CHAPTER FOUR

Mesopotamia is a Greek word for “between the rivers” and points to the land between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers (Hooker, 1996). Often called the “cradle of civilization,” Mesopotamia rivals any other area of the world for its cities and development of government structures. The Middle East supported the unique development of social, economic and political structures at a time when most of the world lagged behind. An area often considered part of the “Third World” today existed as the hub of trade and culture before the common era (BCE). Specifically, the area centering on the Tigris River and the surrounding fertile plains, sometimes referred to as al-‘Iraq, suggests an identity of ancient power (Tripp, 2000).

Sumeria existed from 3100 to 2000 BCE and provided structures of civilization that would continue long after the demise of their existence. During this time, city-states emerged with the temple as its central feature and a division of labor that allowed a few people to grow food for the rest of the population through a distribution system governed by priests (Hooker, 1996). Growers controlled rivers in order to cultivate the land, an extraordinary capability for the time. The Sumerians developed a bureaucratic and record keeping system, which in turn led to a writing system. In addition, actions that were deemed unacceptable to society resulted in ramifications designated by a technical legal system (Hooker, 1996). The downfall of the Sumerian empire occurred due to the constant in-fighting between city-states that weakened the empire and allowed for other groups to invade and take over (Hooker, 1996), an occurrence observed over and over again in the Middle East. Nevertheless, Sumerian structures would continue to endure, as each succeeding group would adopt the cultural, economic and political structures originally developed by the Sumerians.

Each succeeding empire contributed to the development of civilization in the Middle East. Akkadia (2350-2200 BCE) further developed trade and culture and elevated the role of Babylon as the hub of economic growth and influence. Babylonia (2000-1600 BCE) followed, with Humurumbi uniting many of the city-states and constructing a “code of law” that governed many aspects of life (Hooker, 1996). The Kassites dominated militarily and commercially, while the Hittites (1600-717 BCE) were traders and spread their legal and political structures throughout the East. The Assyrians (1350-612) were great conquerors of both North and South Mesopotamia. In order to maintain control over the conquered populations they forced people to migrate to other areas, creating a diversification of cultures. As with modern states, technical achievements grew out of the needs of the military (Hooker, 1996).

Two groups lived on the Arabian peninsula—the Sabaeans in the South who were dependent on the inter-state trade routes and the Arabs in the North who, as Bedouins, were nomadic or had developed the areas around oasis along the boundaries of the great desert—eventually leading to the Arab empire. Judaism and Christianity spread throughout the area and influenced the cultural development of city-states. The Bedouins grew as a military force and centered their power around the city of Mecca (Hooker, 1996). The religious tradition of the emerging Arabism included Bedouin goddesses who were subordinate to the one God, Allah (a likely inclusion from Judaism and Christianity), and other aspects of Christianity and Judaism. Ultimately, political, cultural and religious traditions would change with the advent of Muhammad and Islam.

Muhammad saw himself as a “Messenger of God,” who brought to the world a new message, later incorporated into the Qur’an (Hooker, 1996). The central message transmitted by Muhammad was that the whole community must be taken care of and that wealth should be distributed among all, a concept not appealing to the wealthy clans but accepted by the poor and unfortunate (Hooker, 1996). The parts of the Qur’an taught in Mecca focused on one’s relationship with God. Once Muhammad moved to Medina, he began to concentrate on building communities based on one religion. While Muhammad at first incorporated Jews into the new religion, in Medina he pronounced that Mecca was the direction to face when praying instead of toward Jerusalem, a point that divided followers of Muhammad from the Jewish population (Hooker, 1996).

With the death of Muhammad, change occurred in the Middle East. Contention arose between Muslim factions as to who should lead the people. Abu Bakr, Muhammad’s father-in-law, was tapped and led as khalifa (caliph). During this time, Arabs partook in jihads (“striving in the way of the Lord”) and conquered neighboring areas, vastly expanding the Arab empire. After Bakr’s death, Muhammad’s son-in-law, Muhammad Ali, desired to lead the people, but Umar, another follower of Muhammad, was chosen instead. When Umar’s successor, Uthman, was assassinated, Ali was made caliph, but he, too, was assassinated due to rumors that he had been involved in Uthman’s demise. Under Mu’awiyah, the caliph was made a hereditary position, giving rise to the Umayyad clan’s reign of power with its center in Damascus (Duiker and Spielvogel, 1994). Arab expansionism spread into Europe, resulting in a huge empire ruled by the caliph.

Yet, contention between factions continued. In 680, Ali’s son, Hussein, based in Iraq, led a revolt against the Umayyeds. Hussein’s supporters, called sh’at Ali or “partisans of Ali,” rose up in support of the hereditary line of Muhammad. While the revolt was put down, this began the division between the Shi’ites (followers of Hussein) and the Sunni Muslims, which continues to this day throughout Iraq and Iran (Duiker and Spielvogel, 1994).

During this time, multiculturalism reigned in the Middle East. As a crossroad of several cultures and a focal point for trade, Arabs, Jews, Greeks, Christians and Persians all lived together (Hooker, 1996). With the advent Abbasidian power—when a descendant of Muhammad’s uncle overthrew the Umayyads—Arab power moved to Iraq. Taboos against intermarriage loosened and relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims occurred (Duiker and Spielvogel, 1994). Baghdad (“gift of God”) was built and stood as the center of Arab power, trade, and commerce. While the Arab warrior had previously stood as the “ideal citizen,” judges, merchants and government officials filled the new position. Significant cultural and scientific advancement in astronomy, literature, economics and trade occurred, and an increase in the relative wealth of individuals resulted, especially during the reign of Harun (813-833) (Duiker and Spielvogel, 1994).

While counties develop, rise, and produce advances, they ultimately fall. The Abbasids were no different. Divisions within the government structure and despotism reduced Baghdad’s control over the vast Arab empire (Duiker and Spielvogel, 1994). Different Caliphs rose in various areas throughout the empire, further dividing people along tribal lines. While Baghdad still maintained power within Iraq, Cairo emerged as the center for trade and culture. As a result of the weakening of the Arab empire and the division of its loyalties, the Turks were able to move down from the north in 1055 and entrench themselves throughout the Middle East, initiating the rule of sultans (Duiker and Spielvogel, 1994). Muslim leaders would continue for a time in various areas of the Middle East, but divisions along religious and tribal lines, as well as the influence from the Turks and Mongols, further reduced the ability for any united Arab effort to emerge to counter the invaders (Hourani, 1991). Furthermore, the advent of the plague reduced the population of both cities and countrysides, limiting the capability of governments to collect taxes and produce armies (Hourani, 1991). Ultimately, the Turks won out, and the rule of the Ottoman Empire began.

The area of the Ottoman Empire where Iraq now exists often felt pressure from the Safavid Empire to its east. The Safavids (Shi’i Muslims) and the Ottomans (Sunni Muslims) shared a long border along which conflicts between the two Muslim groups occurred (Tripp, 2000). The Iraqi region consisted of three main areas: Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul. A strong Kurdish system of government existed in the Mosul area, while a tribal system emerged around Baghdad and Basra. Central to the Arab Ottoman empire, especially in Baghdad, was the rule of the mamluks, foreign born leaders raised Muslim who structured power through a tributary system, sending tribute irregularly to the Ottoman sultan in Istanbul (Trip, 2000). Power structures relied on familial supports and political relationships based on kinship (Tripp, 2000). Though mostly Muslim, the Mosul and Baghdad areas also included Christians, Jews, and other religious faiths. Basra alone consisted of a population of Shi’i Muslims governed by Sunnis. This would later raise political problems.

In the early 1800s, the Ottoman empire sought to exert its control over the three districts of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra, redefining the political and economic system through a series of mandates. In an attempt to limit power relationships based on family ties, the Sultanate only strengthened kinship structures as “clients” obtained benefits from the government through established networks (Tripp, 2000). Part of this new structure incorporated a constitution, providing for some pluralistic political structures. Later, in the late 1800s, Sultan Abdulhamid II suspended the constitution and ended reforms, personally creating relationships with top officials in the provinces (Tripp, 2000). Counter movements grew within groups of young men educated in the schools and colleges of the area. Ties were created between provinces as commonalities were found (Tripp, 2000). These “Young Turks” forced the reintroduction of the constitution in 1908, gaining political power and supporting a growing pluralist political dialogue throughout the Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra areas (Tripp, 2000). These groups called for equality, the inclusion of Arabic as a language of state along with Turkish, and an increase of power to the various provinces (Tripp, 2000). Thus, Arab unity around an Arab identity began in the latter end of the Ottoman Empire with the hope of creating an Arab state.

Arabs came into Word War One in opposition to the Turks who had supported the Axis powers. Arabs hoped that they would obtain their own state at the conclusion of the war (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). Instead, through the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Britain, France and Russia divided the Middle East into “spheres of influence” (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). While most Arab states’ boundaries were set by the Green Line of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of July 29, 1913, the borders of Iraq and Kuwait were created when Perry Cox, at the Ugair conference on December 2, 1922, drew a red line on a map, setting the scene for later conflict (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). The Middle East fell under the domination of European powers through a variety of mandates, many of which supported the development and production of oil reserves in Iraq and other states to the benefit of European powers (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). While Kings of Iraq sat in traditional positions of power, the real policy making came from Britain (Tripp, 2002). Yet, with the support of the League of Nations, Iraq obtained a certain level of independence with the Hashimite Monarchy (Tripp, 2002). However, factionalization, Kurdish dissent in the north and Shi’a rebellion in the south provoked harsh measures, limiting popular influence on Iraqi policy making (Tripp, 2002). The Iraqi government supported the British at the beginning of WWII, interning Germans and enacting harsh policies to control public dissent (Tripp, 2002). After several coups forced changes in the prime minister, the British doubted that Iraq was still loyal to the British. Britain requested that troops be allowed to enter Iraq, and when the nod failed to appear, the British forced their way into Baghdad with the help of many Kurds and Shi’a fighters (Tripp, 2002). Shortly after the end of WWII, the Portsmouth Treaty allowed British influence in Iraq to continue for an additional twenty-five years (Tripp, 2002). While the monarchy would continue for another decade, the Iraqi people were effectively denied the ability to control and create their own domestic political and economic policies, which were orchestrated instead by the British government.

