CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION:  POWER, DETERRENCE AND IMAGES

For the first time since the dawn of humanity, we gaze

into the abyss of total annihilation.  In his memoirs, J. Robert Oppenheimer,

once scientific director of the Manhattan Project, said that as he witnessed

the first atomic explosion he recalled a passage from the Bhagavad Gita:

“If the radiance of a thousand suns were to burst at once into the sky, that would be

like the splendor of the Mighty One.... I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds.”

--Daisaku Ikeda[1]

The Puzzle and Its Pieces

Nuclear weapons stand at the dawning of the New Century as the only man-made force capable of annihilating all of humanity and most life on Earth in a matter of moments.  While nuclear deterrence worked throughout the Cold War, new nuclear nations threaten to disrupt this peace brought about through fear.  Policy makers believe that new nuclear states may not adhere to the same cultural standards, create the same political and bureaucratic structures, and hold the same intents as did Cold Warrior states.  In addition, nuclear seeking or capable states failing to adhere to international norms and standards—rogues—may pass this technology on to terrorists.  Thus, rogue states stand as one of the highest threats to U.S. security in the post Cold War era.

The three main questions for policy makers view how and why the problem occurred, and what to do about it.  How did rogue states develop?  Why do they seek nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD)?  What policy solutions offer the best possible outcome when dealing with rogue states?  In an effort to answer these questions, this study considers the development of rogue states, often from a dependent of the enemy to that of a rogue state.  It is suggested that rogue states seek to secure deterrent capabilities no longer provide by the enemy.  This build up of deterrent capability threatens regional and international actors.  A consideration of past policy preferences towards rogue states may provide new ideas on how to address this security issue.

Rather than looking at decisions and their outcomes, this study seeks to enter into the mind of the policy maker, determine whether the rogue state image is held by policy makers, and their responses to rogues in a crisis situation.  It is an attempt to determine why policy makers promote the policy preferences they do.  Hopefully, the outcome of the study suggests points of access where further research can direct change and overcome misperception, often a core function of less than perfect policy making.  How policy makers perceive the transition of a state from that of a dependent of the enemy to that of a rogue and the best policy preferences given the situation holds more importance than what an objective observer may view as the “true” situation and the “right” policy.  What policy makers perceive is their truth, and their policies reflect this perception.  The first step is to uncover their perceived understanding of rogue states, whether flexibility in their perceptions exists, and the policies they consider when dealing with rogues in a crisis situation.  Through this understanding, opportunities may appear for creating increased understanding on how to deal with rogue states.  As each individual is different, not all policy makers perceive rogue states exactly the same, nor do they promote similar policy preferences, and policy preferences appear to vary from rogue to rogue.  Deterrence fails in some cases, but is successful in others.  By considering the similarities and differences in the perceptions and policy preferences of policy makers towards Iraq and North Korea over time, an understanding develops of how perceptions influence policy making, providing points of access for increasing successful policy outcomes.

Power

International relations theories often focus on the relationship between power and states’ interests.  Power is the ability to get others to do what they may not normally have done.  Individuals, groups, and states invoke power everyday when dealing with other people and other states.  Power becomes the instrument used to achieve desired ends.  Pursuing goals through the use of power involves politics.  Politics is “an unending struggle for interests and power” (Morgenthau and Thompson, 1952: 33).  States seek to fulfill desires for power and use political force to do so.  States’ interests include political objectives and are achieved through the use of power.  The desire for power reaches fruition by using political power.  In other words, it takes power to get power.

The capabilities of a state reflect its level of power.  When a state seeks to achieve a policy goal based on its security interests, the state considers the power relationship between itself and the other state.  The total accumulation of capabilities within the state produces power but cancels out when two states’ capabilities are equal (Stoessinger, 1973).  States of equal ability lack superiority over each other, producing an equality of power.  Conflict occurs when one state believes it retains a higher level of capability than another state and when interests collide.  Specifically, military capability helps decide the outcome of conflicting perspectives in the international system (Rothgeb, 1993).  Conflicts often occur based on differing views of state interests and the use of power to achieve political goals.  The power politics of war based on military capabilities often determines the outcome of contention between states.

