CHAPTER TWO
POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY: PERSONALITY, BELIEFS, AND IMAGES
The Development of Cognitive Research
Early work on foreign policy decision making focused on organizational roles, communication and information, and the motivation behind policy choices (Snyder, 1962). Snyder (1962) set out a framework for viewing the perceptions of the decision maker, the context of decision making, how policy decisions reflect the interaction between “structure and process,” and the use of both the individual and group levels of analysis. In the same volume, Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962) discuss the need to develop a typology of states on the basis of political organization, decision making systems and their strengths and weaknesses, and the forms of strategy that policy makers use in determining policy. Policy makers become the “state,” with international politics viewed as the interaction between state processes. State action develops out of policy makers’ perceived images of desired outcomes.
When considering the decision making process, Snyder Bruck and Sapin (1962) state that decision making brings about one state or condition conceptualized by the decision maker and chosen from a variety of possible outcomes (90). Those decision makers worth studying are those who are part of the decision making process (93). Yet, decision makers’ information processing is often faulty, and this may affect policy choices (102). Decision makers act on what they perceive (103), and we understand their motivations through inferring from their actions (139). Additionally, decision makers utilize stereotypes based on prior knowledge to classify actions (164).
Thus, what develops is the importance of viewing the policy maker and his/her choices. Through the analysis of policy makers’ behavior, including the words they use, the researcher uncovers the processes used to make decisions. Additionally, the motivation behind policy decisions underscores why a decision maker takes certain action. Not only must one view outside the box, but one must observe inside the box. Several approaches to the study of cognition and behavior underscore the importance of viewing the mental processes of the individual policy maker. Personality, operational codes (belief systems), and images all provide insight into the workings of the mind and uncover the mental mystery by viewing inside the box. These three approaches overlap and complement each other, producing an interesting look into the methods of cognitive research.
Personality
Originally, researchers often believed that the structures of bureaucracies constrained individual action, limiting the effect of personality on policy making (Greenstein, 1969). An individual acted based on the role he or she held rather than through his or her specific characteristics. The standard operating procedures of the bureaucracy structured political action. Hermann (1976, 1977) suggests that the environment and personality interact to produce political action. Behavior develops from the structures of the bureaucracy and the characteristics of the individual. Meaningful research asks why decision makers in similar situations act differently (Hermann, 1976; Hermann, 1977). Furthermore, the higher the office held by the individual, the more likely that the individual will feel he or she affects decision making. Personality will have a greater effect on decision making when there are fewer limits based on the position held (Hermann, 1976, 1977). In other words, SOPs are less effective as restrictions when the policy maker holds a high office in a hierarchical system.
Hermann (1976) produces eight instances when personality affects policy making. First, the greater the decision maker’s interest towards the policy making process the more likely that his or her personality will affect policy making. Second, personality affects behavior more when there is a strong affective response in the leader when he or she obtains of power, as in a coup or revolution. Third, a charismatic leader will affect foreign policy making more than will an uncharismatic leader. Fourth, closed or monolithic systems where there is a high degree of control over the foreign policy making process will be open to the effects of the leader’s personality. Fifth, new states or those with weaker structures of foreign policy making create instances where personality affects policy making. Sixth, personality affects foreign policy making more in times of crisis. Seventh, cognitive styles will affect policy making more when the decision maker has less training, while an experienced decision maker’s beliefs will more likely affect foreign policy making. Eighth, in ambiguous situations the policy maker’s information processing style will affect foreign policy making. These eight instances, which show how and when personality affects policy making and likely times for observing this influence, structure the way personality is researched. Through an understanding of the circumstances surrounding personality and environment, the specific characteristics of individual actors becomes important.
Hermann (1977) believes there are specific types of policy makers that are more likely to influence international policy making: those who are optimistic about the future, those who hold cognitively complex world views, and those who show a humanitarian ideology or concern for others. Those who are optimistic about the future are likely to feel that they have more control over their environment, that they have the ability to control events. Such a policy maker may show more interest in the international world and become more involved in the policy making process. In this way, the personality of the individual may stand out and affect how and what policies are made. Decision makers who hold more complex views of the world limit their use of stereotyping and see other states in more varied ways. These decision makers likely collect more information than do cognitively simple individuals and apply information based on specific circumstances rather than lump all events into one category. Cognitively complex decision makers may also take more time to produce a policy outcome in their search for more information. These actions allow the individual personality of the policy maker to manifest and affect the policy making process. Additionally, decision makers who show concern for others are also more likely to affect policy making. An empathetic leader attempts to understand the position of other states and people in the international arena. This understanding may lead to putting oneself in the shoes of another. In this way, the individual characteristics of the policy maker influence the policy making process. Thus, the personality of the individual policy maker is more likely to influence the decision making process when he or she is optimistic, complex, and empathetic.
Hermann (1984) develops her personality profiling further through her analysis of heads of state. She states that two personality characteristics affect policy making—sensitivity to the environment and interest in foreign affairs (Hermann, 1984). Those who are sensitive to the environment will be more likely to seek out more information on a situation and to change behavior based on this information. On the other hand, those who are less sensitive to the environment limit the amount of information gleaned on a situation and may structure information to support their beliefs. In the first instance, behavior is modified to fit to the information, while in the latter behavior is based on personality, and information is used to support that behavior. Thus, when individuals are less sensitive to the environment their personality is more likely to affect policy making. These two characteristics filter how personality traits affect behavior.
There are four traits that affect political action: beliefs, motives, decision style and interpersonal style (Hermann, 1984). Beliefs are general conceptions of the world. Specifically, political beliefs structure how information about the political world is processed. Beliefs will be discussed further in the operational code section. Motives, on the other hand, consist of why an action occurs. Motives are difficult to observe, as they are based on the reasoning behind behavior. Decision style reflects the structure and process used to develop conclusions about a situation. How a leader structures decision making may include how a policy maker seeks and interprets information, whether stereotypes are used, and to what degree history is used as an example. Interpersonal style suggests different ways decision makers relate to those around him or her. Some decision makers may want to rely only on the advice of one or two people, or decision makers may like to participate in a give and take session where opposing perspectives battle for preference.
The above traits produce seven characteristics that influence how individuals act in social groups (Hermann, 1984). The first is nationalism or the ethnocentric perspective that one’s government deserves dominance and can answer the problems of the world. Second is the belief that one can control events. Third is the individual’s need for power while fourth is the need for affiliation. Fifth, is the level of confidence, sixth is the amount of distrust of others, and seventh is the orientation to tasks.