The Arab states acted to end the encroaching Jewish state and the domination of European powers. The “Arab revolution” evolved out of nationalism in the form of a developing parliamentary system and an easing into secularism, socialist ideology through the nationalization of industries and the move towards a welfare state, and Islamic fundamentalism (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). Arabs sought to end the dominance of European powers and their acquisition of the Middle East’s natural resources. While the influence of the European countries would continue to structure political and economic policies for years to come, Arabs sought to create autonomy within their respective states. Due to the political nature of oil, European and American powers would not easily be dissuaded and would compete to situate themselves as the dominating force in Arab countries.

The inception of the Baath party occurred in Syria during1943 and traveled to Iraq in 1950. This political ideology promoted Arabism and sought to eliminate classist structures (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). The Baathists would come to power in 1966, but their influence was limited as leaders soon found themselves in exile (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). In the seventies Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia vied for the leading position in the Ba’athist desire to unite the Arab world under one political system (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). This aspiration to create Arab nationalism and unity underlay the political actions of leaders from the fifties to the present.

In 1958, ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim[1] led a revolt against the monarchy and British influence, instead supporting a more militaristic establishment. Qasim encountered strong political influence from the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) in the first two years of his leadership (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987), reflecting leaders’ desires to reclaim political autonomy and national resources through structures opposing European influence. The Soviet Union found the leadership of Iraq amenable to Soviet involvement in Iraqi politics (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987), and Iraqis saw opportunity under the Soviet umbrella. Yet, by the end of 1959, the ICP lost much of its clout with political leaders and found itself out of power. In addition, the Ba’ath party, the nationalists, and the National Democratic Party (NDP) sought to affect politics in Iraq (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987), each jockeying for superiority.

Iraq and other Arab countries began to develop some clout in the international oil market with the inception of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960. As Western powers still desired cheap oil and sought resources to develop in the Middle East, the threat to limit oil or oil development directly threatened the national security of the major powers

(Anderson and Khalil, 1991). If OPEC were to obtain control over the flow of oil in the Middle East it would become a political force with oil as its weapon (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). Part of Iraq’s move to gain power through the acquisition of oil under al-Karim Qasim included the attempt to annex Kuwait June 25, 1961, after the British left June 19, 1961 (Cordesman, 1999). Fortunately for Kuwait, the U.N. admitted it into the organization, solidifying its status as an independent state and providing legitimacy to the Kuwaiti regime (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). While Iraq had sought to retake the portion of its state that had been cut off at the Ugair conference in 1922, the United Nations has acknowledged the nation and its autonomy for the last forty years. Yet, this would not be the last time Iraq would seek to retake Kuwait and place it within its borders.

In 1959, the Soviet Union sought to influence Iraq and initiated arms imports into the state. Once started, arms proliferation into Iraq led to Iran’s seeking of comparable capabilities. Soon, both states were competing with each other in an arms build-up in order to keep the other state from obtaining greater military (Cordesman, 1999). The beneficiaries of this buildup were the countries supplying the arms to the two countries, the Soviet Union and the United States. These two countries sought to influence the political positions of Iraq and Iran through the promise of arms and the subtle influence through intelligence lines.

On February 8, 1963, the Baathist and Nationalist supporters violently took over the government under the guise of a Marxist/Socialist agenda (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). In November of ’63, Abdul-Salam Arif took power as the head of the government (Cordesman, 1999). During this time Iraq sought Soviet help in oil development (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987), allowing the Soviet Union to influence political and economic policy in Iraq. Rumors circled that the CIA, not likely to sit by as events unfolded in the Middle East, helped Baathists Nayef and Dawd regain power in 1968 (Pelletiere, 2001). As the Baathists had developed into an Arab nationalistic party that supported the rise of Arabism, the CIA likely saw the Baathists as a better alternative to the Marxist/Socialist ideologies of other factions.

In the late1960s and early 1970s, a change in political identification emerged with the rise of individual leaders rather than of political parties taking precedence. Instead of aligning themselves with a political party, people followed specific individual leaders (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). There occurred a re-emergence of familial identification whereby leaders placed family and home-town members in positions of power, gaining support through personal relationships (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). Ahmad Hasan al Bakr led the country for eleven years beginning July 30, 1968,[2] with Saddam Hussein as second in command (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). Both men participated in purging the government of individuals considered disloyal to Bakr and put loyal supporters in their place (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). Their Revolutionary Command Council, with Saddam Hussein as vice-chairman, strongly enforced new policies that structured people’s behavior. A repressive government based on mistrust and paranoia emerged, limiting the ability of citizens to influence the development of their government.

The Soviet Union materialized as a major player in the development of Iraqi political, military and economic policy. Bakr strongly opposed western countries and sought the friendship of the Soviet Union (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). The Soviet Union and Iraq signed an agreement on June 21, 1969, that promoted Soviet assistance in technology, with more

agreements to follow (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). Originally relying on the French for oil development, Iraq sought Soviet knowledge and resources, leading to Iraqi dependence on the Soviet Union for oil production (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). Saddam Hussein even visited the U.S.S.R. in December of 1971 to promote the Soviet-Iraqi relationship and sought a “solid strategic alliance with the Soviet Union” (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987:146).[3] On April 9, 1972, Bakr of Iraq and Alexi Kosygin, Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, personally signed a Friendship Treaty, calling for “cooperation in political, economic, technical, cultural and other fields” (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987:147). The Soviet Union was fully entrenched in Iraqi politics, and Iraq emerged as a client state of the Soviet Union.

In the seventies, the Iraqi Communist Party sought support from the Soviet Union in the hopes of gaining strength within the Iraqi government, but the Soviets adhered to a policy of supporting those in power and not providing support to opposition parties (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). However, the Soviet Union did develop a relationship with Mulla Mustafa Barzani of the Kurds who sought an independent zone in Northern Iraq. Yet, Barzani, influenced by the CIA, found solace with the United States in the seventies in hopes of gaining military and economic support against the Iraqi government (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). Barzani and the Kurds also formed an alliance with the Shah of Iran thinking that it would lead to an independent Kurdistan, but the alliance failed to topple the Iraqi Ba’athist and Communist run government and likely would not have resulted in a Kurdish state (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). This relationship between the Kurds and forces against the Iraqi government would lead to repercussions for the Kurdish population in the north.

During this time, states dependent on the Soviet Union militarily and economically set the stage for a great powers altercation. States in the Middle East that depended on either the Soviet Union or the United States for their military strength found themselves the focal point for super power conflict. While a state, such as Israel, accepted aid and arms from the United States, the Soviet Union also sought to influence the power structure of the Middle East by arming states, such as Iraq. As the Soviets did not seek direct conflict with the U.S., dependent states of each country found themselves the tools of the great powers (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). Instead of fighting each other and risking a nuclear war, limited conflict occurred between dependent states (e.g., the Arab Israeli war). The Iraqi government obtained most of its arms from the Soviet Union (Tripp, 2002) and used these weapons against U.S. supported states. Interestingly, although Iraq threatened the national security of Israel and the flow of oil, Iraq never directly aroused the military power of the United States, possibly due to the deterrent effect of its parent state, the Soviet Union.

An oil embargo in the early 1970s threatened national interests in the U.S. as gas prices soared, affecting all areas of the economy and political interests. OPEC sought to increase the price of gas in a “price run up” in 1973 (Pelletiere, 2001). This included an embargo against the U.S., creating a crisis in the U.S. economy and military (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). OPEC’s limiting of the United State’s access to oil reduced the capability of the U.S.’s military and increased economic spending. The national interests of the U.S. were clearly affected and the security of the country was at risk. Also, Iraq increased its level of participation in oil production through the nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum Company in June 1972 (Pelletiere, 2001; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). This move by the Ba’athist leaders galvanized support for the government and created legitimacy for its political leaders (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). A “revolution” in OPEC leading to its increased stature as an oil cartel opened up new markers for Iraqi oil (Pelletiere, 2001; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). As Iraq holds the largest oil reserves after Saudi Arabia (Arnoue, 2000), this Middle Eastern state retains great political opportunity and power, a force that threatens western powers.

The seventies also saw another attempt by Iraq to take property belonging to Kuwait. The altercation started when Iran and Iraq disagreed over the Shatt al Arab waterway and its use as a portal for oil distribution. Iran began firing into the waterway, so Iraq sought an alternative and wanted to use Kuwait as an access for shipping oil. Kuwait refused to allow Iraq access. On March 20, 1973, Iraq moved into the northern part of Kuwait in an effort to force compliance. Later, in 1975, Kuwait and Iraq normalized relations and Bakr acknowledged Kuwait as legitimate and not a part of Iraq (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). Yet, this would not end the threat of Iraqi desire to reclaim Kuwaiti land.

In the latter part of the 1970s, the Baathist regime in charge in Iraq moved away from its dependence on the Soviet Union economically, politically and culturally, but still relied upon the U.S.S.R. militarily (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). The Baathist ideology of pan-Arabism supported the development of Arab culture and political identity. In addition, due to the desire not to appear threatening to the U.S. and its interests (Israel), the Soviet Union reduced its influence with Arab states in the 1970s (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). Concerned that the Soviet Union’s continued support of regimes vehemently against Israel would be seen as a direct assault against U.S. national interests, Soviet leaders sought to reverse some of the Soviet Union’s visible involvement in Arab states, limiting the possibility that aggression between the two superpowers would erupt over dependent altercations.

