd further suggested that Iraq’s military was fully equipped by the Soviet Union (CR: January 31, 1969). Thus, support militarily from the Soviet Union existed and influenced the relationship between the U.S.S.R. and Iraq, supporting a dependent of the enemy image.

Also part of the dependent of the enemy image was the Cold War influence on the various relationships in the Middle East. As was often the case, Cold War confrontations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were played out in the smaller countries under the superpowers’ influences. While the positioning of U.S. and U.S.S.R. ships in the Mediterranean was a direct reflection of the superpowers’ desires to influence the area, Congressmen believed that the Soviets had directed the terrorist actions of Arabs in the Middle East in order to control oil (Pucinski, CR: September 24, 1970). Thus, data also supported Soviet influence on the military policies of other Arab states as well. While not a direct reference to Iraq, Soviet influence on other Arab states did show that Soviet policies were observed as expansionist and included their desire to access Arab oil. As Iraq was one of the top nations with oil reserves and was a known “client” of the Soviet Union, including Iraq as part of the observed Middle Eastern conflict bore consideration. In doing so, policy makers perceived Soviet influence in the actions and policies of Iraq as part of Mideast Soviet policy. This perception appeared to reflect a matter of fact attitude that Soviet influence was prevalent in the region of which all policy makers in the U.S. should have been aware.

The perceived domestic policy of Iraq by Congressional members reflected a general consensus that Iraq lacked the level of civility most international communities promoted (Farbstein, CR: January 28, 1969; Fascell, CR: February 6, 1969; Harrington, CR: March 21, 1973; Ribicoff, CR: January 28, 1969; Ryan, CR: January 30, 1969; Kuykendall, CR: February 5, 1969; Brooke, CR: January 29, 1969; plus numerous others). In addition, Pucinski believed that it was only a matter of time before the Arabs states were as dependent upon the Soviet Union as were Eastern European states (CR: July 8, 1970). He also perceived as a threat Iraq’s Communist Party being reinvigorated and orchestrated by the Soviets as they were “bringing influence to bear by way of suggestions and promises of extended economic and military aid and by agitation and incitement, direct and indirect” (CR: July 8, 1970). In addition, the economic and military aid provided by the Soviets came with strings attached: adherence to Soviet policy preferences. As a result, the statements of these policy makers suggested a perception of an Iraqi government whose domestic policies were influenced by the Soviet Union.

The influence of the Soviet Union economically in Iraq emerged as a perception of U.S. policy makers. Lee Hamilton perceived the Soviets as interested in Iraq’s oil, especially after the nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company in 1972. Not only was the economic aid of the Soviet Union seen as an influence, but also the extension of two billion dollars in credit over a thirteen year period (Hamilton, CR: September 29, 1971). Hamilton’s statements registered his concern for the possible influence Soviet economic connectedness had on the policy making of Iraqi leaders. Part of the perceived ploy of the Soviets was to keep the Middle East in turmoil, thus keeping Arab states dependent on the Soviet Union for military, economic and technical aid (Jackson, CR: December 31, 1970). A strength of Arab states was that they controlled the flow of oil, a necessity for the United States, Europe and Japan. This was perceived as a level of power that exceeded the Arab states’ positions in the international community, a grab for power above and beyond their relative capability, and opened them up to the influence of the Soviet Union, a state that did not have their best interests at heart.

The cultural perception of Iraq by U.S. policy makers reflected a state that failed to meet the standards of the international community, supporting a perception of the state as inferior. Kissinger (1982) was inclined to use the term “radical” in conjunction with Iraq in many instances, and Nixon saw a difference between moderate and radical Arab states in the Middle East (Nixon, 1972:688-690). In response to the hanging deaths of Iraqi citizens of Jewish, Christian and Muslim faiths in 1969, Senators lashed out with revealing words about the observed level of social development in the Iraqi government and society.[2] Terms used by

policy makers reflected their perception that this event was comparable to Hitler’s mass killing of Jews in Germany (Javits, CR: January 29, 1969). Other terms used for the actions of the Iraqi leaders included “bestiality” and a “return to the age of barbarity” (Farbstein, CR: January 28, 1969); “macabre” acts of “genocide”[3] and “violations of human rights and lack of human decency” (Farbstein, CR: February 6, 1969); a “bloodbath” of “murder and tyranny of Jewish alleged spies,” the “monster of the ‘Final Solution’—a monster which, if unleashed again, could destroy us all” (Fascell, CR: February 6, 1969); an “outrageous, deplorable situation” (Williams, CR: January 31,1969); “repugnant acts” (Ryan, CR: January 30, 1969); “reprehensible” (Mikva, CR: September 11, 1969); acts that come from the “Dark Ages” (Thompson, CR: January 28, 1969); and more. Clearly, the Iraqi regime was viewed as less than human, having partaken in acts that reflected the recessive animalistic condition of man represented in the state of nature before enlightenment to humanity. Even the society of Iraq was seen as backwards and lacking in social development. Finally, some policy makers also perceived a connection between the hangings in Iraq and the Soviet Union. While conceding that the Soviet Union no longer openly persecuted Jews, Representative Brasco did perceive a connection between past actions of the Soviet Union and those of the Iraqi regime:

Today, the Jews of the Soviet Union are not being physically wiped out on a methodical bases. . .

That syndrome, however has shifted its location, and is still to be found. Nowadays it dominates the lives of those Jews remaining in certain nations of the Arab world. . .notably in Syria and Iraq.

Both countries are today characterized by barbarous regimes, closely allied with the Soviet Union, and blatantly anti-Semitic. Neither of these two states, whose internal politics would do justice to Byzantium at its worst, is know for reason, logic, or adherence to accepted rules of international behavior. (CR: March 1, 1973)

Thus, the barbaric tendencies of the Iraqi regime continued to be perceived by congressional policy makers through 1973, and some individuals perceived a link between the repressive actions of Iraq and the U.S.S.R.

U.S. policy makers’ perceived goals and motives of Iraq surrounded the question of whether Iraq supported U.S. policies or those of the Soviet Union (the enemy). Kissinger flat out perceived the Iraqi regime’s intent as opposed to western influence in the Middle East and acted against any Arab state that accepted western aid (Kissinger, 1982). Javits perceived a focused intent of Iraqi leaders specifically on Jewish genocide within Iraq, and then their more general goal to disrupt the peace process in the Middle East (CR: January 29, 1969). Iraqi feelings of detestation could have been more broadly construed as having been towards all Jewish people in the Middle East, especially those in Israel. Representative Williams, in May, 1970, flatly states his view that Iraq and other Arab states sought the annihilation of the Israeli state: “The Arab States, particularly Egypt, Syria and Iraq are fighting to destroy Israel as a nation” (CR: May 5, 1970). Congressmen Fong (CR: February 4, 1969), Scott (CR: January 28, 1969), Goodell (CR: January 29, 1969), Brasco (CR: March 2, 1972), and Pepper (CR: March 2, 1973) all reflected the perception that the intent of the Iraqi leaders included aggression against the Israeli state or positions against U.S. goals in the Middle East. Thus, it appeared that the intent of the Iraqi state was to eliminate the Jewish population in the Middle East, both within its nation’s borders and the state of Israel itself. At the very least, U.S. policy makers perceived an intent of the Iraqi leaders that lacked compatibility with U.S. and international goals. Furthermore, U.S. policy makers perceived that the intentions of oil producing Arab states was to “squeeze” the United States and further the goals of Arabs generally (CR: September 8, 1972). Considering the importance of oil as a national security issue, the control over this resource by the Arab states caused U.S. leaders to perceive a threat. Cheap oil may no longer have been an actuality, and policy responses reflecting this new development were considered. Therefore, the perceived intent of the Arab states in regard to oil was for their continued move towards oil-producing states’ control and manipulation of the market, goals that were not compatible with the United States’ desires.

An important aspect of this study was the influence of the Soviet Union’s intent on Arab States. Several Congressmen perceived the Soviets as acting to inflame the already tense situation between the Arabs and the Israelis. Senator Jackson’s report “The Middle East and American Security Policy,” excerpted in the Congressional Record cited Soviet intentions in the Middle East as an important consideration for U.S. foreign policy:

The peace and stability of the Middle East in (sic) now threatened by the aggressive ambition of the Soviet Union, which transcends the tragic conflict between Arabs and Israelis and, indeed, is based upon its exploitation. This policy of Russia to manipulate the conflict in the region for its own advantage is the key reality upon which American Middle East policy must be based. (CR: December 31, 1970)

Soviet intentions in the Middle East, as perceived by U.S. policy makers, not only reflected the desire to keep the relationship between the Israelis and Arabs unsettled, but also to take advantage of tensions for their own gain. Thus, the perception of the intent of the Soviet Union in the Middle East was for the Soviet Union to take advantage of the tensions and use the opportunity to its own benefit.

The event scripts put forth by U.S. policy makers also supported the perceived influence of the Soviet Union. The perception was that the radical Arab states, at the urging of the Soviets, sought to move against that state under the auspices of the United States—Israel—if the Arabs observed any sign of weakness. Iraq and other Arab states were perceived as “unlocked doors” through which the Soviet Union was able to enter the Middle East and create “mischief” (Jackson, CR: December 31, 1970). Thus, the perception of U.S. policy makers was that the Soviet Union emerged as a disruptive force in the Middle East, supporting militant regimes possibly acting against the policy goals of western states. Furthermore, the perceived possible actions of Arab states, including those of Iraq, on oil production promoted an image of states stretching their newly obtained political and economic power. During the sixties and early seventies, many Arab states sought to control their own oil production, which had often been in the hands of western oil companies. With the nationalization of these oil production facilities, Arab states developed a new level of political and economic power. The unification of oil producing states through OPEC—which first met in September, 1960, in Baghdad—created a new political force with which to contend.

The response alternatives that policy makers suggested revealed a perception of an Iraqi state that fits the dependent of the enemy image. Policy makers in the U.S. suggested several response alternatives when contemplating Iraq’s threat to the Middle East and U.S. interests. In 1969, after the hanging of several Iraqis, Congressional members suggested ways of dealing with Iraq. Most often, Congressmen perceived their only real options to be taking diplomatic action, calling for official statements against the act (Farbstein, CR: February 6, 1969; Fascell, CR: February 6, 1969) and requesting that Iraq allow its Jews to emigrate to the United States or another country (Javits, CR: January, 1969; Kennedy, CR: February, 1969; Fascell, CR: February 6, 1969). In addition, Javits suggested that a possible option was to let loose Israel to take retaliatory actions against Iraq if Iraq failed to cease its actions against Jews in its state (Javits, CR: January 29, 1969). Furthermore, in order to create peace in the Middle East, Javits believed that Israel must maintain its ability to deter Arab states from taking action against it and from taking action against Jews within the Arab states, specifically within Iraq. Javits also suggested that the United States refrain from taking undue action as well and continue to guide Israel on what actions it should take. Finally, Javits believed that some means of communication must be built in order for increased dialogue to occur between concerned parties (Javits, CR: January 29, 1969). Yet, many Congressmen promoted sending military assets to Israel to insure its ability to respond to any aggression as the best solution: “I firmly believe that there is no contradiction in my own often expressed view that we leave Vietnam and, at the same time, provide Israel with the means to deter aggression and guarantee its own security” (CR: August 17, 1972). Thus, at a time when the U.S. was pulling away from one hot spot, some policy makers perceived that it must keep its eye on another as U.S. interests in the Middle East were considerable. In addition, asking the Soviet Union to intervene and take advantage of the influence they had on Iraq was also perceived as a possible policy response to Iraq’s actions against Iraqi Jews. Senator Dodd perceived the Soviet Union as party to the actions of Iraq, and as such, the Soviets must take actions to insure Iraq ceases to murder any more Jews:

In this situation, the Soviet Government, because of the very great influence it has in Iraq, bears a heavy responsibility. . .The question which remains to be answered is whether Moscow is willing to use the influence which has inevitably accrued to it as a result of its massive military and economic aid, in the cause of urging restraint on its Iraq protégés. (CR: January 31, 1969)

Policy makers perceived Iraq as being influenced by the Soviet Union, its mentor and “parent” state. As the Soviet Union had given Iraq both military and economic aid, it was perceived by U.S. policy makers that the Soviets had the ability to keep Iraqi leaders from taking further actions against Jews. Yet, not all Congressmen perceived the Soviet Union as having complete control over its dependent states, as Representative Hamilton suggested in 1971: “The Soviet Union continues to lack a high degree of political control over Arab countries with which she has extensive ties” (CR: September 29, 1971). Thus, while the Soviets influenced the Arab world due to its military and economic aid, the Soviet Union lacked the ability to keep its dependent states under the control of the Soviet leadership. Ultimately, U.S. policy makers believed it was the responsibility of the two “parent” states, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., to act to bring peace to the Middle East.