These four traits and seven characteristics relay two orientations towards policy making, the independent and the participatory (Hermann, 1980b). The independent leader has a high need for power, low conceptual complexity, a distrust of others, is nationalistic and believes that she or he has control over events. On the other hand, a participatory leader has a high need for affiliation, high conceptual complexity, trusts others, has a low level of nationalism and only slightly believes that he or she can control events. While Hermann hypothesized that high interest in foreign affairs would increase the effect of personality on foreign policy, her research uncovered the point that low interest in foreign affairs indicated greater personality effects on foreign policy. Apparently, personality becomes more of a factor when the decision maker limits the degree of interest involved in decision making. If there is an interest in foreign affairs, the decision maker may seek more information and allow multiple views to emerge, while low interest suggests that the leader has more influence. Training in foreign affairs also decreases the degree to which personality affects the policy process. The more experienced the decision maker the less personality determines policy behavior. Viewing decision making under these two orientations, interest and training in foreign affairs, provides insight into the instances where personality affects policy making.
Hermann (1980b) believes that five foreign policy behaviors emerge that reflect the degree to which policy makers commit to action. First, decision makers believe at varying levels that there should be a change in the international would. Such change is expressed through the comments of policy makers suggesting that the international world needs a new policy goal. Second, policy makers make statements on the degree to which international action is independent or interdependent. A policy maker believes that action should either be taken unilaterally or multilaterally. Third, policy makers may have different views on how resources are used, making crisis situations a priority at the expense of later possible needs, or limiting the spending of resources in order to possess needed ability for future circumstances. Fourth, policy makers act based on the affect felt towards others. Different actions emerge based on whether the “other” is seen as a friend or an enemy. Fifth, policy makers take into consideration other states’ responses to their actions. If the international community strongly objects to the unilateral actions of a state, it is likely that the policy makers will change their behavior, limiting future negative feedback. Thus, in foreign policy, personality affects behavior, resulting in a variety of policy actions.
Hermann (1984b) furthers her consideration of personality by suggesting that there are times when the situation itself makes personality more important. First, when the policy maker is the head of state, then his or her personality is more likely to influence policy making. Those who hold lower offices may be more constrained by their organizational or elected roles, while the head of state is less constrained. Second, in times of crisis the personality of policy makers may influence policy making more so than in a normal policy making situation. A crisis situation suggests limited information, less time to make decisions, more pressure to make the “right” decision, and less ability to gain differentiated views. Third, an individual policy maker’s personality affects policy making more when a situation is ambiguous and lacks clear definition. In ambiguous situations policy makers may not have reliable information, specific roles or historical reference through which decisions can be made. In these three instances, the personality of decision makers may affect the policy making process more than in normal policy making situations.
Hermann and Preston (1999) consider head of states’ leadership styles and their advisory system structures. The advisory system of a leader becomes important as decision making includes more than just the leader. Thus, how policy is made, the form of the advisory system, and how the characteristics of the president influence this process provide insight into how leaders make decisions. Hermann and Preston (1999) look at leadership style and its effect on the advisory system. In viewing leadership style and the advisory system, Hermann and Preston (1999) consider how involved the leader is in the policy process, suggesting that past experience creates an ability to better understand and accomplish policy objectives. Also, the belief that the leader can control political events relates a view that the leader seeks greater control over the advisory process while keeping conflict between members to a minimum. In addition, a leader is often either more sensitive or less sensitive to the political context of a policy. Those who are less sensitive to the political environment tend to force through their own agendas, possibly making personality a greater factor in the policy process. On the other hand, those who are more sensitive to the political environment seek more information on the issue and are open to different perspectives. These three factors result in three orientations: specialization (increased involvement of the leader), centralization (high need for control of the leader), and coordination (a leader who is sensitive to the environment). Viewing these characteristics develops our understanding of how the leader affects the policy process and increases our ability to anticipate future policy actions.
In an earlier piece, Hermann (1987) concludes that the structure of the decision making group affects the process through which decisions are made. The personality characteristics of the individual leader affect how the leader perceives his or her role in the policy process, which, in turn, affects how information is processed. Hermann proposes six types of leaders based on personality characteristics. First, the expansionist limits conflict between advisory members, seeks information that will support policy objectives and desires to increase the power of the state. Second, active-independents allow their behavior to be reflective of their basic principles, seek various avenues for obtaining information, have an open advisory system, and use a rational decision making process in moving towards political goals. Third, an influential leader’s greatest desire is to keep him-/herself in power, thus supporting a consensus building advisory system and seeking information that sheds light on the decisions of those in support of the leader. Fourth, a mediator-integrator is a problem solver who seeks compromise rather than confrontation and works to resolve conflict and disagreement between advisory system members. Fifth, an opportunist takes small steps towards his/her goals while garnering public support. Finally, sixth, a developmental leader holds office in order to better the nation, seeks the support of those who also have the same goals while taking steps to achieve those goals. These different types of leaders create schemas, images used to process information and develop possible predictions of policy outcomes.
Research has developed interesting perspectives on personality. For instance, Suedfeld et al. (1977) relate how speeches by U.N. ambassadors apparently decrease in conceptual complexity just prior to conflicts in the Middle East. In other words, how a policy maker views other states and enunciates this perspective becomes more black and white, less differentiated, and less unified as Middle East conflict looms. The authors suggest that viewing the conceptual complexity of U.N. speeches can flag when conflict is eminent. Along this same line, Tetlock and Tyler (1996) compare integratively complex and integratively simple reasoning by examining Churchill’s debates on German behavior and self-rule in India. Integratively complex individuals see more than one side of an issue, are open to different perspectives, and see that there are many ways to view the world. On the other hand, integratively simple reasoning structures decision making through a black and white view of the world—that there is only one correct world view. Suedfeld et al. (1977) and Tetlock and Tyler (1996) both seek to understand how policy makers’ personality complexity affects policy making.
George (1980) provides insight into how personality affects decision making. A leader uses a variety of cognitive tools to determine policy choices. First, rather than optimizing, a rational policy makers satisfices, or chooses the policy outcome that first satisfies the desired goals. Second, decision makers take small steps or use incrementalism to achieve policy goals rather than try to obtain policy objectives in one giant step. Third, sequential decision making takes large decisions and separates them into smaller pieces. Fourth, decision makers often must seek a consensus in order to further policy objective rather than force through their own decision. Fifth, the use of analogies often clarifies and provides information on policy history, creating a better understanding of the policy environment. Sixth, policy makers are ideologically goal oriented rather than making decisions based on situational needs. Seventh, policy makers may hold specific beliefs about the strategies and tactics they use to further their political goals. These seven cognitive aids help policy makers in the decision making process. In his work, George (1980) combines aspects of personality, operational code and image theory to explain foreign policy decision making.
There are some limitations to studying personality as a way to understand foreign policy making. Personality research works well when viewing leaders and heads of state. Yet, the foreign policy behavior of the state may be more than just the behavior of the leader. Viewing a group of like-minded individuals may produce a better understanding of foreign policy behavior, especially in those instances when a crisis situation is eminent. Furthermore, while a study of personality considers the motivating factors behind foreign policy behavior, viewing the perceptions of individuals may better explain why individuals take action (Starr, 1984). Cognitive research that provides a structure of the beliefs of an individual extends personality firmly into the political arena and develops a framework for understanding policy behavior.