The unity between the Baathists and the Communist in Iraq began to tear in the mid-seventies. As Soviet influence waned in Iraq, the Communist influence also shrank, and the Baathist forces gained strength. April 1976 marked the beginning of the split with ultimate consequences for the Communists as purges and murders of individuals who took part in communist activities occurred (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). The Baathist leaders once again expunged those whom they felt held agendas counter to that of the Baathist party and put in place members loyal to the individuals in power. As family and home-town members often stood above suspicion, tribal and familial roots determined placement in leadership positions.

A change in the leadership of Iraq occurred on July 16, 1979. Saddam Hussain took over the reigns from al’Bakr and controlled the political and military systems with a firm hand (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987;). A continuation of the policy of placing those loyal to the leader into prominent position would continue. Shortly after his acquisition of the leadership position, Hussein called a meeting of all top officials. During the meeting he called the names of some officials, who were subsequently arrested. Many of these officials met with their death at the order of Saddam Hussein, while others were kept incarcerated for an indeterminate period of time (“Personal”). Thus, socialization into loyalty without dissent developed within the regime, as dissent often meant the imprisonment and death of those considered disloyal.

A short year after Saddam Hussein’s takeover of the top position in Iraq, conflict between Iraq and Iran arose. On September 22, 1980, Hussein instigated war by invading Iran (Cordesman, 1999). Often seen as an aggressive act against an innocent state, others see it as the rational action of a leader under pressure from a more powerful, expansionist country (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2003). Iran’s leaders had supported Kurdish rebellions in northern Iraq and only agreed to stop when Hussein gave Iran part of the Shatt al-Arab waterway. After the Shah fled and Khomeini ascended to power, Khomeini sought to expand his Islamic revolution first to Iraq and then throughout the Middle East. Khomeini again supported Kurdish rebellions as a way to end Hussein’s regime. Thus, it was rational for Hussein to take action against Iran and seek to end its involvement in Iraqi politics (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2003). The Iraqi leader saw a threat to Iraq’s national security and his own political power and sought the means to end Iran’s influence and gain territory as a buffer between the two states.

In order to maintain his military strength, Hussein obtained funds from both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the form of loans and aid (Cordesman, 1999). Perceiving itself as the barrier between Persian Iran and the rest of the Arab world, Iraq sought support from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In 1984, Iraq possessed the ability to launch chemical weapons at Iran (Cordesman, 1999). Iraq’s capability to use chemical weapons became more precise in 1987 (Cordesman, 1999). On the other hand, Iran chose a new strategy by threatening oil tankers in the Gulf. In this way, Iran hoped neighboring countries, like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, would feel the brunt of these attacks and force Iraq to end the war (Cordesman, 1999). In order to combat Iran’s attacks on Gulf shipping, the United States allowed the ships to be re-flagged with U.S. symbols and guarded by U.S. ships (Cordesman, 1999). This unwittingly drew the U.S. into the conflict and started a “tanker war” between the U.S. navy and Iran (Cordesman, 1999). Through late 1987, Iran appeared to be the stronger of the two Gulf states, defeating the Iraqi military (Cordesman, 1999). Then, in May through July of 1988, Iraq’s military strength excelled and was able to take back lost ground. On July 18, 1988, Iran sought an end to the war, and in August, 1988, Hussein agreed to U.N. resolutions (Cordesman, 1999).

In the extended conflict between superpowers, the Soviet influence in the Middle East continued. In 1982, the Soviets supported Iraq militarily by supplying it with weapons for the war with Iran (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). Ironically, the U.S also supplied Iraq with military weapons, placing the Soviet Union and the United States in the unlikely position of being on the same side in a war (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). In 1984, the U.S. normalized relations with Iraq, setting up economic and military contracts and aid to follow (Sciolino, 1991). The United States sought to access the natural resources of Iraq by extending economic and military aid, which would continue up to the eve of the Gulf crisis in August 1990.

One of the devastating and often disparaged issues in the Iran-Iraq war was the use of Iraqi chemical weapons on Iran’s military personnel. Yet, both sides used chemical weapons, with Iraq launching mustard gas and Iran letting loose blood agents (Pelletiere, 2001). In 1988, Iraq launched chemical weapons into Halabja, which found itself under the control of the Iranians (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). Caught in the middle of the fighting were the Kurds, whose blue extremities suggest that the blood agent produced and expelled by the Iranian military killed the Kurds and not the gas from Iraq (Pelletiere, 2001). Other Kurdish areas also came under the assault of the Iranian military. Thus, Pelletiere (2001) suggests, the use of the gassing of the Kurds to incite negative feelings towards Iraq and Saddam Hussein may lack actual validation. On the other hand, some Iraqi military analysts might have considered the town of Halabja an enemy position and acted accordingly. Yet, does the occupation of a town validate the use of chemical weapons, even as an act of war? 6,500 people were killed in Halabja (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). As a comparison, over 200,000 people died in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and tens of thousands of civilians died in the fire bombings of Dresden. In fact, says Pelletiere (2001), the U.S. never really backed Iraq against Iran in the war, it was simply against Iran.

Furthermore, other issues were used to increase support for military action against Iraq in the Gulf War, including Iraq’s importing of capacitors, the acquisition of large pipes for a “big gun,” and its hanging death of Bazoft as a spy. Pelletiere (2001) asks readers to consider that Bazoft really did spy in Iraq, that the large pipes considered parts for a huge gun actually were for use in oil piping, and that the capacitors had other uses than for nuclear weapons. If this alternate view of Iraqi transgressions is considered, U.S. government accusations of the evil aspect of the regime suggest ulterior motives. Yet, the iron hand of Saddam Hussein, the purges and murders of individuals and the disappearance of citizens who oppose the Hussein regime reinforce views of an oppressive government.

The end of the Iran-Iraq war left Iraq with limited resources. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had loaned Iraq money to fund the war, but Iraq was in the position of not being able to repay its debts (Cordesman, 1999). In addition, Iraq once again sought an access to the Gulf via Kuwait in order to stay clear of Iran’s weapons by using the islands of Warbah and Bubian (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). Iraq further complained that Kuwait and the United Arab Emirate’s sought to use oil as a weapon against Iraq by selling more oil than allowed by OPEC, causing prices to plummet. This hurt Iraq as low prices limited the recovery of the Iraqi economy, seen by Iraq as a threat to its security. Furthermore, Kuwait was said to have moved the Kuwait-Iraq border north in order to cut across Iraqi oil fields (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). Iraq made demands of Kuwait, including the waving of required repayment of loans, the limiting of oil production, and the use of the islands as ports, many of which Kuwait acquiesced to (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). Yet, Iraq still felt its security threatened and invaded Kuwait on July 31, 1990. The aggression against Saudi Arabia also may have derived from that state refusing to wave the debt Iraq owed to it (Cordesman, 1999).

While many politicians expressed surprise and disdain at Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, his position could have resulted from the policies of Western powers. U.S. policies promoted Saddam Hussein as the top Arab leader through economic and military provisions and sales (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). Western powers had fully supported Saddam Hussein and Iraq as an Arab state against Iran. Saddam Hussein could not back down when the security of his state and his acquisition of power was threatened (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). Arab nationalism, the cornerstone of the Baathist party, required Hussein to act to preserve his place in the Arab world, which meant going against Western powers and policies (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). Feeling threatened by Israel, which had unilaterally struck Iraq’s nuclear program in 1981 and enjoyed Western support, Hussein fueled the flames of crisis by announcing Iraq would use chemical weapons against Israel if Israel took military action against Iraq (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). The Bush administration failed to take the opportunity to chastise Iraq strongly nor did the administration dissuade Iraq when it complained about Kuwait (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). The Bush administration’s policy was indecisive at best, causing Iraq to believe no action would be taken if it were to invade Kuwait. For the most part, researchers suggest that the U.S. supported Saddam Hussein up to the invasion of Kuwait (Arnoue, 2000).

Nevertheless, reports suggest that the Hussein regime supported actions that undermined human dignity and human rights. Information out of Iraq shows that Saddam Hussein employed periodic purges and executions of people who plotted against his regime or that gained too much popular support (Cordesman, 1999). Even though Hussein used a form of tribalism, the placement of individuals from one’s family or hometown into power positions (Cordesman, 1999), coups, desertion and emigration still threatened Hussein’s power. In addition, an individual who enjoyed popular support either in the military or the bureaucracy might undermines the power of Hussein and lead to the rise of a rival political power. Both types of actions threatened Hussein’s hold on power and were guarded against, resulting in a repressive and frightening regime.

An alternative view of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq suggests that Kuwait should take responsibility for instigating the situation. Not only did Kuwait go over its oil quotas, lowering the price of oil and hurting the economic situation in Iraq, but Kuwait also refused to cede the two islands in the Gulf to Iraq so that it could have access to a Gulf port to export oil and importing other goods (Pelletiere, 2001). From this standpoint, if Kuwait hadn’t blocked Iraq from developing its export/import structures and had curtailed its oil production, Iraq wouldn’t have been forced to invade Kuwait. Furthermore, Anderson and Khalil (1991) suggest that the mightier-than-thou stance of some permanent members of the U.N. security council promoted an hypocritical policy as these same members had invaded other countries in the recent past (U.S., U.S.S.R., China) (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). In other words, the national security interests of Iraq were less important than those of the more advanced states.

Prior to and after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, negative images of Iraq developed in U.S. policy makers’ minds. In one highly touted statement by Bush, he stated that Hussien was a “modern-day Hitler” (Sciolino, 1991). Sciolino (1991) suggests that this remark lacked negative connotations in Iraq as many people there had supported Hitler during WWII. Furthermore, many Iraqi Arabs considered actions against the Jewish population to be good policy measures.