In response to increasing demands for oil in the U.S. and perceived instability in the oil producing Arab states, several oil-policy response alternatives were put forth. Most interesting was that of Representative Rarick (CR: July 21, 1972), who claimed that “bird-watcher” groups sought increased oil imports rather than drill for oil in undeveloped areas of the U.S. His first solution was to create the Alaskan oil pipeline. He also suggested that extending the oil trade with Arab states could be a possibility, but since the U.S. public perceived the oil producing Arab states as pro-Soviet, this did not carry much political clout. He also argued against oil-for-grain trading with the Soviets, as only big business would benefit and not farmers. His obvious preference was to drill for oil in the U.S. wherever oil existed. Senator Stevens suggested that searching for new oil opportunities was an act of “self-defense” as Arab states would act in their own self-interests. Stevens also perceived that the best response alternative was drilling for oil in Alaska’s Prudhoe Bay and creating the means for delivering the oil to the rest of the U.S. (CR: September 8, 1972). Senator Hansen agreed, and stated that “the most enlightened course for our government would be to adopt policies that will enable the search for our domestic oil and gas reserves to go forward as rapidly as possible. This is the only near-term alternative to prolonged and perilous dependence on Arab oil” (CR: September 8, 1972). Representative McCormack also perceived a threatening situation in the possibility that oil producing Arab states may limit access to cheap oil, and called for the “people’s” support for the research and development of new oil sources (CR: June 7, 1972). Thus the response alternative for possible oil restrictions on Arab oil was to find other sources of oil, especially those in the United States, decreasing U.S. dependence on Middle East oil.

The crisis event used to observe the actual policy preferences of the U.S. towards Iraq and the relevance of the policy preferences to the dependent of the enemy image was the Yom Kippur War of October 1973 between Israel, Syria, Egypt, and several other Arab states, including Iraq, and the resulting oil embargo/crisis. This crisis showed the responses considered by the U.S. in a situation when dependents of the Soviet Union were in direct conflict with a dependent/ally of the U.S. It was the Cold War at its most volatile moment, a time when the inclusion of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. as direct combatants almost occurred. Thus, it is ideal in observing the policy preferences of the U.S. as its policy options were restrained by the extended deterrence of the Soviet Union over the Arab states.

In order to convince the reader that Iraq was a participant in the Yom Kippur War, not only factually but in the minds of policy makers, comments from the Congressional Record show the relevance of Iraq’s placement in the Mideast crisis. Senator Robert Dole connects the attack on Israel with the acquisition of two U.S. oil companies by Iraq: “Just today, the papers carry word that Iraq has seized two U.S. oil companies in response to the latest outbreak of hostilities between Israel and the Arabs” (CR: October 8, 1973). Thus, while the major aggressors were Egypt and Syria, the “Arabs” included other Middle East states, including Iraq. Senator Mike Mansfield, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, also perceived Iraq as a member to the conflict which was far reaching throughout the region: “At the present time, it seems that it [the Middle East conflict] stretches from the Atlantic coast clear across the Magreb and the rest of Northern Africa, over into Syria, Jordan, Iraq, possibly Saudia [sic] Arabia, and the Lord or Allah only knows where it is going to end” (CR: October 16, 1973). Once a cease fire was agreed upon by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and accepted by both “sides,” there was continued fighting, the instigation of which was blamed on the other “side.” Representative Bertram Podell implied that the agreement to a cease fire must go beyond Israel, Egypt and Syria, and must include other Arab states, most prominently, Iraq: “In the north, Syria, showing her normal distrust for peace has not answered the proposals [for a new cease fire] and Iraq has flatly rejected them” (CR: October 25, 1973). In the mind of Podell, Iraq was a player in the ability of the Arab states to agree on a cease fire in the war. Furthermore, Representative Clarence Long cites the military capabilities of neighboring Arab states, including Iraq, as possible belligerents whose aircraft numbers far exceeded those of Israel. Finally, Representative Johnson voiced his concern over the escalation of events with the airlift of arms to Israel and the presence of U.S. ships in the Gulf and how they would affect the actions of the Arab states beyond Egypt and Syria: “These are not just acts of friendship toward Israel—they are also acts of war toward Egypt and Syria and the other Arab countries now involved in the war” (CR: October 17, 1972). Thus, it appeared that Iraq was perceived by U.S. policy makers as a member of the “Arab states” that were part of the conflict and an important actor in the ensuing peace.

In the record of the Yom Kippur War, Iraq also appeared as a major player. There were nine states on the Arab side of the Yom Kippur War, including Iraq. Even before the war began, Iraq assisted in the build-up of forces along Israel’s border by supplying a squadron of Hunter jets to Egypt. During the war, Iraq sent 18,000 soldiers and several hundred tanks to the Golan Heights, which were subsequently part of the October 16 attacks on Israel’s positions. In addition, Iraqi MiGs flew over the Golan Heights throughout the war, beginning October 8 (Bard, 2003). Thus, even though Egypt and Syria were the main players in the war, as they were the bordering states, Iraq supplied both arms and people in the actions taken against Israel. Thus, using the Yom Kippur War and the related oil embargo/crisis to investigate the policy preferences of U.S. policy makers towards Iraq is supported.

There were two main reasons for the Yom Kippur War. First, the Arab states sought to regain the land taken from them during the 1967 Six Day Wa,r and second, Israel continued to see the need to occupy the strategic areas of the Golan Heights and the West Bank, as the Arab States refused to recognize Israel’s right to exist. U.N. Resolution 242 stated that this land should be returned to the Arab states in exchange for their acceptance of Israel’s borders and statehood. Yet, neither side accepted the terms of the resolution. Israel refused to give back the territory, feeling that the Arab states did not have the capability of defeating Israel and so would not attack (Bard, 2003). Many of the Arabs were against re-affirming Israel as a legitimate state in the Middle East. Thus, the two sides were in conflict, and found opportunity in their relationships with the two superpowers.

The Yom Kippur War, also known as the October War, or the Ramadan War, began on October 6, 1973. It was instigated on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur, thus its title. At first, the Arab forces did well against Israeli forces due to the imbalanced force size that pitted thousands of Arabs against a few hundred Israelis. The tide turned on October 10^th, when Israel pushed Syrian forces back into Syria. On the Egyptian front, General Arial Sharon participated in a push through a hole in Egyptian forces that would later lead to the opportunity for the Israelis to surround the Egyptian forces and threaten to annihilate them. At this point, the Soviets began re-supplying Syria and Egypt in order to keep the Arab states strong. In response, the U.S. initiated its “operation Nickel Grass,” a month long airlift that would supply Israel with 56 combat planes and 27,900 tons of arms and supplies, the largest airlift ever for both the U.S. and Israel (“Course”). The exact date of the beginning of the airlift varies in sources on the Yom Kippur War, with Nixon (1978) stating that the airlift began on Tuesday, October 16, the Palestine Facts page at October 14, and the North Park University Web Chronicle page stating it was October 12 and 13^th. Regardless, it wasn’t until October 19^th that Nixon went before Congress and requested funding (2.2 billion dollars) for the airlift to support Israel. By October 16^th (“Course”) or October 17^th (Nixon, 1978), the Arab states had voted to put in place an oil embargo against the U.S. and any state that supported the U.S. This affected the airlift as no European state, other than Portugal, allowed U.S. planes to land in its territory for refueling in the fear that they too would be included in the embargo (“Course”).

By October 21^st, the Israelis had the war well in hand and had encircled the Egyptian army after crossing the Suez Canal. The Soviets threatened to enter the war on the side of the Arabs. At this point, negotiations for a cease fire were actively sought between U.S. and Soviet diplomats, with an agreement reached on October 22^nd for the implementation of U.N. Resolution 242 and further negotiations for peace in the Middle East (Nixon, 1978). Yet, either the Israelis or the Egyptians broke the cease fire and the altercation continued. Nixon and Brezhnev communicated directly with each other to come up with another cease fire on October 24^th. Later, two phone calls came to Nixon from the Soviets, the most serious requesting that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. send troops to the Mideast to insure peace, and if the US did not respond, the Soviets would send in their own troops. Late that evening, U.S. bases around the world were put on alert. Nixon then responded to Brezhnev stating that joint coordinated action was infeasible and that unilateral action would be unacceptable as “such action would produce incalculable consequences which would be in the interest of neither of our countries and which would end all we have striven so hard to achieve” (940). Brezhnev backed down, saying he would send seventy “observers,” to which Nixon responded stating that the observers should be named by the U.N. Secretary-General. Finally, the Soviets backed down completely, and while the Israelis continued to surround the Egyptian Army, peace negotiations occurred between the combatants and the two superpowers returned to their detente relationship. Disengagement between Israel and Egypt occurred on January 17, 1974. Both sides claimed they had won the war, yet the real losses were in the people killed. North Park University claims 8,500 Arabs and 6,000 Israelis were killed, while Palestine Facts state 2,700 Israelis, 3,500 Syrians and 15,000 Egyptians were killed. The war also caused economic problems for the three states, increased the dependency of Israel on the U.S. and of Arabs on the Soviets, while the oil embargo led to the 1974-1975 recession in the U.S. (Bard, 2003). On a side note, several sources lament the time it took for the United Nations, especially the Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, to take diplomatic action towards peace, suggesting that while the Arabs were winning, the U.N. did not see the need for peace, yet, when the Israelis began to win, the U.N. took action (Bard, 2003). Indeed, some U.S. Congressional Members also voiced this observation in their statements for policy action throughout the Yom Kippur War.

The policy preferences of the policy makers centered on four options: diplomatic exchanges, calls to the “enemy” (Soviet Union) to influence the Arab states towards a peace process, moves to arm the U.S.’s own dependent (Israel), and domestic policy options. It was difficult to determine if covert actions were involved unless a search of archival documents was conducted. However, Nixon (1978) admits to calling for the airlifts without the knowledge of Congress or the people of the United States. Airlifts to Israel were already occurring when, on October 19^th, Nixon requested 2.2 billion dollars for military aid to Israel. Thus, this could be seen as a covert action for a period of 3 days. There was also no hint of developing economic sanctions against the Arab states, even after the emplacement of the oil embargo. Finally, while President Nixon contemplated having to use U.S. forces in the Middle East if the Soviets acted on their threat to introduce Soviet soldiers into the conflict, the act of using U.S. forces against the Arab states was not actively considered due to the deterrent aspect of the Soviet nuclear capability. Indeed, the Soviets appeared to be deterred by the alert level increase of U.S. forces when Brezhnev threatened to send in Soviet troops.