Operational Code
One of the first research programs to use operational code was the seminal work by Leites (1951, 1953) which viewed the beliefs of Bolsheviks and how these beliefs affected political action. The context of historical events produces political situations, but policy makers act and affect these events. Leites (1951) reports that Bolsheviks believe the “effectiveness” of a policy action is the main rationale for determining decisions. Events that produce obstacles will be opportunities for growth if the obstacles are overcome, and each situation incurs its own response. Ultimately, Leites (1951) seeks to answer what is the nature of political relationships based on the Bolshevik structure of political decision making. In this way, predictions about foreign policy behavior develop (Leites, 1953). However, the “rules” must be known in order to predict behavior. Developing out of psychoanalytic theory, Leites (1953) observes the policy makers’ basic beliefs about politics and how policy makers achieve their political goals.
George (1969) furthers the operational code research program in his discussion on how states’ political views and conflict between actors form the basis for international relations. Political perception and action are bound by an individual’s operational code, a way a policy maker simplifies the world in order to define the problem, situate it in the actor’s experience, and create answers. George relays eight factors that help in developing a study of cognitive psychology: 1) the mind is an information processing mechanism; 2) in order to make sense of their world and organize information, people make a framework of their beliefs; 3) beliefs simplify and structure the world; 4) individual behavior is affected by the environment; 5) the processing of information is a biased operation; 6) individuals process information differently; 7) beliefs tend to be stable over time; and 8) with an abundance of information, beliefs can change (Starr, 1984). These cognitive psychology considerations provides for research consistency that supports theory building.
George (1969) produces a set of philosophical and instrumental beliefs that unpack how decision makers view the nature of politics and how political goals are achieved (201-216):
I. Philosophical Beliefs
1. What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents?
2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other.
3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
4. How much “control” or “mastering” can one have over historical development? What is one’s role in “moving” and “shaping” history in the desired direction?
5. What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical development?
II. Instrumental Beliefs
1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?
2. How are the goals for action pursued most effectively?
3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?
4. What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interest?
5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests?
While the philosophical beliefs identify the political problem, the instrumental beliefs determine how to go about solving the problem (Walker, 1990). George (1969) believes that operational code can uncover the basis for policy behavior by both individuals and elite groups.
Holsti (1977) furthers the research on operational code by suggesting that an individual’s perceptions of the world do not equal reality. People structure their worlds through the use of beliefs and filter perceptions through cognitive maps. Holsti (1977) believes there are certain times when observing beliefs are a better indicator of policy behavior than are others: in times of crisis or instances where routines have been abandoned, when influence of organizational structures on leaders is limited, in long-range planning, in ambiguous situations when there could be a variety of interpretations, in instances when there is an abundance of information, during unforeseen situations, and in times of stress. During these times researchers can better understand how individuals structure their world or use schema to process information. The operational code consists of general principles about political life held by an individual. This belief system is interconnected, meaning that a change in one area of beliefs changes in the entire system. There exists a set of master beliefs that are few in number, salient for decision makers, individually apparent and developed, and last over time. Two master beliefs identified by Holsti (1977) are beliefs about the basic nature of politics—is it conflictual or harmonious—and the locus of conflict—human nature, nations, or the international system.
Walker (1983) takes these two beliefs and creates a typology that further explains the operational code belief system. Six belief types emerge (182):
Fig. 1 Operational Code: Beliefs on Conflict and its Sources
What is the fundamental nature of the political universe?
What are the fundamental Harmonious Conflictual
sources of conflict? (conflict temporary) (conflict permanent)
Human nature A D
Attributes of nations B E
International System C F
Type A is an individual who believes that the fundamental nature of the political universe is harmonious and that conflict stems from human nature. Type B individuals also believe the nature of the political universe is harmonious but that conflict comes from the nation/state. Type C continues to consider the political universe to be harmonious but sees the locus of conflict stemming from the international system. On the other hand, types D, E, and F all believe that the fundamental nature of the political universe is one of conflict.
Walker (1983) believes that there is a commonality between types D, E, and F that allows them to be combined into one type. Walker (1983; Walker and Falkowski, 1984) combines personality and operational code through his suggestion that belief systems develop out of personality, meaning that the experiences of one’s youth affect the development of political beliefs. The personality characteristics that are most important to operational code are those that seek to explain motivation: need for power, affiliation, and achievement. Walker (1983) contends that an individual’s childhood produces personality, which creates a specific political belief system, which, when prodded by external environmental causes, produces decision making behavior.
Yet, Walker (1983) also admits that there are some problems with using operational code and a belief system framework. First, the interaction among and influence between motivations based on an individual’s personality, political beliefs, and policy action is simplified through the operational code structure. While a simple interrelationship is parsimonious, feedback, the environment, and other external events, as well as the possibility that a change in beliefs may support a change in personality, suggest complex interactions of external and internal causes and effects. Second, all the possible policy actions highlighted through an analysis of motives, beliefs and behavior may be limited by organizational structures. The actual options available to the policy maker may be limited by the constraints imposed through the role held by the decision maker. Third, there are few empirical studies that explore the relationship between operational code and decision maker behavior. Thus, a concrete relationship still needs research in order to be substantiated.
Changing one’s belief system is difficult (George, 1969; Walker and Falkowski, 1984). Information countering held beliefs often creates cognitive dissonance, or uncertainty about one’s beliefs (Walker and Falkowski, 1984). Usually, cognitive dissonance is resolved by making the new information conform to the held beliefs of the individual, or by changing one’s beliefs. Manipulating new information that counters held beliefs so that it easily fits into one’s cognitive structure appears as the usual way to resolve cognitive dissonance. On the other hand, being open to changing one’s beliefs based on new information occurs in some instances. Often, policy makers will choose options least likely to conflict with held beliefs in order to limit cognitive dissonance.
Some types of personalities may be more open to changing their beliefs than others, making personality an important aspect of changes in operational code. Walker (1990) suggests that personality and motivation theories are part of operational code. Once the researcher seeks to determine the motivating factors behind policy behavior, personality emerges as the main consideration (need for power, achievement and affiliation). Cognitive schema and motivation act together to produce decision maker behavior (Walker, 1990). Within the philosophical beliefs, the held images of other states, as either opponents or allies, develops as most important to political behavior (Johnson, 1977). Indeed, research suggests that images of opponents are an aspect of an individual’s belief system, even a “master belief” (Starr, 1984). Viewing the images that are held by groups of individuals may shed light on their belief systems and their personalities. Images of other states emerge as a focal point for foreign policy making research.
Image Theory
Image theory seeks to uncover the motivation behind policy behavior. While realist theory considered the quest for power to be the main emphasis behind state action, nuances emerged that suggest states act based on reasons not apparent at the state level. Viewing motivational factors at the individual and group levels may provide a greater understanding of state behavior. Knowing why a state acts results in better planning of a policy response (Herrmann, 1985a).