Furthermore, rather than hurting the political position of Saddam Hussein, western policies and the Gulf War projected Hussein into the hearts of many Third World counties. By fighting against western expansionism into Third World countries, Hussein became a leader of the people in the Middle East and the Mediterranean (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). The more Western powers fought Saddam Hussein, the greater his popularity among segments of the Arab population. U.S. intervention in the Iraq-Kuwait crisis sparked sentiment that the U.S. only wanted greater influence and positioning in the Middle East in order to gain political and economic advantages (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). Rather than trying to eliminate Saddam Hussein from the Arab world, many Arabs believed that only a strong Iraq kept Israel and Iran from taking over the region. Actions by western powers that reduce the political power of Iraq might spell doom for any peace in the Middle East.

The terms of the cease fire sought to limit Iraq’s military and economic capability. Resolution 687, enacted April 3, 1991, called for the dismantling of all weapons of mass destruction and of the capability to produce them, the ability for the U.N. to conduct inspections and oversee the elimination of parts, and the limitation of oil exports (Cordesman, 1999). These sanctions effectively crippled any possibility of rebuilding the Iraqi infrastructure unless Iraq conceded to U.S. and coalition terms. In addition, compliance fell under the interpretation of the U.S., under the guise of the United Nations, making submission to the terms reflective of U.S. policy and continued changing goals.

Left in disarray and limping after the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the Iraqi economy deteriorated further during and after the Gulf war. From the western powers perspective, since Hussein refused to allow UNSCOM to do its job in investigating and eliminating weapons of mass destruction, sanctions remained in place (Cordesman, 1999). Interference by the Iraqi regime with UNSCOM efforts often took the form of “challenge and response” actions whereby the Iraqis challenged parts of U.N. sanctions as a way to inhibit or suspend searches and investigations while waiting for a response by the U.N., often projecting the altercation into a crisis situation (Cordesman, 1999). Only when forced did Iraq allow inspectors into questioned areas, with additional intervention in UNSCOM attempts to destroy weapons of mass destruction capabilities (Cordesman, 1999). Inspectors found that only limited amounts of Iraq’s chemical, biological and nuclear capabilities were destroyed during the Gulf War (Cordesman, 1999). Only after the defection of Lieutenant General Husayn Kamel Majid and his revelation of secret information about WMD capabilities did Iraq suddenly find documents uncovering a weapons program more significant than had previously been thought (Cordesman, 1999). In addition, after several years of sanctions, Iraq obtained economic contracts with Russia, China and France, splitting the U.N. Security Council (Cordesman, 1999). In the end, however, even France and Russia grew impatient with Iraq, strongly condemning it on November 1, 1997 about its circuitous and evasive actions (Cordesman, 1999). Cordesman (1999) believes that Iraq used any means possible, including misdirection and untruths, to obtain WMD capabilities.

After the end of the Gulf War, the attacks on Iraq continued. Often, these attacks came after Iraq refused to allow weapons inspections or denied access to weapons inspectors (Arnoue, 2000). The fifth crisis began January 12, 1998 when Scott Ritter, a weapons inspector from the U.S., was denied entry into Iraq (Arnoue, 2000). Iraq complained about the over abundance of western inspectors on the teams that inspected facilities and the lack of representation by Middle Eastern states. Arnoue (2000) suggests that the United States sought to find a reason in order to take action against Iraq. The sixth such major crisis was on December 15, 1998. In this instance, Richard Butler announced that Iraq failed to comply with U.N. resolutions. Even before the U.N. had a chance to review the report, the United States and Britain began bombing Iraq (Arnoue, 2000). Named “Desert Fox,” this bombing campaign lasted from the fifteenth of December to the twenty-second. B-1 bombers, F-16s, F-14s, F-18s, A-10 fighters and cruise missiles all left their mark on the Iraqi landscape and people (Cordesman, 1999). Even though the official action ended, subsequent attacks on Iraqi installations occurred when radars locked onto U.S. or British planes below the 32^nd parallel.

As much of the perceptions of Iraq center on Saddam Hussein, and U.S. policies reflect his status as a tyrant leader, some consideration of his history merits consideration. Saddam Hussein was born on April 28, 1937 in Auja, 100 miles north of Baghdad. His father either died or abandoned the family about time he was born.[4] Saddam’s mother, Subha, remarried, but his step father, Ibrahim Hassan, was said to have made Hussein steal and abused him until he went to stay with his uncle, Khayrallah Tulfah, in Baghdad (“Personal”). The circumstances of his birth stigmatized Hussein and made him an outcast, while his relationship with his step-father enhanced the dysfunctional aspect of his family (Yaphe, 2000).

In Baghdad he began his education, completing his intermediate schooling (about 9^th grade) when he was sixteen. Denied entry into the Baghdad Military Academy due to poor grades, he focused on the political opportunities available to him. Hussein participated in the failed attempt to overthrow King Faisal II (“Personal”), and, in October of 1959, then 22 year old Saddam Hussein, along with other Ba’thist members, participated in a failed assassination attempt on the leader of the country, Qasim (Tripp, 2002). Strong and prominent actions in support of the Baathist party projected Hussein into a Baathist leadership position. Wounded in the attack on Qassim and sought by the government, Hussein left Iraq and escaped into Syria and then Cairo (“Personal”).

While in Cairo, Hussein completed his basic education and began law school, never far from conflict due to his political beliefs.[5] When Qassim was publicly tortured and killed in 1963, Hussein returned to Iraq and participated in the torture of individuals who opposed the Baathist party. Although jailed by rightist military opposed to the Baathist party, Hussein was named as the deputy Secretary-General position of the Baathist party in 1966 by his cousin, General Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr. Hussein escaped from prison, and soon found himself as a top official in the Iraqi government when Bakr and the Baathist party took over the government (“Personal”).

As Deputy in Charge of Internal Security, Hussein created a system of intelligence that included spies, informers, and assassins loyal to Hussein. Many people promoted to powerful positions were family members, considered less likely to oppose Hussein and more likely to do his bidding. Hussein also commanded much wealth and control over exports of oil, as well as other business adventures. In 1979, Bakr resigned,[6] and Hussein placed himself as the leader of the Iraqi state. His first step reflected his suspicion of Iraqi leaders as he ensconced family members and people loyal to him into top leadership positions while purging and interning those who might oppose him, many of whom were subsequently killed (“Personal”).

During the next two decades, Hussein instigated the war with Iran and the Gulf War. Yet, rather than rousing the public against him, Hussein was able to strengthen his position and has often been seen as a leader or “hero” of Arabism in the Middle East (“Personal”). Many Arabs dislike the incursion of western ideology and culture that has spread throughout the Middle East, and see Saddam Hussein as a stalwart against imperialist United States. Thus, in a way, the efforts of the United States and coalition members to limit the effectiveness of Hussein may actually have launched him closer to his desired outcome of being the pan-Arab leader in a united Middle East.

Saddam Hussein employed policies and structures used by former leaders, which may have created legitimacy for his government. These structures and policies include social ties, the use of force against citizens, and strict laws against opposition (Tripp, 2002). As the second in command, Saddam Hussein supported his kinsman, Bakr, by eliminating any group that might influence dissention towards the government through purges, accusations of spying, and televised trials and hangings (Trip, 2002). Such actions reinforced the legitimacy of the Baathist government, as prior governments also used oppressive actions to limit opposition. Furthermore, the policy preferences of Saddam Hussein limited the desire of his opponents to oppose him publicly, effectively silencing voices of dissent. One additional component used by Hussein is the cult of personality. Through setting himself up as the supreme leader, supported through declarations of his greatness, pictures of himself throughout the country, songs that sing his praise, and other cultural admonitions of the powerful authority of his rule, Saddam Hussein created a cult around his person that engulfed the entire population. This use of cultural structures to support his dictatorship enhanced his ability to control the minds and beliefs of his people, strengthening his rule over them.

From the literature and history presented above, questions arise on the transition of Iraq from a perceived dependent on the Soviet Union to a rogue state acting against the norms of the international community. What was the perceived relationship by U.S. policy makers of Iraq and the Soviet Union? Why did the U.S. seek to involve itself with Iraq in the eighties and why did this relationship turn bad in 1990? How did the perceived image of Iraq by U.S. policy makers influence decision making during the dependent stage and into the 1990s? What influenced Iraq’s desire to obtain weapons of mass destruction, as perceived by the U.S.? The problem I seek to answer centers on how policy makers can successfully interact with perceived rogue states. By exploring the Iraqi cases, a prototype of the rogue state image emerges that sets the stage for future policy actions towards perceived rogue states. As rogue states stand as the focal point for U.S. foreign policy making, determining how policy makers perceive rogue states and their subsequent policy preferences sheds light on possible future policy decisions.

Recent archeological findings show that people lived on the Korean peninsula as far back as 600,000 years ago (Information). From 7193 to 3898 BCE, rulers used the designation Han-In (Lord of Heaven) to preside over the area of Han guk. In 3898 BCE, a new group emerged, the Han ung, who ruled until 2333 BCE. During this time, animal husbandry began, as well as did the use of medicines and agricultural development. 2333 BCE saw the beginning of the Ko-Chosun rule of Tangun (a legendary hero) in the Pyongyang area. The Three Kingdoms era (Koguryo, Paeche and Shilla) began in 57 BCE and ended in 668 CE, with the continued conflict between these states and the Han Chinese for control over East Asia. Beginning in this era and continued in later centuries was the use of mythical legends to create legitimacy for the people in power (History). Situated between China and Japan, Korea acted as a “cultural bridge” for the two states, as seen with the transmission of Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism from China, through Korea, and into Japan (History).