The first policy option considered by most policy makers was the use of diplomatic channels to try and find a path towards peace. Kissinger and Nixon both took steps through diplomatic means to create peace in the Middle East. Nixon spoke on several occasions with Brezhnev, keeping the lines of communication open even when the Soviets threatened to enter into the war (Nixon, 1978). Kissinger made several trips to the Middle East and to Moscow in order to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis without sparking increased tensions. Furthermore, Members of Congress also called for diplomatic means towards the end of the conflict. Senator Jacob Javits (CR: October 8, 1973) commended the actions of Secretary of State Kissinger’s diplomatic measures and called for a peace process that would first return all belligerents to their pre-war boundaries and then work towards a lasting Middle East Peace. Some Congressmen took a stronger stance. Senators Abraham Ribicoff and Richard Schweiker each felt that the United Nations should become involved by supporting Israel’s position. To do otherwise would support the aggressive actions of the Arab states and imply that solving political conflict by military means was acceptable (CR: October 8, 1973). Most Congressmen suggested some kind of multi-lateral diplomatic action (Bella Absug, CR: October 18, 1973; William Keating, CR: October 16, 1973; William Scott, CR: October 18, 1973) that included the participants in the conflict under some kind of U.N. auspice (William Roth, CR: October 12, 1973; Robert Dole, CR: October 8, 1973). Ideally, U.S. policy makers desired that all parties accept U.N. Resolution 242, setting Israel’s boundaries at the pre-1967 locations and having the Arab states accept Israel as a legitimate state (Walter Mondale, CR: October 11, 1973; J.W. Fulbright, CR: October 9, 1973). Yet, as mentioned by Representative Bertram Podell (CR: October 25, 1973), neither group agreed to the interpretation of the resolution. In addition, some U.S. policy makers suggested that the language used to bring the belligerents into the peace process must not be arrogant as it would only make the situation worse (William Keating, CR: October 16, 1973). Some Senators understood the role of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. as that of “parent” states that had the responsibility of rectifying the situation and forcing the belligerent states into a cease fire (Angelo Roncallo, CR: October 16, 1973; Mike Mansfield, CR: October 16, 1973). Even though some policy makers saw the 1973 Arab-Israeli War as a failure in diplomacy, they also believed that actions towards finding an end to the conflict through diplomatic means must continue (William Cohen, CR: October 23, 1973; Bertram Podell, CR: October 16, 1973; Joseph Montoya, CR: October 9, 1973). Finally, in regard to the oil crisis, Nixon (1978) and Representative Wilmer Mizell (CR: October 13, 1973) both suggested that multi-national actions must be taken in order to keep oil flowing, including incentives for oil producing states and continued multi-national research and development.

One of the policy preferences of policy makers was the call to the “enemy” (Soviet Union) to intercede in the conflict. This shows that U.S. policy makers felt that the Soviets had some influence with the Arab states due to the Arab states’ dependence upon the U.S.S.R. Representative Wilmer Mizell (CR: October 13, 1973) sought more than a limited cease fire and called for continued work towards peace in the Middle East. Furthermore, Representative Charles Vanik (CR: October 16, 1973) suggested that if detente was to work, then the Soviets must convince the Arab states to enter into negotiations. Other Congressmen called for the Soviet Union and United States to meet together to find a solution, and for the Soviets to stop supplying arms to the Arab states (Bertram Podell, CR: October 17, 1973; John Tunney, CR: October 11, 1973; Herman Talmadge, CR: October 11, 1973). If the situation in the Middle East did not come to a quick end through superpower influence, said Angelo Roncallo (CR: October 16, 1973), it could easily blow up into WWIII. Some policy makers felt that the Soviet Union caused the 1973 War in the first place, and that the Soviets must take action along with the U.S. to find a peaceful end to the conflict (William Roth, CR: October 12, 1973; James McClure, CR: October 18, 1973). Finally, Nixon (1978) and Kissinger took active steps to work with the Soviet Union to find a cease fire to the conflict. These two world leaders obviously felt that the Soviets could influence the positions of the Arab states and force them into reaching an agreement with Israel and stop the fighting.

Policy makers largely agreed that United States must arm its own dependent state, Israel. The reasoning behind sending arms to Israel varied, with most U.S. policy makers having stated that it was imperative for Israel to maintain its borders (George McGovern, CR: October 8, 1973; Walter Mondale, CR: October 11, 1973; Elizabeth Holtzman, CR: October 16, 1973). Much of the debate surrounded the perceived need to maintain a balance of power in the Middle East, and since the Soviet Union was supplying the Arabs, then the U.S. must supply Israel (Jacob Javits, CR: October 8, 1973; Mike Mansfield, CR: October 16, 1973; William Cohen, CR: October 23, 1973; William Keating, CR: October 16, 1973). Indeed, it was in the interests of U.S. national security that Israel be armed and able to repel any advances by the Arab states (Mike Mansfield, CR: October 16, 1973; Lester Wolff, CR: October 16, 1973). While almost all policy makers agreed on supplying arms to Israel, there was some discussion on who should pay for it: Israel or the people of the United States. In other words, should the arms delivered be on credit or through a grant (arms given without expecting payment in return). While Senator John Tunney (CR: October 11, 1973) and Representative Joseph Maraziti (CR: October 25, 1973) believed that credit should be the means of supplying arms to Israel, Representatives Robert Drinan (CR: October 23, 1973) and Bertram Podell (CR: October 25, 1973) both support a grant proposal for any further arms sent to Israel. Furthermore, several Congressional members saw movement by the Arab states to restrict oil exports to the U.S. as a form of blackmail to restrain U.S. aid to Israel. Under no circumstances did these policy makers believe that the U.S. should give in to the blackmail and cease the shipments of military supplies to Israel (Jennings Dorn, CR: October 24, 1973; Bertram Podell, CR: October 17, 1973; Mario Biaggi, CR: October 18, 1973; Bella Absug, CR: October 18, 1973). Jennings Dorn (CR: October 24, 1973) reflected that giving into blackmail was what led to Hitler’s rise in Europe and to WWII.

On the other hand, there were three Congressmen who saw the arming of Israel as a mistake and an act that should not be proceed. Senator William Scott (CR: October 18, 1973) did not believe that the U.S. should act as the world’s police force, and that arming Israel would set up the U.S. as such an entity. Senator Hugh Scott supported Israel, but sought “restraint” by the U.S. and not act to “broaden” the “passage of arms” (CR: October 9, 1973). Representative Paul Findly (CR: October 17, 1973) saw arming Israel as a hypocritical act, as the U.S. had already called for the Soviets not to rearm the Arab states. Findly also believed that the U.S. was to blame for the crisis situation, as the U.S. had vetoed a U.N. Resolution on the Middle East that could have settled down the Arab states, and that U.S. policy appeared to support Israel’s occupation of the territory taken in 1967 and not U.N. Resolution 242. Findly considered that such actions by the United States may have led to Arab frustrations with the lack of international involvement and the Arab states’ desires to regain the occupied territories.

The last policy preference of the policy makers centered on the emplacement of the oil embargo against the United States. Nixon (1978) actively cautioned against taking any frustration with the lack of oil in the U.S. out on the Arab states: “The temptation to lash out against the Arabs would have to be kept in check in order to capitalize on the tremendous success of our policy during the Yom Kippur War” (977). Instead of taking action against the Arab states in their attempts to influence U.S. policy making though the restriction of oil exports, policy makers called for domestic policy changes. Nixon (1978) promoted a “three stage conservation effort” that encouraged executive, state and local, and congressional action. He suggested seven policy preferences: lowered heating in federal buildings and a call for the same in private homes; a call for car pooling; a request to set state speed limits at 50 mph; a request to congress for the ability of the president to enact an emergency executive order that would “relax” environmental restrictions; a return to daylight savings time; a request for a nationwide speed limit of 50 mph on federal highways; and a proposal for “Project Independence” that would actively seek to gain U.S. energy independence by 1980. Only the change in speed limits and a return to daylight savings time were enacted before the Congressional Winter break, while action was taken on the Alaskan Pipeline Bill to create a means of delivery for oil produced by controversial drilling in the pristine lands in Alaska. While several Congressmen called for increased conservation efforts to deflect decreasing oil supplies (Lester Wolff, CR: October 16, 1973; Bertram Podell, CR: October 16, 1973; Jacob Javits, CR: October 8, 1973), other Congressmen called for increased production (Robert Dole, CR: October 8, 1973; Wilmer Mizell, CR: October 13, 1973). Part of the conservation effort was the call for gas rationing, which would limit how much gasoline citizens could purchase each week/month (Wayne Owens, CR: October 26, 1973; Roger Zion, CR: November 13, 1973). Representative Wilmer Mizell (CR: October 13, 1973) also suggested several other domestic policy options, including a reevaluation of U.S. military requirements, increasing stockpiles, the need for more facilities and ships, increased research and development, and the reduction of environmental restrictions on fuels previously banned (coal and high sulfur oil). Finally, Robert Price (CR: October 31, 1973) suggested a review of U.S. national security interests to reflect a response to those European states that had refused to help in the refueling of U.S. planes re-supplying Israel.

The policy preferences of the policy makers appeared to reflect an image of the dependent of the enemy for the Arab states, which included Iraq, when viewing the crisis situation of the Yom Kippur War and the ensuing oil embargo. Policy makers sought diplomatic avenues to resolve the conflict and called for the inclusion of the “enemy” to step up to the plate and do its part to achieve a win (for diplomacy) in the Middle East. Indeed, several policy makers believed it was due to the actions and influences of the Soviet Union in the first place—through arms supplies and policy suggestions—that the conflict occurred. After the crisis occurred, it was the responsibility of the “parent” states of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to find a solution that both the Arab states and Israel would accept. In response to the Soviets re-supplying of their dependents, the U.S. re-supplied its dependent. There was some hesitancy on the part of U.S. policy makers to become directly involved in the conflict as it would have led to a direct altercation between the two superpowers. Instead, U.S. policy makers desired to leave the actual combat to the two dependent states, a prime example of Cold War politics. Both the U.S. and the Soviets appeared to be deterred from entering the war with troops by the possibility that any such action could end in a nuclear conflict. Finally, in response to the Arab states’ oil embargo against the U.S., the United States did not countenance discussions on direct retributive actions against the Arab states, seeking domestic policies and international efforts for conservation and research and development only. The U.S., despite the national security interests in having enough oil to supply its huge military, did not consider taking direct action against the dependent states of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the image of the dependent of the enemy observed in the years prior to the Yom Kippur War that predicted responses to a conflict that would consider the extended deterrence of the enemy and the enemy’s influence over the dependent’s actions, held true in the ensuing crisis of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and ensuing oil embargo/crisis.

In this section, I show the changing image of Iraq as perceived by U.S. policy makers, from the dependent of the enemy image of earlier years to that of a rogue state who sought weapons of mass destruction in order to create a deterrent capability no longer satisfied by Soviet extended deterrence. The time period under analysis was from January 1989 to the end of July 1990, just prior to the first U.S. Gulf War. The image indicators viewed that reflect the changing perception of Iraq by U.S. policy makers were its military capability, especially in regards to Iraq’s desire to obtain and use weapons of mass destruction, the culture level of Iraq, the intentions of the country and leadership on why WMD were obtained, how they would be used (event scripts), and response alternatives reflecting the perceived image. These image indicators show whether Iraq was perceived as a rogue state or if it fit into some other image category. It was also likely that some variance in the image perception of U.S. policy makers would occur at this time as the rogue state image was not yet fully developed and some individuals may still have perceived remnants of the dependent of the enemy image.