Images emerge through the use of language, written or verbal, and relay mental “pictures” of other countries (Herrmann, 1985a). While images may shed light on individual perceptions, the two are not the same. Perceptions occur from structures other than language and form the basis for decision making (Herrmann, 1985a). Images are “indirect indicators of perceptions” (Herrmann, 1985a:31) and represent underlying factors that cause foreign policy behavior. Perceptions become apparent through images created by words (Herrmann, 1985a, 1985b).
Images of the world do not always exactly represent reality. Individuals experience the world in different ways, creating different frames of reference for further interaction with the world. The experiences of the individual, in the form of beliefs, motives and attitudes, produce images that then spark foreign policy behavior (Eldridge, 1979). Images develop out of individual experience and personality while these images structure how information is obtained and processed (Eldridge, 1979). Personality and beliefs affect the creation and use of images in foreign policy making. Facts are images of past experiences and certain future actions while values are images of what ought to be (Holsti, 1962). Both facts and values are based on one’s perceptions of reality. Interestingly, states often create mirror images of each other, each seeing the other as the enemy (Eldridge, 1979). The image of self is good, just and courageous, while the image of the enemy is evil, hostile and aggressive. Each side sees the other as the enemy and the self as just. Reality may show that the leader takes action that disrupts the security of the other state and harms those people that leader seeks to protect.
Connections exist between aspects of an individual’s personality and the images they hold. Eldridge (1979) suggests that ten specific personality characteristics affect image creation: level of acceptance of high risk, ability to deal with ambiguity, level of intelligence, degree of creativity, amount of self esteem, submissivness, need for power, willingness to use force, psychological flexibility or rigidness, and cognitive complexity. The various ways these characteristics interact produce unique images about the world. In addition, the combination of personality traits, the environment, and domestic politics influence how images emerge (Rosati, 1984).
Some researchers also suggest that individual beliefs form a world view, which presents an image of the international world (Rosati, 1984). The way one believes the political world to be and how one acts to achieve political goals influence the creation of images of other states. When beliefs combine with attitudes (values, opinions), images result that present a “set of ideas and thoughts concerning the environment that are held relatively constant” (Rosati, 1984:16). Normative views about the world along with perspectives on how states act politically create images of states in the minds of policy makers. Beliefs about how “the other” will act when subjected to different environmental effects create an image of that actor (Jervis, 1970). Possible responses to the environment by policy makers of another state reflect beliefs about that state in the form of an image.
Yet, policy makers often share images of the world and of other states (Holsti, 1976). Image theory provides an understanding of the beliefs of groups of people who think similarly (Cottam, 1986). The observed behavior of other states produces similar interpretation and processing in different individuals allowing policy makers to hold similar images of states. In addition, the socialization process of a country works to create a common image of other states (Rosati, 1984). In the same way, the process and institutionalization individuals go through when becoming part of the decision making process also produce similarly held images of the international environment (Rosati, 1984). A “collective image” presents itself as a product of individual images (Rosati, 1984). Furthermore, when a common image emerges in the minds of policy makers, the “aggregate image” affects policy behavior to a greater extent than when policy makers do not share an image (Rosati, 1984). Decision makers respond more strongly to another state’s actions when the image of that state coalesced through common beliefs about the state and its possible future behavior. When policy makers’ images of another state contradict each other, images have less impact on policy behavior (Rosati, 1984). Viewing images held by a group of policy makers may improve research on decision making behavior.
The Development of Image Theory
Much of the early work on images focused on the enemy image (Herrmann, 1988). Originally, the enemy was any opponent who acted in a threatening manner (Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, 1967). Behavior observed as acting against the perceiver’s security suggests the actions of an enemy. More so, the enemy presents a hostile profile militarily and opposes the perceiver politically (Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, 1967). Socially, the enemy represents those who are trying to hurt the perceiver (Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, 1967). In all aspects of state structures the enemy stands in opposition to the perceiver state. More recently, the enemy suggests a state that exudes evil, promotes a “monolithic” political system, appears rational and ingenious, and is perceived in a context of threat (Herrmann, 1988:184). Yet, both threat and opportunity exist in international relations, not just threat (Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1995:416). The enemy may take action when an opening occurs in the power relationship between states. On the other hand, the enemy may react to actions taken against it or when it considers the stand of another state as threatening its security and act based on this perceived threat. Interactions between states involve aspects of both threat and opportunity. In addition, the enemy image does not explain all military interactions. Not all threatening states fit the enemy image, and an expansive enemy image fails to explain nuances observed by threatening states.
Much of the enemy image emerged from the analysis and understanding of in-groups and out-groups. The out-group (enemy) fulfills the necessity of having an entity that calls forth the actions of the perceiver state (Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, 1967). The perceiver state’s actions are not unilateral actions meant to further their own desires but are the result of actions taken by the enemy. The in-group (perceiver state) imagines itself as “superior” and “righteous” as the perceived state’s actions require a response by the perceiver state (Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, 1967). The enemy presents behavior negative in nature while the perceiver only acts in response. The enemy personifies all that is bad while the perceiver state contains the good (Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, 1967). Thus, the image of the enemy supports the desire to act against another state—a justification for state action (Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, 1967). Often, the in-group, through its actions, desires a change in the balance of power and the enemy image becomes the excuse. Additionally, the high status of the perceiver state’s moral standards are upheld through the countering of enemy actions (Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, 1967). The “just” actions of the in-group or perceiver state reflect the “superiority” of that state’s values.
In addition, having an out-group or enemy creates unity within the in-group (Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, 1967). Individuals unite when a common enemy presents itself. If no strong enemy exists, a mobilized group has “low morale and a loss of credibility for the leadership” (Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, 1967:11). Leaders must designate an enemy that threatens the security of the state thereby promoting a unifying factor for state longevity. Thus, under this view, as a necessary component to international relations, the existence of an enemy invokes retributive action and creates a unified front within individual states.
Richard Cottam (1977) discusses how actors within a state perceive the motivations of actors within other states, as well as their own motivation for foreign policy action. This motivation behind foreign policy action becomes observable through an individual’s world view. Examining the threat and/or opportunity perceived by a policy maker enables us to ascertain his/her specific world view and policy preference. The world view of a policy maker takes on an image of another country by translating threat and opportunity into a cognitive structure. Images represent cognitive constructs that filter incoming information (Schafer, 1997). An image of other states emerges that colors information processing and suggests policy behavior.
Cottam (1977) uses images of the enemy, allied, imperialist and colonial states to show why states make foreign policy decisions. The enemy supports a political structure based on a central government with a monopoly of power, that exudes evil, acts aggressively, and is motivated by power (65). The allied state takes defensive action only, sustains a political system pluralistic in nature and keeps itself ready to act when necessary (66). The imperialist image contains two parts: 1) the imperial state and 2) that of the state towards which the imperialist acts. This complex interaction involves a relationship between superior and inferior states. The imperialist state views the inferior state as child-like with capabilities lower than those of the perceiver state (69). The imperialist state makes policy decisions on the basis of perceived opportunity. The colonial image emerges “when the view prevails among its people that the government and people of the imperial power are so deeply involved in the decision-making process of the colony as to deny it real sovereignty” (70). The imperial state limits the power of the colonial state and dictates much of its policy. The colonial state considers this an intrusion on its ability to perform politically and make its own policy decisions.