The Koryo dynasty began with the unification of the Three Kingdoms in 918 CE and Buddhism as the state religion. Buddhism affected much of the cultural and political development of the era, while Confucianism influenced the political structures. In the Chosen Dynasty (1392-1910) Neo-Confucianism became the state ideology. The political structure included a bureaucratic system with a king as a figurehead and a State Council as the real political power. Within the State Council sat the three High State Councilors who directed public policy, while six ministers took care of the administrative end of the system. In order to obtain a position in the political system, individuals had to take a civil service exam, which systematically allowed the best people to hold office. This era typically emerges as the “traditional” period in Korean history. The thirteenth century saw the invasion of the peninsula by the Mongolians who used Korea as a base for the conquest of Japan. However, their influence was limited as the Mongols extended their forces too far and were forced to retract. 1592 through 1598 saw the invasion of Korea by Japan, but the Koreans successfully repelled the attempts. In 1876, the small country known as the “Hermit Kingdom” opened its doors to the international community and allowed trade with foreign countries. While a tributary state to China and invaded by Japan, Korea maintained sovereignty of its borders and continued its march toward modernization.

In 1910, everything changed for the Korean population. Japan invaded again, and this time successfully implanted its political and cultural systems within Korea. The Japanese colonial period is traditionally separated into three distinct phases. The first phase, 1910 to 1919, reflects a forceful Japan that sought to destroy the culture of the Koreans and put in place a forced agricultural development that benefited the Japanese population (through cheap rice exports). Japanese was the language taught in schools and a Japanese version of history limited knowledge of Korean culture, language, politics and history. All opposition to the Japanese influence was squelched, but underground groups and those Koreans in other countries kept nationalistic views alive and helped keep the Korean language and history intact (History). It appeared that Japan sought to make Korea another Japan with Koreans as second class citizens. The March First Movement was an attempt to refute Japanese rule. Despite being a peaceful march, many Koreans were killed by the Japanese policing force. While it failed to change the colonialist influence of Japanese rule, it did raise nationalism among the Koreans and led to the creation of the provisional government located in Shanghai. The provisional government brought together different factions: Syngman Rhee (South Korea’s first president) who held a western democratic view of government and Yi tong-mui who held a strong socialist view of government. Divisions on ideology made united actions difficult.

The second phase of Japanese colonialism (1919-1931) centered on the cultural policy of the imperialist government towards Korea. Koreans sought to include the Korean language, history and culture into the school curriculum and to participate in more political structures. Bloody clashes between the Japanese and the Koreans occurred. The reduction of some political restrictions occurred, such as those against political publications and political groups. Yet, the Japanese colonial government implemented a stricter police system that dealt with political activists. The governor of Korea, Saito, sought to present Japan as the wiser older brother of Korea, worthy of respect in the Confucian ideology. Saito created an aura of “tolerance and freedom” that some Koreans considered open to change through the process of “gradualism,” political influence in a step-by-step process. On the other hand, socialist ideology crept into the vocabulary and thoughts of Korean activists as they sought to regain their freedom.

The third phase of Japanese colonialism reflected Japan’s invasion of Manchuria through to the liberation of Korea. Due to its activities in Manchuria, Japan needed more solders to fight its war. Many of these new soldiers were Koreans, some who elected to go and others who were forced into fighting for Japan. Korea became a base for Japanese excursions into China. More than four million Koreans were moved to Manchuria and Japan to work in mines and factories as part of the Japanese war efforts. Later in the war, Koreans also filled the void left by dead Japanese soldiers as the human resource of young men in Japan was limited. In addition, the colonial powers once again strictly enforced Japanese policy as any façade of political leniency ended. Finally, in 1945, the Japanese surrendered and gave up their colonial Korea to the allied powers.

The intrusion of the Soviet Union and U.S. forces lagged for a time after Japan’s surrender, allowing the Koreans to set up a political structure under the banner of the Korean People’s Republic. This was a committee based structure that allowed for local input into political decisions, primarily focusing on socialist ideology for public policy. The allied forces of the U.S.S.R, U.S., Britain and China, however, did not feel that Korea was capable of governing itself. As early as 1943, the allied states met to consider how best to “raise” Korea and conduct its own affairs after “due course.” “General order number one” divided Korea between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in order for them to supervise Korea’s political development with the intention of unification through elections. The U.S. ignored the KPR and instead worked with former collaborators of the Japanese colonial power. This sparked dissent in the areas under U.S. control. On the other hand, the Soviets purged all former leaders who had any connections with the former Japanese government and worked with the people’s committees formed by the KPR. Furthermore, the U.S.S.R. employed Soviet Koreans as mediaries between the Soviet Union and Korea, as they knew and understood both Soviet and Korean culture and systems (Chong-Sik, 1968). The communists, led by Kim Il Sung, agreed to the supervision of the Soviet Union. Kim, one of several important figures after the war, depended on the support of the Soviet Union in placing himself as the leader of the Koreans in the north (An, 1983).

In May 1947, conflict rose between the Soviet Union and the U.S., and any possibility of a joint governing system faded. The United Nations continued to promote a general election to unite the two spheres, passing a resolution calling for a watchdog group to go to Korea and oversee elections. Made up of mostly U.S. allies, the group was welcomed in the south but denied entry by the north. At this point, the U.N. decided that separate elections could take place with unification a desire further down the line. Thus, North and South Korea were effectively created through the machinations of the U.N. and U.S. allies. The South held its elections in May 1948, electing Syngman Rhee, with the North’s elections not far behind in the autumn with Kim Il Sung elected as premier.

One of the major challenges of the new governments was how to create legitimacy. Both states claimed to be the sole governing body of the Korean peninsula and called for the destruction of the other. Tensions grew between the two Koreas over the next two years. The Korean People’s Army in the North formed with the help of Soviet advisors and military resources, while the South was supported by the U.S. Rhetoric reigned as Rhee called for a “march north” to take over the North Korean area even though his military did not match that of the North.

Not only did Kim Il Sung have to deal with the South Korean leadership, but he also had problems within his own party. While Kim held the powerful position of premier, he still had to respect the divergent forces in the Korean Worker’s Party. Three other men held prominent positions in the party: the leader of the Soviet-Korean faction, Ho Kai-I; Southern Korean-raised Pak hon Yong who moved to the North at the end of the war; and Chinese-Korean Kim Tu Bong, part of Kim Il Sung’s guerrilla faction. To remedy possible disunity, Kim eliminated the opposition and become the sole “voice” for North Korea (History). Yet, this took time, and a perception of a unit of leaders existed until after the Korean War (Chong, 1967).

The Soviet Union continued to strengthen its influence over the East Asian state. North Korea was a “client” or “satellite” state of Moscow and acted based on its “hospitality” and “paternalistic guidance” (Tai, 1983; Chung, 1978). The Soviet Union occupied North Korea until 1948 and dictated its policies (Chong, 1967). Some experts would even go as far as to say that Kim started out as a Soviet puppet (Tai, 1983). In addition, the U.S.S.R. supplied arms and advisors to North Korea’s army (Henrickson and Jonguyn, 1997; Chung, 1978), a likely influence during the Korean War.

While the Korean War began with North Korea invading the South, both sides instigated the conflict with fighting words that raised tensions between the two states. President Rhee of the South called for South Koreans to march into the North and to end the reign of the Korean Worker’s party. At the same time, Kim sought to promote his government as the only legitimate one on the peninsula, calling for a militaristic unification of the North and South.

On June 25, 1950, 70,000 North Koreans invaded South Korea with Soviet weaponry and made their way all the way down to lower South Korea (An, 1983; History). MacArthur and the U.S. troops, under the banner of the United Nations, landed on the western city of Inchon and fought to regain the territory lost to the North. Not content with moving the North back to the 38^th parallel, MacArthur urged his troops all the way to the banks of the Yalu River on the border of China. Having been warned not to threaten Chinese security by pushing the North into China, the Chinese military entered the war enforce and pushed the Southern and U.S. forces back below the 38^th parallel. After a little movement back and forth, the fighting settled around the 38^th parallel. At this time, talks started between the two sides while guerilla fighting and U.S. bombing persisted. On July 27^th, 1953, an armistice was agreed upon, and the fighting stopped.

More than three million Koreans died in the Korean War, and many more were made homeless. One million Chinese were killed, and 54,246 U.S. forces died (History). This occurred in a short three year period. The human loss was tremendous.

Kim Il Sung supported a cult of personality (Tai, 1983). Concerned about the rise of individuals opposed to his rule or those gaining more popular support, Kim sought to limit the influence of such individuals through purges of government officials at various times (Tai, 1983). In 1956, a group of opposition leaders, with the support of the Soviet Union, sought to end Kim’s leadership based on personality, via a Khrushchev directive, but failed (Chong, 1967). His nationalistic ideology also supported the philosophy of Juch’e, or self-reliance and self-sufficiency as part of a national identity (Tai, 1983). As a response to former dependence on Soviet resources, Juch’e developed as part of North Korean policy (Tai, 1983). Kim Il-Sung changed his ideology from one of being under the rule of a great power to one of self-reliance (Park et al., 1987). Through the combination of the cult of personality, communism, nationalism and Juch’e, Kim sought to control the thoughts, hearts, and minds of the population (Tai, 1983). Furthermore, the move towards militarism was reflected in North Korea’s economic structures centering around cooperative farms—leaders went to local farms and directly taught methods of farming with their “superior” knowledge based on communism. Economic rewards were few. Instead, the benefit to Korea and its economic productivity were the ideological rewards of the masses (Chong, 1967).