Many policy makers perceived an image of a state seeking weapons of mass destruction. Often, the perception focused on Saddam Hussein alone and his desire to increase his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability. One category of WMD discussed by U.S. policy makers, chemical weapons, also implied aspects of a state that had less economic strength and sought to obtain a capability equal to that of great powers without the financial output. CIA director William Webster echoed many policy makers in his reference to Iraq’s seeking of chemical weapons as the “poor man’s answer to nuclear weapons” (Senate Hearing, Feb. 9, 1989). This perception reinforced an image of a state that had less capability than the perceiver state but was still seeking to obtain the capability to deter others from attacking it. While chemical weapons could also have been used in an offensive act, and indeed were used by Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war, nuclear weapons were a capability associated with deterrence and, as such, suggested a deadliness that an opposing force would not want to test. Webster and other policy makers also perceived the stockpiling of chemicals used in making chemical weapons, supporting the claim that Iraq sought to create an arsenal of these weapons.

Senator Robert Dole agreed that the development of Iraq’s chemical weapons may create deterrence at a “bargain basement” level, or create “bargain basement blackmail” (CR: May 17, 1990). Policy makers who believed that Iraq had chemical weapons perceived that the weapons might be used in a manner different from the nuclear weapons employed by the superpowers. Instead of seeking only to keep other states from attacking it, U.S. policy makers perceived an Iraq capable of using its WMD to threaten the great powers and others and making them to bend to Iraq’s will, or it will unleash its power. Insight into the perceived mentality behind the use of chemical weapons in Iraq emerged from additional comments by Webster and other policy makers. Webster suggested that chemical weapons were being developed in secret as the Iraqis made their chemical weapons production sites look like regular industrial buildings. This secrecy was likely the result of not wanting to incur a preemptive strike from another state, or because the Iraqis were sneaky and didn’t want to show their hand (democratic states are more open and so are less likely to partake in misperceptions). Furthermore, since Hussein had used chemical weapons in the past, policy makers believed that he would have no problem using them in the future. It was this deterrence situation that kept states like Israel from taking preemptive action against Iraq, like Israel did in Osirik in 1980, and destroying Iraq’s WMD capability early on.

Of even greater concern to many policy makers was the possibility that Saddam Hussein also sought nuclear weapons. Senator John McCain relayed how Iraq’s desire to obtain nuclear weapons spanned a decade, and, as Iraq was a “terrorist” state, it must be dealt with harshly. On the other hand, President Bush did not want to say positively or negatively that there was any real substance to the belief that Iraq was building nuclear weapons in the spring of 1989. Yet, Bush also stateed that he wouldn’t “give credence to the fact that Iraq is in the process of building nuclear weapons. I cannot confirm that” (Address to Regional Reporters, March 31, 1989) (italics added). It could have been a misuse of the above italicized statement, or an acknowledgement that indeed Iraq was in the process of developing nuclear weapons, but because of diplomatic necessity, and a perceived opportunity in Iraq, Bush was unable confirm this development officially. Closer to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, many policy makers voiced their objection to the “triggers” that were found in Britain, soon to have been sent on to Iraq. While Iraq denied that the triggers were to be used in nuclear weapons, policy makers perceived this as an immediate threat and denounced Iraq for attempting to import the technology.

However, not all policy makers saw Saddam Hussein and Iraq as a belligerent in the Middle East. Many policy makers, mostly Republicans, also believed Hussein could be the cause for peace in the region. Senator Specter stated that if Hussein were “properly motivated,” he could be a unifying force in the Middle East and play a “constructive role” in the peace process (CR: March 6, 1990). Policy makers delicately discussed Hussein’s merits and his charismatic aura, and that policies toward Iraq that enhanced rather than deterred closer relationships between Iraq and the U.S. should be followed. Saddam Hussein could have been a “spokesman for peace” in the Middle East if provided the opportunity through U.S. economic and political policies (Senator Metzenbaum, CR: May 17, 1990). These statements came only two to four months prior to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the U.S.’s response. However, in terms of the number of positive versus negative remarks made about Saddam Hussein and Iraq during the time of this analysis, by far the majority of statements reflect the perceived threat of Iraq, its likelihood of seeking WMD, and the likelihood that it would use them in the future.

The dependent of the enemy image often became apparent through the acquisition of weapons from the Soviet Union. During the 1989-1990 time period of this analysis, there was some mention of past and present reliance on the Soviets and other states in order for Iraq to build up its arsenal. For those believing that Saddam Hussein could play a pivotal role in the Middle East peace process, the perceived lack of ability of the Soviets to continue to supply its dependent states with weapons and other goodies was forcing these dependent states to look elsewhere, i.e., to the U.S (Senator Spector, CR: March 6, 1990). Instead of Soviet assistance, policy makers perceived that the U.S. could now fill that role for Iraq and become a powerful force determining the direction Iraq would take militarily, economically, and politically in the future. Others, such as CIA director Webster, believed that, while Iraq was dependent in the past on the Soviets, and had obtained the precursors to chemical weapons through other foreign states, that was no longer the case. Iraq now had the capability to develop its own WMD and could use them with a variety of delivery methods (Senate Hearing on Chemical and Biological Weapons, February 9, 1989). Thus, there was definitely a change occurring in the perception of Iraq, from a state once dependent on the Soviets to a state either open to U.S. influence through trade and association or to a state that was a threat to the U.S. and should be watched carefully in the years to come.

Another aspect of the rogue state image is a culture that does not support the same values as those of “our” country, does not value human life to the same degree as the “civilized” world, and will take actions that go against international standards. Many policy makers tended to see Iraq in this negative view. Iraqis didn’t understand “our” “outrage” and “horror” at the use of chemical weapons, that a “moral barrier” had been passed as numerous states, including Iraq, sought biological weapons (CIA Director Webster, quoted in an article by Ali, February 10, 1989).[4] Congressmen saw Iraq as a “terrorist” state with “ruthless and unprincipled” leaders and advisors (Senator McCain, CR: May 17, 1990), the “darkest place in hell” (Senator Glickman, CR: July 26, 1990), a “gangster state” (Senator Heinz, CR: May 2, 1989) and more. The overwhelming majority of policy makers who voiced their opinions on Iraq saw the state as taking inhuman action in the Iran/Iraq war and against Kurdish insurgents by using chemical weapons against them. If one were to realistically analyze the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, their use could have been the consequence of a cost/benefit analysis supporting

their use at that time. Due to little international disapproval at the time, the use of chemical weapons could have been considered acceptable when used against insurgents threatening the security of the government in the Kurdish event. It seems hypocritical for the only country to have used nuclear weapons against another state to claim abhorrence when a state less powerful than itself used a limited WMD. Yet, not all policy makers believed that Iraq would be compelled to continue down its path of international disfavor. President Bush continually danced around condemning Iraq for its radical statements and apparent desire to seek nuclear weapons.

After Hussein had made a statement setting forth the policy that an attack by Israel on any of its assets would, in turn, provoke the annihilation of Israel by Iraq, Bush simply said that Saddam Hussein had made a “bad” statement and that he “would strongly urge Iraq to reject the use of chemical weapons” (The Boston Globe: April 4, 1990). Yet, even those who believed change could occur within Iraq based their optimism regarding this change on a willingness by Hussein to be truthful and compliant to international restrictions (Senator Dole, CR: April 20, 1990; Senator Specter, CR: March 6, 1990). The outcome was that most policy makers saw Iraq as a state with cultural values different than, and inferior to, those of the U.S.

The perceived intentions of Iraq by U.S. policy makers also supported the developing rogue state image of Iraq. For many policy makers, there was a direct link between Iraq and terrorism. If Iraq obtains WMD, then it would have given the weapons or technology to terrorists to use on western countries around the world (Senator Pell, CR: May 16, 1990). The real direction of Iraq was based on the needs of Saddam Hussein and his desire to be the “messianic” leader of the Middle East (Senator McCain, CR: April 2, 1990). Furthermore, Iraq sought the destruction of Israel, the U.S.’s friend in the Middle East, and would annihilate Israel and all of its people at the drop of a hat (Senator Pell, CR: April 2, 1990). Thus, the intent of Iraq was the destruction of other states in order to promote the power of its own state, and to also supply terrorists with WMD. This perception of the intentions of Iraq fits well with the developing image of the rogue state.

An interesting aspect of the rogue state image is the view that much of the problems associated with the state and its inability to relate to the international community or abide by social norms reflect the leadership and not necessarily the people themselves. In support of this view, many policy makers perceived the capability, culture, and intentions of Iraq as those of its leader, Saddam Hussein. Hussein was “ruthless and unprincipled,” (Senator McCain, CR: May 17, 1990) used chemical weapons as blackmail to bully others (Senator Lautenberg, CR: July 31, 1990), had a “malignant attitude” and “squandered” his chance for good relations with the U.S. (Senator Metzenbaum, CR: June 12, 1990). Saddam Hussein wanted to be the leader of the Middle East and further a path of deadly destruction, including the end of Israel (Senator D’Amato, CR: April 20, 1990 and May 17, 1990; Senator Reid, CR: July 18, 1990). He was “the Butcher of Baghdad,” the “Mad dog of the Middle East,” a “murderer,” and a “radical,” (Representative Kasich, CR: June 6, 1990; Senator D’Amato, CR: April 20, 1990; Senator Lieberman, CR: March 30, 1990; Representative Henry Hyde, CR: March 23, 1989). It was likely that Saddam Hussein would actualize the “madman” scenario, according to which a radical leader thinks irrationally and launches WMD in a first strike action (Vice President Dan Quayle, May 1, 1990). Thus, if Hussein was removed from power, then Iraq would open itself to political and economic reform, making it no longer a threat but an opportunity for U.S. involvement. Yet, some policy makers saw a different Saddam Hussein in the months prior to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. After a meeting with Saddam Hussein in January, 1990, several Senators relayed their impression of an “imposing figure who exudes strength and confidence,” that could advance the cause for peace in the Middle East, who was “cordial and candid,” and who, while focusing on peace with Iran, could look to finding a solution to peace with Israel in the future (unknown Senator, CR: February 27, 1990; Senator Dole, on CBS This Morning, April 13, 1990; Senator Spector, CR: March 6, 1990). However, while a select few Senators believed there was an opportunity for closer relations with Saddam Hussein, the vast majority of policy makers perceived Hussein as an evil and dangerous leader of an influential state in the Middle East.