Cottam (1977) defines complex states as those states that do not fit the prototypical images held by policy makers. He explains that states fitting the prototypical images allow policy makers to engage in less information processing to determine their policy preferences. Images create a cognitive structure of a state that promotes a specific way of viewing that state. When new information comes in, policy makers reflect on the images and consider the new information based on their cognitive frameworks. The images themselves suggest policy options without the policy maker having to consider all information available. Cottam (1977) also suggests that complex states need more information processing as they do not conform easily to prototypical images. Complex states do not enjoy the same degree of image structure as those states that appear more typical of an image category. This means that policy makers must view new information more closely when contemplating policy action towards a complex state. Cottam (1977) also explicates how states may vary over time, sometimes fitting the prototypical images and at other times becoming more complex. Thus, states fluctuate within the image spectrum and may move away from the prototypical image to take on characteristics that induce a closer consideration of incoming information.
Martha Cottam (1986) looks to the psychological literature to gain support for a new group of images. She defines cognition as the “psychological processes involved in the acquisition, organization, and use of knowledge” (6). People create structures in their minds through the use of information that then structures additional information processing. Cottam (1986) believes that viewing actors’ cognitive structures leads to an understanding of how policy makers make their decisions (7). How an individual decision maker structures information leads to an understanding of policy behavior. Furthermore, Cottam (1986) suggests that classifying U.S. policy makers’ “world views” or their “perceptual patterns and behavioral tendencies” would benefit understanding and foreign policy formation (17). Decision makers act based on how they believe the world exists and interacts. These images offer an insight into how and why policy makers act. By structuring these images into a framework, patterns of behavior emerge that reflect the cognitive conceptions and behavior of policy makers.
Individuals create images for categorizing people, much like stereotypes, and these categories provide ways of responding to people and/or events (Cottam & Cottam, 2001). If individuals didn’t create cognitive structures of information, events would always appear as new, and large amounts of information would necessitate processing. Cognitive categories allow individuals to access preconceived structures through which new information travels. Recalled images of an event suggest possible behavior. Images of states develop in the same manner. A categorization of states aids in information processing and structures the political world (Cottam & Cottam, 2001). States and events compared against cognitive categories provide insight into behavior and trigger a response. Cottam also argues that policy makers put states into categories for “cognitive efficiency” and that there is a “prototype” image of a category against which other states are compared (Cottam, 1986). Comparing states with prototypical images allows the policy maker to determine how closely states appear to the image and what reactions best fit the situation. States within the categories appear similar politically, socially and economically (Cottam, 1986). Similar states often spark similar policy options as they fit into the same image categories.
Cottam (1986) promotes a two step process when placing a state into an image category. First, a “nominal” judgment considers what category the state fits. Second, an “ordinal” judgment determines how well the state “fits” the prototypical image. Policy makers place states into these categories through the use of cognition. Drawing on psychology literature, Cottam (1986) discusses the process of nominal and ordinal judgments and the difficulty of changing a state’s perceived image. The literature suggests that nominal judgments occur on a subconscious level of analysis. Placing a state within a category utilizes cognitive capabilities that do not reflect a conscious effort. Nominal judgments also reflect the expertise of the decision maker (Cottam, 1986). More experienced policy makers may categorize states quicker and more precisely as their judgments reflect greater familiarity with such situations.
Ordinal judgments determine how well the state fits the ideal-typical prototype of a category (Cottam, 1986). A range of an image occurs within a category with some states closer to the prototype and others further away, or more complex. As the state nears the prototype, the decision maker’s confidence in his/her decisions increases as less information requires deciphering and analysis. Ordinal judgments filter information and provide information about a state that might not be available otherwise (Cottam, 1986). Policy makers compare new information to the prototype, and then the category itself provides missing information about a state (Cottam, 1986). The closer a state lies to the prototype image the fewer and more restricted the response alternatives, and the further away the state lies from the prototype the larger the number of response alternatives that become available to the policy maker (Cottam, 1986). A complex state requires the decision maker to consider more responses to a state’s actions than do states close to the prototype as prototypical states instigate concrete and specific responses only partially available in response to complex states.
Furthermore, several image categories emerge defined by perceptions of motivation, capability, decision style, locus of decision making and domestic forces’ interaction (Cottam, 1986). Cottam (1986) outlines seven categories: enemy, hegemonist, dependent ally of the enemy, neutral, ally, dependent of the perceiver’s state, and puppet of perceiver’s state. Each image develops “through a discussion of the peculiar combinations of the attributes, event scripts prototypes and response alternatives associated with the image” (50). Attributes include military capability, the style of domestic politics, economic structure, cultural characteristics, how the perceived state feels toward the perceiver’s state, degree of flexibility in international bargaining and other general goals. Event scripts point to how the policy makers of the perceiver state interpret the actions of the perceived state, such as instances of aggression, government stability, major issues, and analogies (Cottam, 1986). Response alternatives indicate how the policy makers of the perceiver state respond to the perceived state and include diplomatic exchanges, military force, economic force, doing nothing and appealing to the international community (53-54). Images spark response alternatives specific to that category. Responses vary from image to image and develop in reaction to perceived characteristics. Through the use of these characterizations, policy makers develop categories, enabling them to perceive possible actions of another state and even predict behavior (55). Information based on image categorization fulfills requirements of providing solutions to questions on what policy actions a perceiver state should take by suggesting the behavior of a perceived state. Thus, observed behavior implies possible future action, sparking responses by the perceiver state.
Cottam (1986) originally developed her categories based on empirical evidence collected through a survey issued to U.S. government officials. The survey asked how the policy makers categorize states. While the hegemonist and puppet states lacked clear identification, the enemy, ally, dependent of the perceiver state, dependent of the enemy and neutral states did have meaningful outcomes as they supported Cottam’s hypotheses. Cottam suggests that the hegemonist state, seen as “more powerful than the perceiver’s state,” lacked salience as the respondents resided in the U.S., and a state more powerful than the U.S. was unfamiliar (76). The puppet state lacks clear categorizing, but the data agreed with projected results (85). The other state images, explained in detail below, supported hypothesized expectations.
Cottam (1986) relates that the enemy state, equal in military power to the perceiver’s state, supports a different type of political organization—a centralized and imposing system “devious” in intent. The perceived state, also equal in its economic and cultural development to the perceiver state, holds values that are different and “disdained.” Cottam (1986) explains that the enemy state “is unsupportive of the goals and policies of the perceiver state, inflexible in policy formation and implementation, and aggressive in pursuit of its goals” (74). Seeking objectives that differ from those of the perceiver state, the enemy acts forcefully in achieving its goals. Several policy options open up to policy makers of the perceiver state. The perceiver state’s responses towards the enemy state include diplomatic exchanges, military force and economic force (Cottam, 1986). The perceiver state would first respond with containment policies as any direct contact with the enemy may prove dangerous and risky. Diplomatic efforts in the form of high level dialogues signify a secondary step in a response situation. If high level talks fail, economic sanctions often offer an escalation of the crisis without employing military forces. Finally, military options, including embargoes, force deployment, conventional weapons operations and the threat of nuclear strikes, suggest a threat from the perceived state of extreme dimensions. Policy makers feel compelled to react to the threat of an enemy state, even seeking assistance from the international community (Cottam, 1986). Event scripts—the perceiver state’s view of what actions the perceived state will take—support varied considerations. Strong actions against the perceiver state rank high and behavior that threatens their security seems likely. Often, the perceiver state will invoke historical analogies that relate to the crisis situation, with Hitler and other significant enemy leaders a favorite comparison (Cottam, 1986).