After the Korean War, communist ties to the Soviet Union persisted, but outright dependence on the Russian empire began to ease (Tai, 1983). A “coexistent” policy existed with the Soviet Union (Tai, 1983). Yet, resources from the U.S.S.R., both economic and military, still found acceptance in North Korea. While the North sought to fulfill its philosophy of independence, reliance on Soviet knowledge and resources proved necessary. Furthermore, the Soviet Union helped North Korea after the war to repair its damage (Henrickson and Jonguyn, 1997). The economic assistance brought with it political influence. In 1959, North Korea and the Soviet Union signed an Atomic Energy Agreement for Peaceful Use, another means for the Soviets to influence economic policy (Henrickson and Jonguyn, 1997). While meant to provide electricity for a growing economy, some nations saw this as a move by the North to obtain nuclear weapons (Henrickson and Jonguyn, 1997). Such a heavy water plant provided the opportunity to produce the material needed for manufacturing nuclear devices.

Soon another communist state entered the picture and sought to influence the “Hermit Kingdom.” China began to compete with the Soviet Union for sway over North Korea (Tai, 1983). Although both were Communist countries, the leaders supported differing views about the strategic means of producing a Communist state. During the 1950s, North Korea needed the resources of China and sought to keep the flow of goods coming into North Korea. While Juche was still the ideological goal, the reality was that North Korea needed the resources of “parent” states in order to survive. Furthermore, by the summer of 1958, North Korean leaders adopted economic and political systems based on the Chinese model (Chung, 1978). In many respects, North Korea played the Soviet Union off against China, especially in the 1960s (Tai, 1983). In this way, North Korea was able to obtain economic and military benefits from both countries as the Soviet Union and China sought to influence North Korea.

The sixties saw an increasing desire in North Korea for the development its Juch’e ideology to become less reliant on the Soviet Union and China (Henrickson and Jonguyn, 1997). Indeed, some theorists consider the influence of the Soviet Union and China to be minimal. North Korea often blazed its own path and sought autonomy outside the world of communist states (Haggard, 1965). Haggard (1965) believed that Soviet and Chinese forces were not prevalent in North Korea and did not affect policy making. In addition, despite an agreement between the North and the Soviet Union for the latter to provide military assistance, there was a greater trend towards an alliance with China as it was more hard-lined and was seen as having a greater ability to keep the U.S. at bay (Haggard, 1965). North Korea interpreted Khrushchev’s backing down in the Cuban missile crisis as a sign of weakness and that the Soviet Union wouldn’t stand up to the U.S. (Haggard, 1965). In addition, China was a better partner for the possible reunification of Korea (Haggard, 1965). Another issue that created a separation between North Korea and the Soviet Union was Khrushchev’s move away from a “Stalinist” view of power politics. The North Korean leadership refused to “de-Stalanize” and eliminate the “cult of personality” as it would have reduced Kim Il Sung’s power. North Korea took a strong stance against Soviet influence both politically and economically (Haggard, 1965).

The end of the Korean War did not end North Korea’s desire to unite the two Koreas. The North continued to pester and disrupt the balance between the two states. The North increased its excursions into the South with 566 “significant incidents” in 1967 alone (An, 1983). A major incident occurred in January, 1969, when the North Koreans seized the U.S. ship USS Pueblo. The United States claimed that the ship came under attack while it was in international waters (An, 1983), while the North Koreans claimed it was spying in North Korean waters. The ship was seized and one crew member was killed in the crisis. A year-long negotiation occurred between the U.S. and North Korea, ultimately resulting in the release of the Pueblo’s men. The ship itself still resides in a harbor in North Korea, a trophy highly regarded by the North Koreans.

Internationally, North Korea moved through several stages in the sixties and seventies. It was considered a “pariah” state after the Korean War and only interacted with communist states. 1960 saw North Korea’s first diplomatic relations with non-communist states, and, by 1965, the North interacted with over thirty states. Of course, the non-communist states held radical nationalistic, non-western views (Haggard, 1965) and typically denounced the policies of the U.S. The intrusion of the U.S. into Third World countries developed as a major foreign policy concern for North Korea (Park et al., 1987), gleaning support from these states for North Korea. During this time, much of the international community saw North Korea as one of the most “hostile” and “isolated” countries in the world (An, 1983). On the other hand, North Korea also changed its blanket support of communist actions in the sixties and seventies. In an effort to open doors of dialogue with the South on unification, North Korea offered economic support to its southern neighbor (Haggard, 1965). This type of maneuvering, at one time towards the west and South Korea and at other times away, would portend North Korean actions in years to come.

The late 1970s saw a warming of relations between North Korea and other non-communist states. North and South Korea opened talks and began a “dialogue” (Park et al., 1987), possibly seen as a first step towards unification. In addition, North Korea began to consider talks with the U.S. (Park et al, 1987). Yet, the bi-polar aspect of North Korean actions made the possibility of talks unlikely as instances of conflict in the demilitarized zone proved difficult to overcome. One such instance still loomed in the memories of officials. On August 18, 1976, two U.S. military men were killed and nine South Koreans and Americans injured by North Koreans during a tree pruning incident. In addition, instances of incursions against opponents occurred between North Korea and the United States. Often seen as claims meant to discredit the other, both states partook in complaints about the other’s actions, child-like if not in such a high-tension area. For instance, on August 26, 1981 the U.S. complained that North Korea had shot at an SR-71 flying over South Korea and international airspace, an action which North Korea denied, saying that the U.S. was just trying to cause problems (Shinn, 1982). The North accused the U.S. of being Imperialistic (Shinn, 1982), while the U.S. saw the North Koreans as Stalinist Communists. Thus, a relationship at times conflictual, at other times conciliatory, continued to exist between the North and the U.S.

A change also occurred in the late seventies in the relationship between North Korea and the Soviet Union. While reliance on the Soviet Union receded during the sixties, a move towards the auspices of the Soviet Union occurred in the seventies. 1978 saw a rapprochement between North Korea and the Soviet Union (Shinn, 1982). Economic ties also continued to grow, despite North Korea’s access to China’s influence. Indeed, North Korea had extensive trade with the Soviet Union, twice as much as with China (Shinn, 1982). North Korea needed the resources of the more advanced communist states, taking the opportunity to obtain desired assets from both countries.

The 1980s saw the introduction of Kim Jong Il as the successor to Kim Il Sung (Shinn, 1982). While Jong Il emerged as a “co-leader” with his father, Kim Il Sung kept his leadership position, but now as the “elder statesman” who sought to “tutor” Jong Il (Shinn, 1982). Pro-successionists viewed the succession of Il Sung by Jong Il as an extension of the theory expounded by Marx and Engle. Supporters said that no other communist state fully addressed the successionist issue, and that North Korea had set a precedent by instating a hereditary model of succession (Shinn, 1982). In 1984, Kim Jong Il took over more of the administration roles previously held by his father and cohorts of his father (Kihl, 1985). Thus, Jong Il began to clothe himself in the trappings of authority designated by Il Sung.

An ongoing issue for both North and South Korea was the reunification of the peninsula. Despite desires for unification, or perhaps because of them, North and South Korea moved farther apart in 1981 (Shinn, 1982). Attempts by North Korea to undermine the political stability of the South only succeeded in creating a pariah state of the North. On October 9, 1983, North Korea orchestrated the bombing of South Korean cabinet members in an attempt to assassinate then President Chun doo Hwan of South Korea who was visiting Ragoon, Burma (Kihl, 1985). President Chun survived, but several others were killed. Questions arise concerning why the North would take such an action as all it did was to cause many states to sever ties to North Korea.

In 1984, North Korea made moves to be more open to South Korea and the international community. Observable in its aid to South Korea for flood victims, North Korea tried to find ways to open lines of communication (Kihl, 1985). Developing a relationship proved difficult as the North had to overcome the image of the “Hermit Kingdom” and its comparison to an authoritarian Stalinist-like state (Kihl, 1985). North Korea sought to begin tripartite talks between the U.S., North Korea and South Korea, to end the U.S. presence in South Korea, and to sign a peace agreement with the U.S. (Kihl, 1985). In addition, North Korea tried to stimulate economic recovery by opening up areas for foreign investment (Kihl, 1985). Unfortunately, an incident in the demilitarized zone worked against North Korea’s plans. In 1984 (Nov 23), when Vasily Matuzok, a Russian tour guide and diplomatic student, crossed into the demilitarization area, shots were fired and both sides reacted. A South Korean was killed as well as were three North Koreans, and an American and a Korean were injured (Kihl, 1985). Incidents like this limited the effectiveness of North Korea’s attempts to strengthen international relations.

Kim Il Sung continued to seek assistance from both China and the Soviet Union. In talks between the U.S. and North Korea, China often acted as an intermediary (Kihl, 1985). On the other hand, Kim Il-sung made a trip to the Soviet Union in 1984 to seek military and economic benefits (Kihl, 1985). Thus, the policy to accept assistance from both communist states continued as North Korea sought to create its own nationalistic, Stalinist state.

The fall of the Soviet Union affected North Korea in a variety of ways. Economically, North Korea lost its major export market, which had repercussions for the North’s ability to sell its products (Henrickson and Jonguyn, 1997). No longer able to export products to the Soviet Union, North Korea’s economy faltered and the ability to purchase goods from the Soviet Union ended. As with other dependent states of the Soviet Union, the end of Soviet influence and support reduced North Korean movement towards self-reliance and shocked backward several decades its economic development. Kim Jong Il believed that the demise of the Soviet Union was a direct result of the imperialist influence of the west on the communist regime (Kim, 1995). Perestroika and glasnost brought down the great empire, revealing the destructive force of western imperialism and the capitalist structure. The Soviet Union gave in to capitalism and western ideals, an obvious denial of the supremacy of communist thought.