There were a variety of response alternatives that came with the developing perception of Iraq as a rogue state. Some policy makers saw the problems with Iraq and its WMD as having developed out of past U.S. policies that failed to come down hard enough on Iraq when chemical weapons were used in the late 1980s. The Reagan’s administration’s (via the State Department) opposition to sanctions at that time sent a message to Iraq that chemical weapons were okay to use. The solution, as Senator Pell suggested, was to penalize harshly and sanction any state that used chemical weapons (CR: May 16, 1990). Others believed a containment policy towards Iraq, enforced by the U.S., the Arab states, and Israel, was the best solution (Senator Reid, CR: July 18, 1990). While some policy makers believed that laws should have been changed to limit business transactions based on Iraq’s desire to obtain WMD (Senator Lieberman, CR: March 30, 1990; Senator Helms, CR: January 25, 1989; Representative Schumer, CR: April 3, 1990); those policy makers who perceived an opportunity in trading with Iraq believed that any sanctions against granting credits to the Arab state would only hurt U.S. businesses (Senator Inouye, CR: May 15, 1990). Interestingly, some policy makers took this opportunity to push for Bush’s strategic defense initiative (SDI) program, Brilliant Pebbles, as a means for stopping incoming missiles (Senator Wilson, CR: July 27, 1989; Senator Bond, CR: August 1, 1989; Representative Kyle, CR: June 27, 1990). While many policy makers called for some kind of action before a crisis situation occurred in the Middle East, the vast majority of them only pointed out the problem and failed to put forward any solution. Yet, from the response alternatives suggested, there was a growing view of Iraq as a rogue state, but with a few dissenters whose views on trade suggested a dependent relationship on the U.S. instead.

Thus, from the above analysis, a growing perception by U.S. policy makers of Iraq as a rogue state was emerging. While the term “rogue state” had yet to appear in the vocabulary of policy makers, the perception of the state fit well with the theoretical view of the rogue image. Iraq sought WMD, would use them without hesitation and with impunity against another state, it was an outlaw state with morals and values inferior to those of the U.S., and had expansive and destructive intentions in the Middle East. Response alternatives ranged from economic sanctions on those who traded WMD supplies to Iraq, to sanctions on Iraq itself, to the development of a strategic defense initiative that really wouldn’t apply to regional conflicts. On the other hand, there was the perception by other policy makers that Iraq maintained a dependent position, maybe no longer dependent on the Soviets, but increasingly open to the influence of the U.S. through trade. If the correct actions were taken, then Hussein, who was an intelligent and pragmatic leader, would see the opportunity in becoming indebted to the U.S. and allow its influence through economic, political, and military assistance. Therefore, the image that emerged in the minds of the policy makers at this time was mixed, but heavily leaning towards that of a rogue state, supporting the hypothesis that such an image existed at this crucial time. The key question now was whether the actual policy options that arose during a crisis situation supported the image.

On August 2, 1990,[5] Iraq invaded Kuwait. The overwhelming response of the international community was to force Iraq (really, Saddam Hussein) out of Kuwait through diplomacy, economic sanctions, and, if necessary, the use of force. The United States structured and supported UN resolutions, putting in place economic sanctions and embargos against Iraq and Kuwait (in order to guard against Iraq taking advantage of Kuwaiti assets abroad). The

initial U.S. decision to support UN sanctions developed out of the White House as Congress enjoyed a mid-term break at this time. Secretary of Defense Cheney apparently considered the absence of Congress for the decision of early troop dispersal to the Gulf a benefit, as the White House could therefore act in undertaking “what had to be done, rather than explaining it” (Senator Kennedy, CR: Oct. 10, 1990). While Saddam Hussein called the intervention in Kuwait an act to support nationalist factions that sought to “shake off” the imperialistic presence of the west, the international community perceived it as a grab for power by the Iraqi state through the acquisition of land and oil. Throughout the next few months, the safety and security not only of the Kuwaiti people but also of international citizens who worked in Kuwait and taken as “hostages,” specifically those from the U.S were of concern to Congressional leaders and the White House.

Interestingly, in light of the September 11, 2001 tragedy, President Bush made a historic speech on September 11, 1990, in which he discussed the evolution of a “New World Order” with the United States as the leader in a new era of influence in the Middle East, a region where the U.S. would never be defeated nor discouraged from taking action. Supporting this view, the

United States led an international coalition in an embargo, supporting economic sanctions against Iraq and the buildup of forces in the Gulf in order to coerce Iraq into leaving Kuwait and releasing the hostages. The need for insuring the security of the Gulf from weapons of mass destruction also developed as an interest of U.S. policy makers. Over the next few weeks the U.S. gave an ultimatum to Iraq to leave Kuwait by January 16, 1991, or risk an escalation of events. While several diplomatic exchanges evolved between Iraq and various countries and the hostages gained their release, the U.S. observed no improvement of intent by Iraqi leaders.

On January 16, 1991, the international coalition, led by the U.S., began an air bombardment of Iraqi and Kuwaiti locations to soften military, economic, and structural capability. Six weeks later, a ground assault began in order to solidify the success of the coalition’s endeavor to force Iraq out of Kuwait. By the end of March, the war was over, and the long road of sanctions against Iraq to force WMD compliance began.

The policies supported by the President, his advisors, and Congress from August, 1990 to January, 1991, provided support for a shift from the dependent of the enemy image of Iraq to that of a rogue state in the minds of policy makers. Yet, the policy preferences of the decision makers hinted of a lingering acknowledgement of past Soviet influence in the area and supported a transitional aspect of the dependent of the enemy policy preference code. For instance, Bush sought U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the Middle East, even as the Soviet Union was in its last days of power. On August 2, 1990, Bush relayed that the Secretary of State, James Baker, “has been in close touch with the Soviet leadership and indeed, the last plan was for him to stop in Moscow on his way back here” (Press Conference of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and President George Bush). In the same news conference there was a discussion on the successful cooperative efforts in conjunction with the Soviets and that Moscow had already acted to stop arms shipments to Iraq. In addition, Baker, in a joint interview with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, provided a reference to the Cold War era and the burgeoning change in the U.S.-Soviet relationship regarding the Middle East conflict. Instead of being on opposite sides as in past crisis situations, Baker saw the U.S. and the Soviet Union standing on the same side, albeit a difficult decision by the Soviets in having taken such a strong stand against its one-time dependent. Yet, the cooperation between the two powers provided influence and support for the developing resolutions in the United Nations (Joint Statement and Press Conference by Secretary of State James A. Baker, III and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, Aug. 3, 1990). Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney also supported a new, post Cold War, U.S.-Soviet relationship that provided the opportunity for the UN to act as it should have the last 40 years, now that the Soviets were supporting the UN Security Council (“Fox Morning News” Interview with Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, September 4, 1990). Yet, the Soviet participation failed to develop into more than a peripheral influence, more an aspect of what the Soviets weren’t doing rather than what they were. Even later attempts to involve itself diplomatically by suggesting a face-saving way out for Saddam Hussein prior to the air war failed to garner support from the U.S. Instead, the U.S. touted its new role as the leader in a New World Order of international cooperation and UN support and effectively silenced any Soviet effort.

Yet, most of the policy preferences in response to the crisis situation suggested by policy makers fell into the Retributive Actions section supporting the rogue state image. At the onset of the crisis in August 1990, Bush and his advisors supported economic sanctions, an embargo to enforce the sanctions in the Gulf, and military deployment to deter Iraq from further action in the Gulf, specifically towards Saudi Arabia, and to hopefully coerce Saddam Hussein into withdrawing his troops from Kuwait. Furthermore, Bush and his advisors called for multi-lateral support for economic and military actions, or coalition building, with the United Nations as an integral player in obtaining legitimization. Bush was firm in that any use of force was to be defensive in nature only, that the deployment of forces was not an act of war and not in preparation for a long ground war (Press Conference with President Bush, August 8, 1990). Bush stated that he believed economic sanctions could work, with the support of the UN and participant countries (ibid). Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Advisor, supported sanctions, but also specified that the continued degradation of the situation in Kuwait would affect any time table (Special White House Briefing by Brent Scowcroft, September 28, 1990). The Bush administration focused on four goals: forcing Iraq out of Kuwait, restoring the legitimate government in Kuwait, the security and stability of the Middle East, and the protection of Americans abroad. On September 11, 1990, a fifth objective was added: a New World Order with the U.S. as the leader in support of peace and justice, whereby the Rule of Law replaces the Rule of the Jungle, and according to which the U.S. would not be intimidated in its actions (Text of Remarks by President Bush to the Joint Session of Congress, September 11, 1990). The Gulf crisis provided a test of a new post-cold war era whereby international events could be addressed multi-laterally with a strong UN presence (Secretary of State Baker at the Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, September 4, 1990). Yet, Bush considered diplomatic measures toward Iraq hopeless, that the U.S. would refuse any form of compromise or negotiation, and that talks could proceed, but not to expect any flexibility in the coalition’s response (Remarks of President George Bush and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, August 27, 1990).

November 1, 1990, Bush directly addressed WMD and stated that if the security of the region was important, then WMD development and proliferation in Iraq must be addressed (Press Conference with President Bush, November 1, 1990). Starting the second week of November, with a large increase in the number of troops sent to the Gulf and a change in troop rotation that eliminated the return of troops to bases outside the Gulf, Bush and his advisors began an effort that demonstrated how economic sanctions would take many months, maybe years, and could provide an opportunity for Saddam Hussein to improve his position. William Webster supported this position in his report to Congress, stating that while sanctions would hurt the lower levels of Iraqi society, it was unlikely to affect the nation’s “relatively simple Soviet-style” military capability of Iraq or Saddam Hussein himself, and continued sanctions would not likely dissuade Hussein’s actions nor spark civil dissent (Text of Letter From CIA Director William Webster to Representative Les Aspin, January 10, 1991). Ultimately, the Bush administration listed its reasons for the use of force against Iraq, and an air war commenced on January 16, 1991.

Similar to the Administration’s policy preferences, the Congress also tended to support retributive actions. Even though Congress was in break during the onset of the crisis, interesting discussions occurred. Most Congressional members supported economic sanctions against Iraq and the deployment of troops, and believed that a UN supported, multi-nation effort was the best means for a crisis solution; however, some variance in the degree of support for Bush administration policies existed. On the Republican side, Senator John McCain supported Bush’s actions, that this was a national security crisis, a “mission” based on oil needs, and even believed an air war acceptable, but that under no means should there be a ground war and that financial support should come from other countries, especially those whose oil needs made the Middle East an important strategic value (Larry King Live, August 27, 1990; Fox Morning News, September 12, 1990). Senator Kasten went a step further and suggested bringing in NATO into the war in order to defend Turkey (Press Conference with Senator Robert W. Kasten, Jr., August 9, 1990). Republicans also tended to support the use of force as a possible action, with some debate over the constitutional rights of the Congress versus those of the President.[6] Ultimately, Republicans sought to achieve a united front in Congress that would translate the United States’ determination to Iraq of Iraq’s ouster from Kuwait.

While many Democrats supported sanctions, the economic embargo, and UN/multi-nation involvement, there were some misgivings about the President’s policies. From the start, many Democrats did not want an escalation of events to the use of force, but rather, wanted to allow enough time for sanctions and the embargo to work (Alan Dixon: CR, August 3, 1990; Lee Hamilton, Press Conference, August 9, 1990; Edward Kennedy, Press Conference, November 30, 1990) When Bush signaled to the world that he was ready to take military action in January, 1991,[7] the debate over whether Congress would support the use of force became more heated. Many Democrats voiced a strong position against military action (Senator Charles Robb, Press Conference, December 20, 1990; Peter DeFazio, CR, January 9, 1991; Senator Paul Simon, United States Senate Debate, January 10, 1991; ), while some recognized that force might be necessary in the future after sanctions had been allowed to work (Representative Stephen Solarez, American Interests Program #1010, December 1, 1990, Senator Paul Simon, Press Conference, December 20, 1990), with others in support of a quick and decisive war. Again, much of the debate revolved around Constitutional matters—whether the President had the right and responsibility to start a war without Congressional support,—concern over the number of casualties that would come from U.S. forces versus the forces of other involved states, and who was going to pay the monetary costs of the war.[8] Some Democrats even believed that an end to the crisis could be achieved though diplomatic means if the Bush administration exercised more flexibility and provided a way out for Saddam Hussein (Representative Marcy Kaptur, Congressional Record, October 10, 1990).