The dependent ally of the enemy presents an image weaker in military power than that of the perceiver state, Cottam continues. If acting solely on its own, the dependent of the enemy state offers an easy opportunity for power control by the perceiver state. However, a dependent of the enemy includes the potential to draw upon the deterrent aspect of the enemy’s military strength. Extending its deterrent strength to its dependent, the enemy provides an umbrella of military power that inhibits the perceiver state’s actions. Dependent of the enemy states may also support the political actions of the enemy and offer the opportunity for the enemy to act through the dependent’s political and economic system. Culturally different and economically less developed (78), this image offers opportunity to the enemy not available to the perceiver state. Response alternatives including diplomatic exchanges, military action and economic coercion depend on the level of enemy involvement and must consider the enemy’s likely response. Indeed, much of the response alternatives focus on the actions of the enemy and seek the involvement of the enemy in solving the situation.
Cottam (1986) asserts that the neutral state image, inferior militarily, presents a state that limits its use of military force. Neutral states seek other means of furthering their goals and objects, preferring not to support either side in a crisis. While the neutral state recedes as a threat to the perceiver state, it also fails to promote completely friendly relations. The neutral state’s similarity economically and culturally to the perceiver state suggests that responses to a neutral state’s actions focus primarily on diplomatic and economic policies. Since the neutral state only reluctantly uses military force, military action by the perceiver state seems unlikely. A neutral state’s actions during a crisis situation, Cottam (1986) continues, consist of doing nothing or appealing to the international community. An event script suggests that neutral states limit their involvement with competing states and fail to support either side. In addition, as neutral states produce stable governments and economies, aggressive behavior by a neutral state and an alliance with the perceiver state appear unlikely (Cottam, 1986). A neutral state seeks to stay neutral.
Cottam (1986) found the ally state equal to the perceiver state militarily, economically, and culturally. The ally state builds capable military and social structures and retains the ability to use them in a crisis situation. Government structures of the ally state also appear similar to those of the perceiver state. The ally state actively seeks to obtain its goals while also supporting the perceiver state’s actions. Response alternatives would include diplomatic exchanges, but not military or economic force, as the ally stands as a friend to the perceiver state. Since the ally image presents a friendly relationship with the perceiver, failing to respond to the ally seems unlikely. Image characteristics support event scripts of the ally state coming to the aid of the perceiver state with security and economic issues a priority (Cottam, 1986). The ally state and the perceiver state form a cooperative relationship and seek supportive policies.
Cottam (1986) found that the dependent of the perceiver state presents an image inferior in military strength, economically and culturally. The government of the dependent of the perceiver state may be similar to that of the perceiver state, but may also support government aspects differing from those of the perceiver state. The dependent of the perceiver state relies on the military strength of the perceiver state to create a deterrent effect, similar to the relationship between the enemy and the dependent of the enemy. Response alternatives of the perceiver state range from diplomatic exchanges and calls for international involvement to military and economic pressure. Having no response to dependent of the perceiver state actions may also signify an option (Cottam, 1986). Event scripts for the dependent of the perceiver state likely reflect the state’s dependence on the perceiver state and dependent’s support the perceiver state’s policy objectives as well.
Context
Context also influences the perception of a state. The more “accessible” a category the more likely the perceiver makes assumptions about a state. In Cottam’s (1986) study, U.S. policy makers more readily used the dependent image for Latin American countries than the neutral state image. Thus, the dependent image was more accessible for categorizing these states than any other image. Also, the more hostile the environment of state interaction when categorized, the more hostile the judgment (121). Cottam (1986) relates that accessibility of a category plus hostile effects may lead policy makers to categorize a state as a greater threat than it is in reality. This perceived threat may not really exist, but the policy maker may choose a response alternative based on faulty information processing. Cottam (1986) concludes that “the general implication of these psychological studies is that categories both interact with the external environment and create contexts that influence judgments” (123). Image categories relate to events and actions in the reality of the world, resulting in new events that need processing. Image categories also create levels through which states flow, framing placement within the categories.
Once placement of states occurs both nominally and ordinally, change becomes difficult (Cottam, 1986; Cottam and Cottam 2001). Cottam (1986) lists five reasons for only limited opportunity in changing a state’s placement. First, policy makers expect certain behaviors, so they look for them (124). Second, ambiguous feedback and information keep the policy maker locked into his or her judgment of a state (124-125). Third, judgments use old information even if new information suggests change: “Adjusting judgments to new information takes time” (125). Fourth, accessibility of a category keeps the policy maker more inclined to choose one category over another for some states (125). Fifth, “re-education” of policy makers and “the constant close look” of perceived states assist in changing a perceiver’s viewpoint, but the perception of outward appearances may fail to indicate inner conditions of change, preserving faulty decisions (126). Thus, moving a state ordinally from one level within a category to another occurs only over time and with extensive new information. A nominal change to a new category presents even more difficulty.
Cottam suggests that context plays a large role in policy makers’ placement of states in categories:
The use of political categories will be influenced by the context created by the environment, the context created by the elements composing the category and the interaction of the two. The gestalt created by the combination of each category’s characteristics produces general impressions of threat and/or opportunity associated with each type of state. (128)
The creation of categories reflects information processed by perceivers on events. Information about new events structures how states fit nominally and ordinally within the categories. When both new and old event information interact, an overall framework develops that sheds light on state behavior. This framework structures whether a state deserves analysis through an environment of threat or of opportunity. Policy makers ignore new information that contradicts the category while they accept information that fits the image (Cottam, 1986:129; Cottam and Cottam 2001:88). If the contradicting information continues, however, then a shift occurs away from the prototype or to another category (Cottam, 1986:129). Finally, old information used for political judgments takes precedence as policy makers may ignore new information or rely more on the old information that placed the state in its category in the first place (129). Rational actor theory assumes that complete and precise information on an actor exists. Image theory does not assume this. The use of an image overcomes incomplete information and fills in gaps which would otherwise limit policy makers’ behavior.