Yet, North Korea continued its love/hate relationship with the South and its allies. North and South Korea signed a basic agreement in 1991 that called for the de-nuclearization of the peninsula (Doh). The agreement between the two states involved the U.S, an achievement necessitating talks between the U.S. and North and South Korea. Eventually, the U.S. removed its land-based nuclear weapons in 1991 (Kang, 1995). The removal of the U.S.’s nuclear weapons depended on the non-nuclearization of North Korea and its agreement not to acquire nuclear weapons, a question that would arise several times over the years to come.

Starting in 1993, disputes over North Korea’s nuclear program rose (Henrickson and Jonguyn, 1997). The IAEA requested to search two areas near Yongbyon, which North Korea refused to allow (Kim, 1995). In addition, South Korean and U.S. military forces still conducted the “Team Spirit” war games that the North considered a blatant rehearsal for the invasion of North Korea (Henrickson and Jonguyn, 1997). Both the attempts to inspect the “off limits” sites and the Team Spirit games influenced the North to back out of the Non-proliferation Treaty in March 1993 (Henrickson and Jonguyn, 1997). At this same time, North Korea refused the International Atomic Energy Agency’s request to visit the Yongbyon site (Henrickson and Jonguyn, 1997). Several states saw North Korea’s actions as threatening, as North Korea would now legally be able to continue its nuclear program. Analysts saw this as a blackmail attempt by North Korea to secure direct talks with the U.S. and to gain economic benefits (Kim, 1995). Talks between the U.S. and North Korea did occur, causing North Korea to put its decision to withdraw from NPT into limbo, being neither in nor out (Kim, 1995).

North Korea sought concessions from the U.S. and South Korea, but failed to obtain what it wanted, so it halted all IAEA inspections in early 1994. As a result, both North and South Korea, as well as the U.S., began to fortify positions along the demilitarized zone at the 38^th parallel by March 1994. By May 1994, the crisis escalated, and at least 8,000 fuel rods were removed from the 25 megawatt reactor in Yongbyon, once again instigating a crisis situation (Kim, 1995; Blanc, 2001). When North Korea began de-fueling its nuclear reactors, it prompted a meeting between U.S. military leader Gary Luck in South Korea and generals in the U.S. to devise the support aspects of a war in Korea (Doh). They estimated a four month war with 1 million casualties, eighty to ninety thousand of them American, total destruction of South Korea’s economy and possible nuclear radiation clouds over the peninsula (Doh). A policy of brinkmanship emerged with the U.S., instigated by North Korea (Kim, 1995).

June 1994 saw movement in the U.S. and North Korean stances towards finding a solution to the standoff. The IAEA withdrew its technical assistance from North Korea on June 10, and the North responded on the 13^th by withdrawing from the IAEA (Kim, 1995). On June 14^th, the U.S. called for sanctions against North Korea (Kim, 1995). Former President Carter then visited Kim Il Sung and determined what the North would accept in order to comply with the IAEA, easing the crisis situation (Kim, 1995).

On July 8, 1994, Kim Il Sung, at the age of 82, passed away, but his legacy lived on in his successor, Kim Jong Il. This line of succession, though supported through years of preparation, was not a certain outcome. Some talk occurred about the possibility that Kim Jong Il might not garner the support of his policy makers and that he lacked the ability to run the country adequately. Steps were taken to solidify Kim Jong Il’s position in the Korean Worker’s Party and as the next leader of North Korea. Even the eulogy of the “Great Leader” placed an emphasis on the transition from Il Sung to his son Jong Il (Kim, 1995). Nevertheless, even by the end of the year, Jong Il still was not officially announced as the head of state (Kim, 1995). Some suggested that this was due to Jong Il respecting the mourning period after the death of his father and that such pronouncements would occur in due time. Yet, accepting the lesser position of president was really only a figurehead title for international affairs, a role not wanted by Jong Il. The real power lie in being the leader of the Korean’s Worker’s Party. Interestingly, the actions of President Clinton helped solidify Jong Il’s position. After an announcement by North Korean Vice-Foreign Minister Choi that Jong Il was the supreme leader of North Korea and the military, Clinton sent a letter to Jong Il as the head of state, an act seen as a political victory by North Koreans (Kim, 1995). However, such an act by Clinton could have been an effort to solidify the Jong Il regime, as a disruption in the government or the turnover to a more radical group could have been detrimental to the ongoing talks.

At first, Clinton took a firm stance against North Korea in the nuclear proliferation crisis, but decided on dialogue and approved talks in Geneva (Doh). Finally, on October 21, 1994, North Korea and the U.S. signed the Agreed Framework (Henrickson and Jonguyn, 1997). The agreement included two light water reactors for North Korea to be completed by 2003, and heating oil to replace the electricity lost by turning off the Yongbyon reactor. In addition, North Korea would face only limited U.N. sanctions. The North also agreed to stop construction of its new reactor, halt refueling of the old reactor, allow IAEA inspections, and reinstate talks with the South (Henrickson and Jonguyn, 1997). The U.S. would also open the door to economic trade and move towards normalizing diplomatic relations (Doh). However, for North Korea to obtain all of its promised benefits, it had to prove that it was keeping its end of the bargain first (Doh). Both the North and the U.S. agreed to take reciprocal steps, fulfilling their obligations only after the other had acted first (Kim, 1995). The reciprocity of obligations would continue to cause dissent between the U.S. and North Korea, each condemning the other for not fulfilling its promises.

North Korea saw its ability to negotiate directly with the U.S. as a major step toward its stature within the international community (Kim, 1995). The negotiated agreement set a precedent, however, that North Korea would fight or talk, depending on the actions of the U.S., showing that the U.S. still affected the peace and security of the Asian world (Kim, 1995). In other words, North Korea could effectively blackmail the United States into obtaining what it wanted under the threat of developing nuclear weapons. In addition, North Korea’s use of a nuclear threat reinforced the view that nuclear weapons are integral to foreign policy and that they provide power to a state (Kim, 1995). Whether used as a deterrent force or as a threat to produce, nuclear weapons affect foreign policy making. Even a small state with limited capabilities can gain tremendous power through the acquisition of nuclear capability.

Despite North Korea’s acceptance of the Agreed Framework, it continued to hold a trump card in its hand. Analysts believe that the nuclear site at Yongbyon produced enough weapons grade plutonium for at least one nuclear weapon (Blanc, 2001). Depending on the missile capability of North Korea, it could effectively threaten Asian countries, including the U.S.’s close ally, Japan, and even western parts of the U.S., such as Hawaii and Alaska. In addition, two sites in North Korea that the IAEA desired to inspect have never been seen by any inspections team, leaving North Korea with the capability to threaten major countries while seeking economic benefits. It may be that North Korea’s desire to seek nuclear weapons reflects the withdrawal of the Soviet Union’s nuclear umbrella (Kim, 1995). Without the deterrent capability of its parent state, North Korea may have considered that its only option was to secure national security via the acquisition of nuclear capability.

Tensions rose in the East Asian community when North Korea tested it Nodong and Taepo Dong missiles in 1998 (Blanc, 2001). These missiles, especially the Taepo Dong, threaten not only South Korea but also China and Japan. If these missiles were tipped with nuclear technology, the North could effectively hold hostage several Asian countries. For months, the testing of these missiles produced a crisis situation between the U.S. and North Korea. Talks occurred between North Korea and the United States in 1999 and 2000 (Blanc, 2001), but little agreement resulted. Secretary of State Madeline Albright visited North Korea in October 2000 (Blanc, 2001). This was the first time a senior official went to North Korea and commenced talks. Agreements eased the crisis situation between the two states.

North Korea’s actions continue to support the view that it is an unpredictable pariah state (Kang, 1995). Sometimes acquiescing to international pressure, but then testing missiles over the skies of neighboring states, presents a country that may not adhere to the standards of the international community. Yet, North Korea may purposely create this perception as a way to influence U.S. foreign policy. Kang (1995) suggests that a neo-realist view of North Korea explains its policy as unified and predictable. He states that five facts believed to be true about North Korea are non-falsifiable and not necessarily true: 1) North Korea is expansionist and aggressive; 2) the U.S. and South Korea are pacifist; 3) as South Korea grows economically and militarily, North Korea will become more dangerous; 4) North Korea holds the greater military strength; and 5) the North-South Korean relationship is a “powder keg” (Kang, 1995).

First, Kang (1995) considers whether North Korea really desires to expand its territory and act aggressively. This question is reflected in the position that the North could invade the South at any time. Kang (1995) asserts that the only time North Korea came close was in 1950 when the U.S. said it had no plans to support South Korea, and South Korean president Syngman Rhee said South Korea would “march northward.” Thus, tensions were high on the peninsula and exchanged signals may have prompted preemptive action. Subsequent actions of the North since the end of the Korean War have only been taken when the cost was low, with the North backing down when the threat was high. Thus, North Korea takes a rational view of how to retain power and will not rashly throw it away for no beneficial outcome. In addition, Kang (1995) questions the position that the peninsula rocks on a shaky boat of deterrence. If the area is so unstable, then why hasn’t deterrence failed? Tensions are high, the situation is open for misperception, and North Koreans are risk takers and not satisfied with the status quo—a situation ripe for deterrence failure. Kang (1995) believes that the U.S. promotes an image that any invasion by North Korea of the South not only will fail, but will provoke an immediate and destructive response. Thus, a stable situation of deterrence exists on the Korean peninsula.

The second issue countering beliefs about North Korea suggests that the North may not view the U.S. and South Korea as the pacifists presented to the international community. Team Spirit exercises between the U.S. and North Korea appear, to North Korea, offensive in nature—an only slightly veiled rehearsal of an invasion of the North. Team Spirit exercises suggest that U.S. forces in the South are there for more than just defensive reasons (Kang, 1995). In addition, South Korean military capabilities exceed those of North Korea, and, even though no U.S. nuclear weapons exist on the peninsula, submarines retain the capability of delivering nuclear weapons to North Korea. Unpopular in the world community, North Korea feels alone in its position as a voice against the intrusion of the U.S. on the Korean peninsula (Kang, 1995).