In regard to domestic policies, several Congressional leaders voiced their concern over the increased dependency of the U.S. on imported oil, especially oil from the Middle East.[9] Policy makers suggested various means for reducing this dependence, from oil restrictions, new research and development in oil reserves, to the development of new technologies for fuel.[10]

As the previous section on the developing rogue state image suggested, there was a mixed response to the crisis situation in the Middle East regarding Iraq. Interestingly, the mixed response did not reflect the image some Republican’s had of Iraq that observed an opportunity in the relationship with Iraq before the war. As Republican policy makers appeared to support closer ties to Iraq prior to the crisis, policy preferences that supported finding diplomatic and economically beneficial solutions may have been expected. The exact opposite occurred, however. While Democrats tended to hold policy preferences that supported their previous views of an emerging rogue state, Republicans responded with retribution and intensely hostile actions, not always alluded to prior to the crisis. At a minimum, rehabilitative policy preference

for the rogue state for some Republican policy makers might have been predicted, but not one Republican seriously considered diplomatic measures (ones that would provide flexibility and compromise), a reduction of sanctions (in an effort to promote better behavior), or economic assistance. Republicans tended to set forth policy preferences that supported a prototypical rogue state image, calling for a severe spanking for Iraq having gone against the parent’s (in this case, the U.S.’s) wishes.

In response to critics, charges about the apparent change of face regarding Iraq and that that the Bush administration apparently had been caught unawares with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Bush responded that his administration tried to create good relations with Iraq, but that the administration had been “very, very wary all along of his – of his intentions” (Press Conference with President Bush, August 8, 1990). Consequently, when Iraq acted upon another state with uncalled for aggression, the U.S. could no longer act towards better relations and was forced to take action. Democrats, like Representative Peter DeFazio, believed that the overly speedy desire by Republicans to go to war signaled a cover-up mentality for past policies that supported Iraq and provided benefits to that country’s leadership (Representative Peter DeFazio, Congressional Record, January 9, 1991). Both sides probably had some insight into the strong Republican reaction, but a consideration of what exactly the rogue state image implies suggests that the Republican response was exactly in-line with the rogue state image. Consider, for example, that the rogue state is the “naughty child” that needs to be forced back into line through corporal punishment. Prior to being naughty, Iraq was being nurtured along by the Republican administration to be an ally and asset for U.S. policy makers in the Middle East. Iraq was a “good” child, although potentially dangerous and disruptive, and should act with respect and appreciation towards the parent by behaving in a way that would not cause the parent embarrassment. Yet, Iraq did act against the international “norm” and caused U.S. policy makers who had supported Iraq embarrassment. There was no attempt to explain the behavior away as a unique and isolated event that could have been fixed through rehabilitative measures. This suggested that there was a lingering thought in the “parent’s” mind that such negative behavior could occur, but that the parent was such a good parent that they could keep the bad behavior from happening. In response, the now angry parent lashed out at the child not only to change its behavior to fit with the international norm, but also because the parent was made to look bad in front of others and so must prove that it is a good parent by seeking harsh punishment towards the child. Thus, the response of the Bush administration exactly follows the movement of an image of dependent state (as Iraq had moved from being a dependent on the Soviet Union to seeking dependent status on U.S. beneficiary) to that of a rogue state. While other theories have failed to support this change in policy behavior by the Bush administration and Republican policy makers, image theory does. The radical change was not due to a conspiracy by the Bush administration to pull Saddam Hussein out and then slap at him simply to provide the opportunity to insert troops into the Middle East. Rather, it was the response of an embarrassed administration that violently took action against a state that had failed to live up to its imagined role in the hierarchical relationship between the two states.

On the Democratic side, along with those Republicans who had originally provided data supporting a rogue state image, policy makers voiced policy preferences that supported their already held view of an Iraqi rogue state. Policy preferences fell into the retribution category of a prototypical rogue state with only a very few considerations of rehabilitative measures that centered on diplomatic efforts and compromise. Policy preferences included sanctions, embargos, the use of force and coalition building. Thus, the predicted image of an emerging rogue state was supported in the analysis of the data. Indeed, for some policy makers, the exact moment of the emergence of the rogue state image was observed.

By the end of the 1990s, Iraq was observed as the “bad child” in the international community. Although the Clinton administration undertook efforts to eliminate the term “rogue state” from its diplomatic vocabulary (though the term was not non-existent), the conceptual image was still prevalent in policy makers’ minds and ultimately affected policy making decisions. The difficulty in the analysis for this section was that after the end of combat in March 1991, an ongoing sense of crisis emerged in the Gulf as the U.S. sought Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions and Iraq continued to dance around the fulfillment of agreed upon requirements for ending the war. At times, Iraq appeared to comply with requests to allow UNSCOM[11] weapons inspectors to enter facilities and visit locations, but events also supported a regime intent on hiding WMD capabilities. On the U.S. side, policy makers observed Iraqi non-compliance, which necessitated continued sanctions and increased threats towards the use force against questionable locations. On the Iraqi side, enough was enough, and unless the UN, led by the U.S., was able to show a schedule that offered some kind of finality in the search/sanction actions, Iraq was no longer going to comply. Some international community members, led by Russia, France and China, sought a middle ground, and asked for the lessening of sanctions—as these measures only hurt the poorer civilians—while they sought actions that would promote compliance on the part of the head of Iraq. Thus, in an attempt to observe the image perceived by U.S. policy makers that prevailed from 1997 to 1998, we enter into a continued conflict situation, one that topped the list of important security concerns for the United States at this time.

The offensive capability of Iraq centered on its WMD and the possibility that these weapons could either be used by Iraq against its neighbors if attained or given by it to terrorist groups to use against western states, specifically the U.S. Berger (December 13, 1998) lamented the point that Iraq still had the capability to produce and deliver WMD and sought to keep that capability. Furthermore, policy makers agreed that since Hussein had used such weapons in the

past, he was likely to use them again in the future (Albright, February 11, 1997; Clinton, January 17, 1998; Berger, December 13, 1998; Ashcroft, September 2, 1998). Such a possibility could not be allowed to happen, from the policy makers’ perspectives. CIA director George Tenant pointed out Hussein’s continued efforts to hide WMD capabilities (January 28, 1998), while Congressmen agreed that Hussein continued to use obfuscation to counter UNSCOM actions that sought to locate and destroy WMD capability (Kyl, CR: April 27, 1997; McCain, CR: November 5, 1997; Gephardt, CR: February 12, 1998; Grams, CR: February 27, 1998). Even while inspections and sanctions were in place, Saddam Hussein still attempted to obtain technology that could have been used in weapons production (Torricelli, CR: November 13, 1997). If Saddam Hussein was not stopped during this action of weapons inspection and was allowed to rebuild his WMD arsenal, he would have the capability to threaten not only regional neighbors but the international community as well (Kerry, CR: November 9, 1997). Thus, Iraq’s capability centered on WMD and the likelihood of their use if obtained, placing Iraq squarely in the rogue state image category.

Cultural sophistication is a second category that elucidates whether the image held by policy makers of a state is that of a rogue or other category. Throughout policy makers’ commentaries on Iraq, U.S. policy makers spoke of the “inhumane” and “uncivilized” actions of Hussein, his army, and Iraqi officials. As observed in 1988 to 1991, policy makers commented on the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war and against Kurds in Northern Iraq (Gilman, CR: January 8, 1997; Berger, CR: February 13, 1998; Clinton, February 17, 1998; Albright, November 28, 1998). Such actions against his “own people” signified the base level of animality existent in Iraqi leaders. In addition, policy makers perceived Iraqi leaders as quite willing to use religion as a means of furthering their own goals as Iraqis stated that any action against an Arab state during religious observances was anti-Muslim (Clinton, April 22, 1997). Clinton observed that Hussein enforced policies domestically that “repressed” the population while he supported “aggressive” policies internationally that threatened regional neighbors (October 31, 1998). Hussein supported terrorism and would provide terrorists the capability to go “from airport to airport wreaking havoc in the world of the 21^st century that our children will live in” (Clinton, November 13, 1997). Some labels given to Iraq during this time included “rogue” (Kerry, CR: November 9, 1997; Weldon, CR: November 22, 1997), “pariah” (McCollum, CR: June 10, 1997) and “outlaw” (Berger, CR: February 13, 1998), the leadership were the “true terrorists” that were part of a “murderous, ruthless dictatorial regime” (Gilman, CR: November 13, 1997) that pursued “lawless policies” (Albright, February 11, 1997). The leadership in Iraq partook in “gross violations of human rights” that called for the leaders’ prosecution for instigating international criminal acts (Gilman, CR: November 13, 1997), and had “pursued a policy of deception, lies, concealment, harassment, and intimidation in a deliberate effort to hamper the work of the inspectors” (Lantos, CR: January 12, 1997). Hussein knew “little about the Western World” and could not comprehend the United States (Torricelli, CR: November 13, 1997). Not only did Hussein fail to care about his own citizens and the anguish they were going through because of his non-compliance with UNSCOM efforts (Albright, February 11, 1997), but he also had no consideration for the environment (Spector, CR: March 12, 1998). U.S. policy makers perceived Hussein’s mandatory compliance with international requests for Iraq to submit to weapons searches as a result of his own actions (Albright, November 14, 1997; Cohen, November 24, 1997). Thus, Iraq was conceptualized as a state that was less than civilized, took inhumane actions, and was forced to submit to international norms and requirements. In other words, it must “grow up” or be severely punished.

Saddam Hussein crystallized as the focal point for all that was wrong in Iraq, a prominent aspect of the rogue state image. As in previous years, Hussein was a “dictator as evil as Hitler” whose “reign of terror [was] unmatched in the post-cold war era. . . a brutal dictator, a tyrant” (Ashcroft, February 27, 1998). His legacy was a “murderous, ruthless dictatorial regime” that oppressed domestically and threatened regionally (Gilman, CR: November 13, 1997). He was “despotic and cruel” (Gilman, CR: August 1, 1997), violated human rights (Gilman, CR: August 1, 1997; Hastings, CR: November 13, 1997), an “outlaw” (Kerry, CR: November 9, 1997), and a danger to the community (Berger, February 13, 1998). Saddam Hussein was a “chronic problem” that just would not go away (Berger, February 13, 1998). He was “reckless” in his pursuit of WMD (Berger, February 13, 1998), “stupid” and “his own people’s worst enemy” (Clinton, December 16, 1997 quoted by Bowers, CR: December 17, 1997), and bore close watching (Clinton, 1998). The only thing that Saddam Hussein understood was a good whooping (implied by Gingrich, CR: October 9, 1997). Furthermore, his “behavior has not improved” (Hamiliton, CR: August 3, 1998) and must be kept “on a short leash” (Kerry, CR: November 9, 1997). If he was not stopped at this time, he would destroy the region and the world (Kerry, CR: November 9, 1997), just as he had already destroyed the wonders of the fertile crescent (Kerry, CR: February 25, 1998). Policy makers loved to vilify Saddam Hussein, and the comments went on. Ultimately, Hussein was the only thing stopping peace in the Gulf: the policies of the state of Iraq were Hussein’s policies; he was the one building WMD; the locations of possible WMD information and technology were his palaces; he was the one who had brought down such harsh actions upon his state as he refused to work with inspectors; he had been the cause of death and destruction in his own country; he was in control of the future of Iraq and only he could make it better. It was “Saddam Hussein’s Iraq” (Clinton, 1998). This perception fits exactly with the image of the rogue state: there is a leader or group at the top of the government that is the real problem, and if the leader would just disappear, all would be well. Saddam Hussein was seen as an errant, aggressive, power seeking man, yet one who was clever and calculating. However, he was not mature enough to handle the responsibilities of an internationally-minded state, was more of an animal than human, and garnered aggressive treatment as that was all he knew and understood. Saddam Hussein was perceived as a rebellious teenager, a leader of a gang of thugs, bent on taking over the community through force, and must be stopped.