New Developments in Image Theory
Cottam (1992) suggests that, due to the end of the cold war, image theory needs a review and reconceptualization of its main tenants (3). A new image of the enemy emerges, a “cognitive change” that should translate into new policies for states that were in the enemy and dependent of the enemy image categories. A policy of containment may no longer be viable as those states that used to be seen as the enemy no longer hold this position and are now more complex in their perceived image by the U.S. In addition, as the enemy may lack meaning in the post-cold war era, the dependent of the enemy also loses its meaning. New international structures or relationships mean new ways of viewing states (6). New categories develop as well as changes occurring within categories. New research focusing on the changes of the enemy and dependent of the enemy images offers insight.
Three stages take place when policy makers place states into new categories (Cottam, 1992). First, new information gathering occurs on the state that goes against prior information. This process may take time as perceiver states often ignore information contrary to an image. Once an abundance of new information suggesting an image change develops, policy makers, depending on their personalities, may consider altering image perceptions. Second, a review takes place on any behavior not in line with past behavior. As images produce event scripts that prescribe a perceived state’s actions, behavior inconsistent with projected scripts conflicts with previously held images. Cognitive dissonance occurs requiring either a reconciliation of new information and behavior or a change in image categorization. Third, a new image develops that reflects new information and behavior, resulting in a new categorization of the perceived state (79). As old images become less consistent, the enemy and dependent of the enemy event scripts provide little insight into a state’s projected behavior. New image categories emerge.
Martha Cottam and Richard Cottam (2001) suggest a new set of images: enemy, ally, barbarian, imperialist, colonial client, rogue and degenerate. These new images reflect “assessments of capability, culture, intentions, threat or opportunity posed, and decision making patterns; that is , are the decisions made by a small group or a complex assortment of competing groups” (96). In addition, affect plays a large part in the perception of states and in the emotions triggered through the observation of a state’s behavior. Emotions of the policy maker affect the perception and placement of a state nominally and ordinally. The political context, or the observance of threat or opportunity, also plays a role (105-106). A state perceived through a context of threat suggests event scripts that delve into the perceiver state’s security interests. An environment of opportunity, on the other hand, promotes projected behavior limiting aggressive behavior by the perceived state.
The (“diabolical”) enemy evolves under a perception of threat:
It is simply and ineluctably aggressive in motivation, monolithic in decisional structure, highly rational in decision making to the point of being able to generate and orchestrate multiple complex conspiracies, and owes its power advantage to a greater will and determination than the threatened public can muster (Cottam and Cottam, 2001:106).
An important characteristic of the enemy image reflects its strength in military capability as equal to or greater than that of the perceiver state. In addition, the cultural and economic levels of the enemy also promote systems equal to the perceiver state. Threatening actions by a state with lessor military, economic and cultural capabilities fall into a different image category. The emotional “tags” associated with the enemy image reflect negative responses to behavior and “include anger, frustration, reproach, envy, jealousy, fear, distrust, and grudging respect” (106). A response to the enemy would be a strong stand against it, such as U.S. containment policies against the Soviet Union. Many of the event scripts and response alternatives previously projected by the enemy image remain in the new categorization.
The ally state seeks a positive relationship with the perceiver state. Again, much of the previous event scripts and response alternatives projected by the ally image carry over to the new set of categories. However, the relationship develops under a context of threat due to the perceived threat of their common enemy or threatening state (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). Thus, while one might think of the interaction between the perceiver state and the ally state as a positive relationship (Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1995), policy in response to the perceived threat of eminent danger brings the perceiver state and the ally state together. The perceiver state and the ally state work together and support each other’s policies in order to counter the observed threat of the enemy state or other threatening entity.
The perception of the barbarian state image also occurs in a context of threat. Interestingly, the barbarian image reflects a superiority in military power but an inferior cultural system (Cottam and Cottam, 2001:108). While this image projects event scripts that suggest military action, the cultural level implies a limited moral position and actions that lack support of the international system. The barbarian image promotes aggressive intentions and a “monolithic” government structure, but a group “cunning in decisional style and willing to resort to unspeakable brutality including genocide, and determined to take full advantage of its superiority” (108). Response alternatives to the barbarian state promote actions towards coalition building to counter the perceived threat as the strength of the barbarian state overwhelms the perceiver state. The emotions in response to the barbarian would include disgust, anger, and fear, with a desire not to have direct conflict but to find other states willing to participate in a combined force against the state.
The perception of threat also occurs with the Imperial image. The Imperialist state, superior in capability and culture, exploits the perceiver state’s resources (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). The imperial state involves itself extensively in the perceiver state’s actions: “On the surface the system appears to operate through local leaders, but in fact the imperial power is perceived as pulling the strings, often at a very detailed level” (112). A “just” relationship between the two states projects emotional tags of fear and uncertainty. While a just relationship still includes imperialist involvement into the perceiver state’s political, economic and cultural systems, the perceived threat occurs at lower levels, and groups of people (elite) receive positive effects of the relationship. Response alternatives include policies promoting self-protection and avoidance of conflict, with respect towards the imperial power. Event scripts suggest “benevolent paternalistic affection by the imperial group for the subordinate group” (113). An unjust relationship projects behavior of the imperialist state that restricts, constrains and limits the development politically, economically and culturally of the perceiver state. Military power of the imperialist state threatens the security of the perceiver state. Emotional tags of jealousy, anger, shame, and desire for equality support actions that seek to undermine the imperialist hold over the perceiver state. Behavior promoting conflict with the imperialist state permeates policy options of the perceiver state (115). The perceiver state seeks to end the dominance of the imperialist state but encounters its strength, resulting in efforts to sabotage the imperialist state’s authority.
A new image since the end of the cold war, the rogue state image, occurs in a context of threat, yet the rogue state’s military capability, economic system and cultural level appear inferior to those of the perceiver state (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). Most states placed in the rogue state category developed as a dependent of the enemy during the cold war. The rogue state, limited in strength yet naughty in character, aggressively seeks to increase its level of power. There is usually a small group of elite leaders, or even a single leader, who, if removed from power, would allow the rogue state to fall in line with the wishes of the perceiver’s state (116-117). As the perceiver state believes itself to be more “mature” than the rogue state, “responses to this type of state are driven by a sense of superiority, hostility, and antagonism” (116). The perceiver state acts from a position of moral righteousness and views the actions of the rogue state as not only a threat to its national security but also as contradictory to international laws and standards.
The degenerate image develops in a context of opportunity. Equal in capability and culture to the perceiver state, the degenerate image reflects a state “uncertain and confused in motivation, characterized by a highly differentiated decisional structure that suffers from the absence of a clear sense of direction, lacking in a clear decisional trust and largely incapable of constructing an effective strategy, and lacking the will and determination to make effective use of its power instruments or to mobilized effective public support” (117). While the degenerate retains a military capability equal to that of the perceiver state, it fails to generate the ability to take assertive action. This leaves the degenerate state open to the involvement of the perceiver state in a move for power. Thus, opportunity exists for the perceiver state to gain power through the subjugation of the degenerate state. Disgust, contempt, scorn, and anger or hatred reflect the emotions that the perceiver state experiences when relating to the degenerate state.