Third, analysts suggest that North Korea feels threatened by the South’s increased economic and military strength. As a result, North Korea may become more likely to invade the South. Such an analysis fails to mesh with North Korea’s cost-benefit analysis and past actions. If the North only invaded when benefits were high and the costs were low, increased costs would inhibit future action (Kang, 1995). Thus, rather than prompting an offensive move by North Korea, South Korea’s continued advancement economically and militarily would further restrain the North’s action. On the other hand, the fourth point suggests that North Korea holds military dominance over the South and will use its strength to unify forcefully the peninsula. An analysis only viewing the number of forces may support a militarily superior North, but when subjected to a critical view, the North lacks the technological and educational levels of the South (Kang, 1995). Due in large part to its relationship with the U.S., South Korea maintains a technologically advanced military that sharpens it tools through military exercises with the U.S. On the other hand, while the North received both Soviet and Chinese assistance, North Korea failed to keep up with the South. Nevertheless, the North does retain a formidable force, and, if true, the North’s possession of nuclear weapons deters other states from seriously confronting its national interests.

Finally, the North-South situation often draws remarks suggesting that the DMZ is the most dangerous and conflict prone area in the world. Due to a continued armistice between the U.S. and North Korea, and the often called for reunification of the peninsula by both the North and South, the Korean peninsula is a “powder keg” waiting to go off. Yet, for fifty years, successful deterrence has existed on the peninsula. Even when altercations sprouted up, like the Pueblo incident and the various North Korean excursions into the South, both sides refrained from escalating events into a crisis situation. Therefore, if conflict between the North and the South has not occurred, then the area is not as volatile as previously thought (Kang, 1995). If deterrence has been successful so far, then continued stability likely will continue to exist.

Recent events in North and South Korea suggest a new deterrence. As reliance on a superpower’s extended deterrence wanes, smaller states must create their own deterrence, including the acquisition of nuclear weapons (Kang, 1995). Nuclear weapons serve a dual purpose: they deter states from infringing on one’s national interests and affect the foreign policy making of much larger states. The precedent set by negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea have likely been viewed by other smaller states wishing to control their own destinies.

As with Iraq and Saddam Hussein, the conception of North Korea as a rogue states has been influenced by the leadership of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. A review of these leaders’ histories broadens our understanding of North Korea’s placement in the international system. Kim Il Sung, born in 1912 near Pyongyang, moved to Manchuria in his youth with his family to flee the persecution of the Japanese. Korean communists proliferated in this area near the Korean border with the hope that Soviet Russia would assist Koreans in their desire to liberate Korea from the Japanese (Chong, 1967).

Part of the myth around Kim suggests that he fought against the Japanese in their invasion of Manchuria (Chong, 1967). In addition, communist Koreans made excursions into Northern Korea in order to promote communist nationalism in the populace. After being hunted down by Japanese forces, Kim fled into Siberia with his followers in 1941 (Chong, 1967). Kim was in Russia for four years and learned Soviet Communism first hand. Thus, he was well known to the Soviets and after WWII was an ideal leader for the newly formed dependant state (Chong, 1967). While there were other leaders after the end of WWII who had political clout, Kim had earned the support of the Soviet Union and was their man (Chong, 1967).

As an ideological structure, the cult of personality of Kim Il Sung found prominence in North Korea and reached the ultimate in actuality. As a part of the structure behind the Kim Il Sung’s cult of personality, North Korea has erected more monuments of and written more ideological declarations about their leader than any other state (Kim, 1995). When the “Brezhnev” doctrine emerged in the Soviet Union, calling for an end to cult of personality leadership, Kim Il Sung kept his “proletarian” view. Kim saw the Soviet Union’s pressure to change as a move to undermine his authority, creating a rift in the relationship (Zhebin, 1995).

Jong Il went to Kim Il Sung University in 1961 and began his training to take over from his father (Shinn, 1982). Jong Il took over the reigns when Il Sung went on state visits starting in 1975 (Shinn, 1982). Kim Jong Il wrote on “Kimilsungism,” which promotes the ideological stance of “juche.” Jong Il never felt comfortable in the realm of international relations and is much more versed on domestic politics (Kim, 1995).

Branded a recluse, Jong Il produced few documents and interviews, making an analysis of his personality difficult. A theoretical piece written in 1994, “Socialism as a Science,” promotes his ideological view of socialism. He addresses the downfall of the Soviet Union and the move by China to open up areas of trade. Kim states that those who once supported socialism but now state there is no value in the theory are “renegades.” Furthermore, those who open their doors to “opportunism” hurt socialism, but socialism will win out in the end. Private ownership leads to individualism, which leads to class conflict only remedied by a communist state. Individualism supports greed while collectivism creates a society that meets the needs of all the people. The “social collective” frees one politically and socially, enabling equality throughout the state and the development of all its citizens. On the other hand, imperialistic states, based on an inequality of wealth, force political and social ideals onto a country and fail to enable all citizens to compete in the world. Those who act against the state are re-educated in order that they live up to their full potential and support the theory of Juch’e.

Kim Il Sung was seen as an international problem second only to Saddam Hussein (Doh). Now, Kim Jong Il and his projected personality of an eccentric playboy who threatens the United States continues the threat of an irrational, pariah state. North Korea presents an image of a “renegade state” officiated by a group of “paranoid survivalists” (Kang, 1995). Such an image suggests specific policy actions that must consider the possibility that North Korea has nuclear weapons. Yet, U.S. policy states that it will not allow North Korea to obtain nuclear capability. This situation continues to threaten the peace and security of the Korean peninsula and the international community.

There is no real framework for creating a long term peace between the North and the South (Doh). Indeed, even though there have been some regional differences between North and South Korea, it has been the influence of the superpowers that has created the problems between the two states (Doh). The extension of the cold war to the client states increased the tensions between the North and South and supplied arms and military knowledge that exasperated tensions. Russia’s foreign policy in Asia and North Korea reflected the bipolar relationship between the U.S. and Soviet Union and the fight against the expansionist Imperial west (Zhebin, 1995). Korea has found it difficult to find a balance between opening its doors to international powers and keeping its own sovereignty (Doh). This dichotomy has often resulted in an image of unpredictability and irrationality. There is a triangular dependent relationship among North Korea, South Korea and the U.S.—the armistice between the U.S. and North Korea, the dependence of South Korea on the U.S., and the relationship between North and South Korea (Doh). While its socialist ideology is important to any view of North Korea, its relationship with the U.S. has influenced its development and international position (Doh). The relationship between the U.S. and North Korea has been a balance between conflict and rapprochement. Even crisis between the two states (e.g., the Pueblo and tree cutting incidents) resulted in dialogue and not military confrontation (Doh).

Yet, there is always the threat of war when a crisis emerges, as in 1993 when a plan of action in case of war was drawn up and submitted to Clinton (Doh), or when North Korea has threatened war if the U.S. or South Korea invade. North Korea asserts that any sanctions against it equate to a declaration of war, resulting in the past in the U.S. negotiating with North Korea (Kim, 1995). Continued acquiescence to North Korean threats will only reinforce the behavior of North Korea to threaten action. Yet, a strong stand against North Korea, calling its bluff, may result in conflict undesirable to the U.S. and the South. There is no easy answer when dealing with a rogue state.

North Korea emerges as a state high on the list of those states that the U.S. keeps its eye on. North Korea has often busied itself in acting against South Korea and the U.S. in small incidents that threaten the security of regional states. While contemporary historians and political scientists understand the division between the Soviet Union and China today, the perceptions of policy makers and the end of the 1960s likely reflect a continuing “Monolithic” Communist empire headed by the Soviet Union, using states like North Korea as pawns in the Cold War game. Viewing the changes in U.S. policy makers’ perceptions of North Korea from a dependent to a rogue may provide needed information for future policy actions. What was the perceived relationship by U.S. policy makers between the Soviet Union and North Korea? How did this perception change over time? What were the policy differences between the two perceived images? Furthermore, the similarities and differences in image perception by U.S. policy makers of Iraq and North Korea may also offer insight into past foreign policy action and future decisions. While similar policy preferences occurred in the past (the U.S. took military action against both Iraq and North Korea when each state invaded a neighboring state), some policies also appeared to differ (Iraq was bombed for not allowing in inspectors and for its suspected WMD program while North Korea was not). What perceptions of each state by U.S. policy makers suggest similar policy preferences and why are there different policy preferences in other cases? Are the differences in policy preferences due to different perceptions of each state, or are the policy differences a reflection of the larger cost of taking military action in North Korea? The puzzle I seek to put together answers these questions and furthers the knowledge and understanding between image perception and policy outcome.

[1] President of Iraq from the revolution in 1958 to 1963.

[2] Cordesman (1999) places the date as July 17, 1968.

[3] Quoted in Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987, from the BBC, SWB, January 13, 1972; ARR, February 10, 1972.

[4] Some documents question whether Hussein’s mother was married to his father; the story of his father’s death may have been used to limit repercussions from family and village members (see Judith Yaphe, “Tribalism in Iraq, the Old and the New”).

[5] Saddam Hussein was arrested twice for threatening other students due to their political beliefs (“Personal”).

[6] It is suggested that Saddam felt Bakr was getting close to forming an alliance with the leaders of the Baathist party in Syria, with Bakr as leader and a Syrian leader in the number two position. As this would have reduced Hussein’s power and diminished his desire to be the pan-Arab leader in the Middle East, Hussein forced Bakr to resign (“Personal”).