The goals and motives of Iraq also fit into the rogue state image as they supported the desires of the leadership in its acquisitions of power and were counter to the goals of the international community. The goal of the leadership of Iraq was to spread fear and terror throughout the region (Gilman, CR: August 1, 1997), to obtain and to provide terrorist groups with WMD (Berger, February 13, 1998), and to block weapons inspectors’ access to areas that might expose WMD development and thus curtail said acquisition (McCain, CR: November 5, 1997; Lantos, CR: November 12, 1997; Tenet, January 28, 1998; Berger February 13, 1998; Clinton February 17, 1998; Leahy, CR: February 26, 1998; Hamiliton, CR: August 3, 1998; Kyle, CR: March 2, 1998; Albright, November 28, 1998). Saddam Hussein only cared about Saddam Hussein: “The only cause Saddam believes in is his own survival and ambition” (Berger 12/8/98). In his attempts to solidify his own position, Hussein sought to disrupt the unity of the international community through subterfuge and to limit UN authority by “dictating terms of compliance” (Kerry, CR: November 9, 1997). If he was allowed to obtain WMD, he would use them or threaten to use them (Kyl, CR: August 31, 1998). Thus, policy makers perceived Saddam Hussein’s intent and motives as having been based solely on selfish desires for power without regard to his own people or the international community. It was not the same as the perceived evil intent of the enemy that sought to increase its role in the international community through the spread of its (comparable) military, social and political structures, but rather is the perceived immaturely driven desire for raw power in order to threaten and abuse others. There was no equality conceptualized in this perception of motive. Rather, U.S. policy makers perceived the power-seeking motive of a lesser-being that must be squashed.

Interestingly, the response alternatives for this period of time centered on the failure of containment policies[12] and the threat to use force in order to obtain Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions. After the end of the Gulf War in March, 1991, there was likely a reduction in the prototypical placement of Iraq in the rogue state category, or at least the hope that Iraq would comply with UN resolutions and allow weapons inspections. However, by the time 1997 rolls around, there was a definite feeling that diplomacy had reached its end, that “containment” was not working, and that some other means for enforcing compliance must be found. For the prototypical rogue state image, this entailed a retributive action meant to either whip the state into shape or eliminate the leadership altogether.

Clinton and administration advisors tended to support diplomatic efforts in determining solutions to Iraqi non-compliance with UNSCOM inspectors (Clinton, November 6, 1997; Cohen, November 14, 1997; Albright, 1998), but they also understood that strong support for more aggressive actions supported diplomatic efforts, and that the last step effort would be the use of military force (Cohen, November 14, 1997; Berger, February 13, 1998; Gore, CR: February 17, 1998; Cohen, 1998). The administration refused to back down, was inflexible in demanding access to locations by weapons inspectors, and would not accept limitations put on UNSCOM. If Iraq failed to comply with UN requests, it would signify the end of diplomatic measures and the use of force would prevail (Albright, February 11, 1997; Berger, February 13, 1998; Clinton, February 17, 1998). In the end, the use of force garnered support from the international community as all other measures to insure global and regional security had been exhausted (Clinton, November 15, 1998). In addition, while sanctions adversely affected Iraqi citizens, they obviously affected Iraqi leadership capabilities as well and must be sustained (Clinton, November 14, 1997; Berger, February 13, 1998; Clinton, October 31, 1998). As some states in the international system sought the reduction of sanctions, continued efforts to work with these states in promoting U.S. policies also appeared as a priority (Albright November 14, 1997). Furthermore, though many advisors and the President would have willingly accepted new leadership in Iraq (Albright, February 11, 1997), forced regime change would have cost too many American lives and may not have necessarily supported U.S. strategic interests (Berger, February 13, 1998; Albright, 1998). Administration members sought to continue working with opposition forces in promoting close ties to a successor regime, but would not pursue direct military action intended to eliminate the Iraqi leadership (Berger, February 13, 1998).

While some congressmen sought to sustain humanitarian efforts and voiced concern for Iraqi citizens (Abraham, CR: October 7, 1997), the response alternative most often suggested was the use of military force to compel compliance if diplomatic efforts failed. Democrats especially believed every diplomatic channel should be explored before using force, but agreed, for the most part, that force may be necessary with the Iraqi state as it often failed to adhere to its agreements (Gephardt, CR: February 12, 1998; Leahy, CR: February 26, 1998; Cleland, CR: March 17, 1998; Levine, CR: November 10, 1998). The desire for diplomatic solutions above all else reflected the U.S.’s role as the only superpower, a role that, if the U.S. acted with unnecessary force, say some Democrats, would project an arrogance of authority to the international community (Kerry, CR: November 9, 1997). If the U.S. exercised the use of force, then the UN must support such actions (Kerry, CR: November 9, 1997; Lantos, CR: November 12, 1997). Furthermore, Democrats had not wanted to see U.S. servicemen and women unnecessary killed in the Gulf (Cleland, CR: March 17, 1998). Policy makers believed that if any use of force were to be taken in the Gulf, it must have both the diplomatic and military support of other states (Cleland, CR: March 17, 1998).

On the other hand, Republicans tended to support “any means necessary” to enforce UNSCOM inspections (Gingrich, 1997). Republicans tended to put the blame for Iraqi non-compliance not only on Saddam Hussein, but also on the weak and inadequate policies of the Clinton administration. Republicans believed that Hussein had observed a weakness in U.S. policy and used it to his advantage (Weldon, CR: November 22, 1997; Gilman, CR: October 1, 1998), and at the time of the analysis, the Clinton administration was trying to amend the situation. Furthermore, past Clinton policies had handed over authority to “functionaries” at the UN, which had limited the U.S.’s ability to take appropriate action (Ashcroft, CR: February 27, 1998). Both “containment” and promoting regime change had failed (Ashcroft, CR: September 2, 1998). Only a few Republicans called for other response alternatives before the use of force, one the support of opposition forces in and out of Iraq (Wexler, CR: February 26, 1998; Gilman, CR: October 1, 1998), and another being the exploration of a covert military operation to remove Saddam Hussein from power (Grams, CR: February 27, 1998). In addition, Republicans called for a U.S. strategic defense initiative (Weldon, CR: November 22, 1997) despite its irrelevance in regional conflicts. Another response alternative was the call to set up an international criminal tribunal to judge Saddam Hussein and other top Iraqi officials (Gilman, CR: August 1, 1997; Gilman, CR: November 13, 1997; Spector, CR: March 12, 1998).

Both Republicans and Democrats sought a single, unified strategy in the Middle East that was reasonable, supportable, and had an ultimate achievable goal, ideally one that enforced sanctions, promoted democracy, provided incentives for a democratic turnover in government in Iraq, and voiced these goals to international actors (Kerry, CR: November 9, 1997). Ultimately, U.S. policy makers called for all WMD and WMD technology in Iraq to be completely eliminated (Kerry, CR: February 25, 1998). No one supported reducing sanctions, and only a few suggested increasing humanitarian efforts.

For the most part, response alternatives also supported the image of the rogue state in policy makers’ minds. While the Democrats supported diplomatic efforts, which could be observed as less supportive of the rogue state image, this possible policy response does fall into the rehabilitative side of policy options. While the prototypical rogue state calls for the use of force, diplomacy is a “New Age” alternative in diplomatic “parenting” of wayward children. Just as parents today seek measures that do not promote violence in the home (violence only begets violence—if you want to change the behavior a child who hits, you don’t hit them to stop it), “enlightened”[13] international members will seek non-violent alternatives that attempt to coerce without the use of deadly force or destructive sanctions. However, in the international

community at this time, there existed still the threat of violence to back up diplomatic measures. Furthermore, Democrats observed that, as the U.S. retained the capability to force its will upon any rogue state (if accepting the costs associated with the action), the use of such force upon less militarily and economically capable states could have been seen as arrogant and an abuse of power. Yet, many U.S. policy makers supported the use of force if diplomatic measures failed to produce the desired results. Additionally, arguments existed on how “diplomatic” a process it was to enforce compliance with UN resolutions that sought to destroy WMD. There was no give and take, no middle ground, no desire to seek a compromise. It was, “you do this or else,” period. Not really a diplomatic means of finding a solution to a crisis. Rather, it was a desire to coerce without having to use force, or pay the costs of enforcement. Thus, the rogue state image was supported in the response alternatives of U.S. policy makers and reflected the conceptual image held by policy makers of Iraq during 1997 and 1998.

All of the indicators for the years viewed supported a rogue state image. Capability levels showed a state desiring WMD, often considered a cheap means of obtaining a deterrent capability against the intrusion of larger states or other regional actors. The perceived level of cultural development firmly suggested a “belligerent child” that lacks self-control. The motive behind Iraqi actions was the desire for raw power, sought by a single leader, Saddam Hussein, who was incapable of understanding the international community and miscalculated at every turn, who had the intent to either harm others himself or to provide the same means to others (terrorists). Response alternatives centered on diplomatic and military force meant to coerce Iraq into complying with the demands of the international community, specifically those of the U.S. If compliance was not accepted, the single superpower regulator would have to force adherence to the rules. Iraq was the prototypical rogue state, an ideal image for conceptualizing such states in the international system.

Throughout 1997 and 1998, Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi leadership balked at complete compliance with UN weapons inspectors and requirements based on UN resolutions. While the U.S. saw this as a flagrant disregard for the international community and a threat to regional and world security, the Iraqis considered the level of intrusion against their sovereignty debasing and indefinite. What has often been called a “cat and mouse” game ensued. By November, 1998, the international community, led by the U.S., sought to militarily coerce Saddam Hussein into compliance. On November 14, 1998, Saddam Hussein sent a letter to the UN Security Council that stated Iraq’s full compliance with UNSCOM measures, a last minute attempt to stop the bombing already agreed upon by UN members and supported by Arab states. Clinton decided not to bomb at that time, stipulating that if Iraq failed to comply, bombing would commence. On December 15, head weapon’s inspector Richard Butler determined and reported to the U.S. that Iraq had failed to comply fully with UN requests: Iraq would not allow access to party headquarters, it often blocked inspectors who sought to take pictures of bombs by, kept inspectors from interviewing people, and refused to turn over documents (plus more). With this information in hand, the Clinton administration, along with British support, began a 4 day bombing operation designated Desert Fox (December 16 to December 19, 1998). While supported by past UN resolutions and Arab agreements, many states in the international community opposed the action by U.S. and British military forces (specifically, France, Russia, and China). After four days, the intense bombing stopped, weapons inspectors did not re-enter Iraq, containment proceeded, and the Iraqi state became the target of ongoing military measures meant to limit official activity in the northern and southern areas of the state and further reduce Iraqi capability.