Lastly, perceived in a context of opportunity, the colonial image appears inferior in capability and culture to that of the perceiver state (Cottam and Cottam, 2001:118). Similar to the two aspects of the imperial image, two types of colonial state occur: those that collaborate with the imperialist state and those that fight against it. Event scripts range from groups of people who willingly adhere to the policies of the perceiver state to active aggression against it. The emotions of the perceiver state towards the colonial state include disgust, contempt, pity, anger, and repression. Furthermore, response alternatives suggest that the perceiver state tries to “civilize” the colonial power. The perceiver state, having reached a higher level of development, seeks to share its political, economic and cultural systems with the colonial state. The colonial state either receives the perceiver with open arms or fights against the injustice.
While Cottam and Cottam (2001) outline the new categories, room exists for further research, especially on the rogue state image. Since the end of the cold war, the diabolical enemy lacks saliency. A new strategy must be developed, with the rogue state image the focus of new strategies for future international actions. While some theorists may view a state in the rogue state category as the enemy, the limited military strength and unequal aspects of economic and cultural systems make the enemy and rogue state images distinct and suggest unique events scripts and response alternatives. Furthermore, simply looking at the rogue state limits the understanding of this image as a conceptual construct and the state placed in this category. A look along a continuum will provide needed insight into the development of the rogue state and its unusual characteristics. As the rogue state emerges as the major threat to the security of the United States and the international system, research should reflect this need. Additional defining of the dependent of the enemy and rogue state images structures further analysis.
The Dependent of the Enemy Image
The dependent of the enemy image, perceived in a context of threat (Cottam, 1994), depends on the enemy for deterring the perceiver state. As the power of the enemy increases, it uses the dependent of the enemy state as a part of the enemy’s plans for expansion. The dependent of the enemy alone lacks the ability to threaten the perceiver state but exhibits a threat based on the power of the enemy behind it (Cottam, 1994:21). Cottam (1994) describes dependents as “weak, childlike, inferior, inept and led by a small and often corrupt elite” (25). The perceiver state acts to weaken the dependent of the enemy and undermine the dependent’s authority and alliance with the enemy. A high degree of threat observed by the perceiver state produces response alternatives that include military and covert actions (33). Yet, the perceiver state prefers positive actions (carrots) over negative ones (sticks) (34). Military action against the dependent of the enemy may provoke a military response from the enemy, a situation actively avoided by the perceiver state. Furthermore, due to the perceived state’s reliance on the enemy, response alternatives likely focus on the enemy state as the source of the conflict and the means through which the situation will end.
The Rogue State Image
Michael Klare (1995) discusses how the enemy no longer appears to exist, nor does the same containment policy that the United States employed in the past. A lack of policy focus created an “identity crisis” in the U.S. (6). A new strategy must take into consideration regional areas where states maintain large conventional armies and/or weapons of mass destruction (16). This “aggressive” “new enemy type” has or seeks to have nuclear weapons (23). Klare (1995) states that the term “rogue state” developed with strategists and policy makers for those states that held anti-western policies and attempted to obtain nuclear weapons and/or weapons of mass destruction (24). A new policy supported by militarists during the Bush years, called the “Rogue Doctrine,” required the U.S. to achieve the ability to wage war in two Gulf War-type conflicts at the same time (25-26). States considered rogue states include Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and North Korea (25). Klare sees the Gulf War as a test of the Rogue Doctrine.
In determining what type of policy rogue states should exact, Raymond Tanter (1998) looks at rogue states and determines whether U.S. policy should be one of carrot, stick, or a combination of both, based on the desire of “retribution or rehabilitation.” Retributive actions against rogue states may include sanctions, military actions, but not diplomatic ventures (Tanter, 1998). Situations occurring in a context high in threat support retributive actions, especially military actions limiting the use of weapons of mass destruction. Rehabilitation actions would consist of diplomatic measures, lessening of sanctions, and possibly economic assistance. A rogue state with limited levels of threat towards the perceiver state incurs less retributive actions and may move closer to international standards under rehabilitative response alternatives. Threat levels directly influence the type and severity of response alternatives instigated by the perceiver state.
Paul D. Hoyt (2000) attempts to get at the salience of the rogue state through a frequency count of the number of times rogue state appears in documents from the White House, State Department, the Department of Defense and CIA web pages. This study reflects a classic-style of content analysis (see Holsti, 1969). The results of his research showed that bureaucratic communication personnel use the rogue image in statements for the public. Hoyt (2000) believes that there exists an increase in the use of rogue state imagery. He mentions the importance of the rogue state conceptual image and its relevancy to foreign policy, but fails to link the increase in rogue image usage to specific policy action.
Hoyt (2000) suggests that the perceiver state acts based on a compellence policy. A compellent strategy would include the use of force, but would not likely include diplomatic measures because of the differences culturally between the perceiver state and the rogue state. He does not support a rogue state image under a context of lesser threat that results in rehabilitative response alternatives. However, due to the varied nature of those states listed as rogue regimes, Hoyt rejects the rogue state image as a category of state image. He sees the rogue state categorization as a “cognitive construction utilized by policy makers to explain the world around them” (15), but claims this differs from the process of image creation. Yet, as shown above, image development and use employs information processing through cognitively created categories.
A New Image?
Finally, a question arises whether the rogue state image holds meaning for policy makers. In a statement to the press on June 19, 2000, Secretary of State Madeline Albright[1] stated that a change in terms would occur. The rogue state designation was to end and “states of concern” used instead. Richard Boucher, the Department of State spokesman, claimed that states of concern was “a more general phrase,” and listed three premises for inclusion into the category: a state would show opposition to 1) the peace process 2) international standards, and 3) liberal government development and democratization. Boucher believed that the White House had made a descriptive change after former rogue states addressed problems established by the U.S. Each state deserved policies based on its own merits. Thus, a politically correct category emerged that reflected a desire to encourage diplomatic interactions and limit negative responses to a suggestive categorization.
Yet, the rogue state image still reflects a category of states prevalent in the international arena. Whether we use “dependent of the enemy,” “states of concern,” “rogue state,” or any other term, policy preferences develop based on the perceived behavior and projected event scripts of a state that behaves in a manner in opposition to international standards. Yet, the response alternatives to the dependent of the enemy differ in some ways to those of the rogue state. Analyzing these differences and the development of the dependent of the enemy image to the rogue state image produce important information for policy makers and researchers. With Iraq and North Korea as the cornerstones of the “Axis of Evil,” the rogue state emerges as the major threat to U.S. security and the security of the international community. Some individuals
may look to terrorist figures like Osama Bin Ladin and Al Qaeda as major threats, but terrorists obtain money and military support from rogue regimes and would not develop without the backing of rogue states. Limiting the resources of rogue states would directly affect the capabilities of terrorist groups. Thus, U.S. foreign policy should focus on rogue states, making the motivation behind policy choices a major theoretical question for researchers. Image theory seeks to answer this question and shed light on the cognitive processes used by policy makers. Image theory research on the dependent of the enemy and rogue states images provides important information on the role of cognition in policy making and suggests possible responses to states in the rogue image category.