Almost all policy makers, both administrative and congressional, supported the use of force against Iraq in response to the crisis situation. Policy makers tended to voice frustration about Iraq’s actions, specifically those of Saddam Hussein’s, and how this was all Hussein’s fault, not theirs. There was even the consideration that adherence to UNSCOM requests at this late date may limit military action (Berger, December 16, 1998). President Clinton and his advisors centered their comments on the desired outcome of the bombing operation. As weapons inspections’ success had been limited and effectively curtailed by the Iraqis, bombing sought to degrade existing WMD, halt and reduce development and proliferation capability, and eliminate the threat to regional states, (Albright, December 16, 1998; Clinton, December 16, 1998; Albright, December 17, 1998). Operation Desert Fox sought to address real security concerns of the United States, the Middle East, and the world (Clinton, December 16, 1998). Indeed, the administration asserted, the world and the UN were behind the U.S. efforts as countries continued to voice their support (Albright, December 16, 1998; Berger, December 16, 1998; Clinton, December 16, 1998; Albright, December 17, 1998). Dissention by some states (France, Russia, China) had done little to offer solutions to the problem (Albright, December 17, 1998), and calls to Russia to exert pressure and persuasion on Iraq had failed (Albright, December 16, 1998; Albright, December 17, 1998).

Extended sessions in Congress provided the opportunity for members to voice support for the men and women in the military, for the President, for the use of force, and to go over the history of events that had led up to the bombing (see Congressional Records, December 16 and 17, 1998). To list all the members of Congress who had taken advantage of this opportunity would take pages. Some qualifications did appear, as a few members of Congress reiterated that their support for military action depended on the continued support of the United Nations and the international community for the use of force (Biden, CR: December 16, 1998; Conyers, CR: December 17, 1998; John, CR: December 17, 1998).

The interesting aspect of this analysis centered on the dissenting views by a select minority of Congressmen. Some members of Congress questioned the timing of the bombing. Some supported the bombing, but believed that such actions should have been conducted months or years before (Weldon, CR: December 17, 1998). Sanders not only questioned the timing, but also the support from the UN, the international community, and the Pope, and the devastating effects on the Iraqi civilian population (Sanders, CR: December 17, 1998). Republican Representative Paul believed that the bombing was not only “annoying,” but was likely illegal, an act of subterfuge by the President to avoid impeachment proceedings, and another straw to support impeachment (CR: December 16, 1998). Sanford believed that the bombings were little more that a pinprick that would have no real affect on Iraqi WMD capability (CR: December 17, 1998).

Considerable discussion revolved around whether the bombing was motivated by the political needs of the President. Debate on impeachment proceedings was set to commence a few days later, and members of Congress voiced questions, concerns and disgust that the President might put men and women in harm’s way for his own political interests (Livingston, CR: December 16, 1998; Paul, CR: December 16, 1998; Gilchrest, CR: December 16, 1998; Sanford CR: December 17, 1998; Lott and “other Republicans” in Warner, CR: December 16, 1998). Berger and others reiterated that the timing was the result of Saddam Hussein’s actions, not the President’s, and that the need for a quick response was due to possible information leakage and the upcoming month of Ramadan for the Muslim community (Berger, December 16, 1998; Biden, CR: December 16, 1998; Nadler, CR: December 16, 1998; Albright, December 17, 1998). If the U.S had not acted at this time, no credibility would have existed in dealings with other states of interest (Biden, CR: December 16, 1998). National security concerns dictated the need for action at this time, not the impeachment proceedings (Albright, December 17, 1998). Furthermore, Clinton observed that the men and women on his advising committee would not have stood for supporting personal political aspirations for war (Clinton, December 17, 1998). In addition, only using U.S. and British forces had not signaled a lack of support for military action. Rather, it was the necessity for promptness and quick action that prevented the inclusion of other countries’ military forces—the coalition behind the effort was strong in spirit (Berger, December 16, 1998; Cohen, December 16, 1998).

In response to those who questioned the effectiveness of such a limited strike, Presidential supporters responded by saying the strike effected real action against Iraq (Albright, December 16, 1998) and was not a “pinprick” or limited strike as it extended for days rather than hours (Biden, CR: December 16, 1998). To prove the power of the bombing, Cohen announced that the number of ship and air-launched cruise missiles in the operation exceeded the total number of the same launched in the entire Gulf War (Cohen, December 18, 1998). Furthermore, Clinton announced that any efforts by Iraq to develop WMD, threaten its neighbors, or take action against the Kurdish population would provoke additional military action by the U.S. (December 16, 1998).

Other policy alternatives suggested by a few policy makers were to reduce economic sanctions against Iraq and increase humanitarian efforts, as sanctions had only hurt the poorer populations in Iraq, mostly women and children (Conyers, CR: December 17, 1998; Kilpatrick, CR: December 17, 1998). Strategic interests of the U.S. could be better addressed through humanitarian efforts and a “tough stance” than through sanctions that caused more problems than solutions (Kilpatrick, CR: December 17, 1998). However, those that discussed sanctions generally believed they had worked and should be continued into the future, and that humanitarian needs were being met through the oil-for-food program (Albright, December 16, 1998; Clinton, December 16, 1998; Clinton December 19, 1998; Cohen, December 19, 1998).

Addressing reporter’s questions on how the administration felt about direct actions to remove Saddam Hussein from power, as apparently suggested by a small number of Senators, Albright reiterated that forced regime change was not the intent of the bombing, but if such an occurrence developed, the administration would be ready and willing to work with new leaders (Albright, December 16, 1998). A number of policy makers also called for undermining the Iraqi leadership by supporting opposition forces either within Iraq or abroad (Albright, December 16, 1998; Berger, December 16, 1998; Clinton, December 16, 1998; Albright, December 17, 1998; Conyers, CR: December 17, 1998; Clinton, December 19, 1998), and by promoting Radio Free Iraq in the region (Clinton, December 19, 1998). However, other policy makers felt that democracy must be promoted in Iraq to provide for a stable Middle East (Gilchrest, CR: December 17, 1998), and if strong action for regime change were taken, then the U.S. should be at the forefront (Spence, CR: December 17, 1998; Lott and Helms by Warner, CR: December 16, 1998).

In regard to domestic policies, several Congressmen sought to affect future votes on funding for the military. The need for sending U.S. men and women abroad to fight for U.S. and world security must be translated into additional funding for military growth and development (Weldon, CR: December 17, 1998), retirement concerns, and capability (Gilchrest, CR: December 17, 1998). Always an issue in times of conflict and war, the ability of servicemen and women to act and protect themselves, and their subsequent morale, galvanized policy makers to seek additional funding for the military and supporting industries.

All in all, the policy preferences of policy makers during the Desert Fox operation supported the use of a conceptual category of the rogue state image for Iraq when processing information, as projected by the pre-crisis data analysis. The overwhelming support for the use of force to coerce Iraq, or really, punish Iraq for not complying, adhered to the rogue state image. The U.S.’s having to take forceful action was all Saddam Hussein’s fault—the child must be punished or it would continue to act out. Furthermore, if the “parent” had not taken action, it would have suggested to other “children” that the “parent” was weak and that other child-like rogue state could act out as well. The only real dissention focused on timing and political interests of policy makers, not whether using force itself was the correct action or not. Once again, the use of a conceptual image to predict policy makers’ policy preferences is supported.

In this chapter, the transformation from the dependent of the enemy image to that of the rogue state image was supported in the case of Iraq. For Iraq, there was an effort to retain its deterrent capability achieved through its relationship with the Soviet Union after Soviet influence began to wane. For Iraq to achieve deterrent capability it sought WMD. By seeking WMD and holding on to an anti-western stance as observed in its desire not to follow international norms, Iraq found itself perceived as a rogue state. If Iraq had sought WMD but supported western norms, the harsh treatment designated by being perceived as a rogue state may have been limited. Yet, powerful states in the international system continued to hold views that new nuclear and WMD states did not have the same constraints on irrational behavior that older nuclear states possessed, making any new development in WMD by smaller states (or Global South states) threatening. Thus, any development of WMD by Global South states, whether supporting western ideals or not, may provoke a threat-induced response by the U.S. However, it may be that those states that do not fit the prototypical rogue state image, ones that may be further along the line towards the complex image, may instigate responses more along the lines of rehabilitative than retributive. As North Korea has yet to be bombed, this case may offer some insight into the spectral positioning of rogue states in policy makers’ perceptions and policy makers’ subsequent varied responses.

[1] Please see the appendix (C) for a policy maker’s rank and party affiliation.

[2] These comments could be understood in a time when many nations were re-assessing the use of capital punishment in the judicial system as no persons were put to death by the U.S. government in the years 1968 to 1976. Yet, from 1930 to 1967, the United States killed over 3,500 people through capital punishment and over 700 since 1977, and the numbers are generally increasing yearly (http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/tables/exetab.htm).

[3] More than ten Congressmen used the term “barbaric” in describing the Iraqi regime.

[4] With this analysis, the U.S., who stockpiles and develops chemical and biological agents for weapons, threatens every individual in the world with death through its grotesque supply of nuclear weapons, and continues to develop tactical nuclear weapons for use in theatre-based warfare, disregards the innate human right of every individual on the planet to live free of fear.

[5] By some accounts, the invasion began on August 1, 1990; or even as early as July 31, 1990.

[6] I.e., as this was not a war of the U.S. versus Iraq, but a UN sanctioned war, there was no need to invoke the War Powers Act as the ratification of the UN Charter by Congress already provided consent, or that the President didn’t need to get consent from Congress as the War Powers Act was unconstitutional.

[7] These signals appeared through the covert act of deploying more troops and ending rotations out of the Gulf and in his rhetoric that became increasingly supportive of military action beginning in the latter half of November, 1990.

[8] The payment for the war considered whether the U.S. should seek monetary support by other states (Les Aspin, Press Conference, November 15, 1990) or pay for its own war-making, forcing the U.S. population to consider the real terms of war and not just accept the use of its military abroad (Bob Kerry, Meet the Press, August 26, 1990).

[9] Not a new concern, as shown in the previous crisis (1973) when there was to be an active attempt to decrease the U.S.’s dependence on imported oil by 1980. Yet, by 1990, the dependency on Middle Eastern oil appears to have increased, making the area an even greater concern for U.S. security interests.

[10] On a personal note, just as the crisis in the Middle East in 1973 led to the development of the Alaskan oil pipeline, the crisis in 1990-1991 led to the development of off-shore drilling along the California coast, a significant change to the visual beauty of my new home-town, Huntington Beach, from when I left California 15 years ago. The question now is whether the new crisis today (2003-2004) will lead to the drilling of oil in the Alaskan wilderness, despite the awareness that said oil will not provide a real solution to the end of our oil reserves in the next 25 to 50 years.

[11] This was an acronym for the United Nations Special Committee (UNSCOM) for searching out and destroying weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

[12] The type of “containment” as a policy against Iraq was not the same containment policy used against an enemy state. Iraq was not being contained at this time from spreading its political, economic and military strength to other states as it did not have this capability. The Clinton containment policy was different (Berger, 12/16/98): 1. economic sanctions, 2. UNSCOM detection and destruction of WMD, 3. threat to use force if threatening neighbors, 4. support from other regional actors. In application to the enemy, however, containment was meant only to keep military might from expanding, not necessarily to reduce its ability to develop weapons, as seen in the development of weapons technology by the Soviet Union allowed in arms treaties by the two superpowers. In addition, containment against the enemy is the best option as direct contact may lead to nuclear war. In the case of Iraq, containment was based on the threat to use force if Iraq’s behavior did not improve—two very different intentions behind “containment.”

[13] An “enlightened” view of international relations is only one way of thinking according to this argument.