On the other hand, power may take on different forms in the twenty-first century.  Military power may be limited in the current international system as non-military states have gained power through their economic strength (Rothgeb, 1993).  States like Japan and Germany strengthen their political power through their economic abilities to contribute to and control certain markets.  Equality between states’ economic power often supersedes military power between states.  States’ use of power, observed through policy makers’ actions, furthers national interests, but it takes on new forms.  While in Eastern Europe and the Balkans divisions of nations takes place, the unification of states creates greater economic power.  The European Union exemplifies the growth of economic power through unification.  In addition, Joseph Nye (2002) relates the increasing importance of soft power, those aspects of a state’s “image” other than economic and military capability.  How much another state desires to “be like Mike” develops out of its perception of “goodness” within the state viewed.  Cultural level, intent, and domestic policy all reflect aspects of soft power.  Even the geography of a state contains power (Spykman, 1952).  The United States gains power due to its sharing of borders only with Mexico and Canada and thousands of miles dividing it from the states of Europe, while the power of the states united within the European Union increases due to decreases in border conflicts. Power is contextually bound (Lamborn, 1997) and takes many forms, from the ability to control the minds and actions of others to the influence the president has over subordinates (Morgenthau and Thompson, 1985).   The internal power of a state—made up of hard and soft power, and geographical location—influences the power used towards other states in achieving political goals.

Furthermore, international relations occur under the banner of power, and states interact based on power politics.  “Political interest” defines power and is observed through the balance of power between states (Morgenthau and Thompson, 1985), as it is the nation-state that holds the power (Modelski, 1972).  States exercise power by furthering their interests in the international arena.  International politics develop through the struggle for power (Morgenthau and Thompson, 1985), and the ability to make other states act according to one’s desires (Rothgeb, 1993).  Power politics between states depends on how states’ interests interact with capabilities.  States use power to further their national interests, achieving desired ends if their exercise of power brings success. 

Traditional realist theorists state that as capabilities equate with power, the ability to reach wanted ends depends on the capabilities of the state, or hard power.  The study of power between states has been a hot topic for thousands of years.  Thucydides[2] explores the power relationship between the Athenians, Spartans, and other small city-states during the Peloponnesian war.  Thucydides describes how military leaders and government officials use military strength to coerce, deceive, defeat, or deter their enemies.  Both Athens and Sparta used military force to gain land and position, through which political power was obtained.  Specifically, Thucydides describes the exchange between the Melians and the Athenians, when the latter sought to subjugate the former, as the use of power politics:  “[T]he standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” (Thucydides, 402).  It was rational for the Athenians to slaughter the Melians when they irrationally chose to fight against the odds.  Similarly, Clausewitz[3] promotes a very rational argument for waging war.  As a policy tool of the state, war is a “rational instrument.”  The objective of the state is to increase its power at the expense of other states through rational decision making.  Sun Tzu[4] also calls for the rational analysis of power relationships in offensive actions.  A state should only seek more power (attack) when the odds support such action.  After all, war legitimizes a nation-state’s power (Modelski, 1972).  Therefore, the rational use of power in furthering states’ interests influences decision making.

States’ interests vary, but include the national security of the country and those issues that affect this security.  Power enables states to secure their interests.  National interests develop at the state level, vary from state to state, and are consistent over time (Krasner, 1978).  In this way, the issues important to the United Nations and the world community often lack support at the individual state level.  The national interests of the U.S. may include environmental issues while such interests hold less meaning in another state.  Longevity of interests supports the position that the whims of policy makers fail to become national interests.  Furthermore, the state has the responsibility to maintain itself, and its interests include both power and peace (Morgenthau and Thompson, 1985).  Maintaining the state includes keeping borders secure.  More specifically, a state’s interests include society’s mutual benefits and international bargaining chips (Clinton, 1986).  Benefits suggest interests that support the lifestyle of those living in the state and its ability to participate in the international relations game.  By viewing the general goals of society that last over time and are arranged in an ordered preference, the interests of the state are apparent (Krasner, 1978).  In this way, the state’s interests involve more than the interests of individual politicians.  Nevertheless, individual actions of policy makers construct national interests at the state level (Krasner, 1978).  While the short term desires of policy makers do not usually create national interests, the individual makes policy choices that evolve into and support national interests.

Still, there are a variety of ways realists look at what develops as states’ interests.  While Morgenthau and Thompson (1985) see national interests as a state level concern, Krasner (1978) observes state interests at lower levels (domestically)—but these interests become state level interests over time.  Some concerns that originate at the grassroots level slowly develop into state level concerns.  More recently, national interests may advance beyond the borders of a state’s territory and take on the interests of the United States “Empire” (Strange, 1989).  Here, corporations and political entities produce interstate influences that support the political and economic interests of the U.S.  Still, international interaction, the realists state, must be understood through international political theories (Waltz, 1979).   Influences developing from inside the state are “reductionist” and should not concern the international theorist.  What is inside the box doesn’t matter—only the outcomes have meaning (Hollis and Smith, 1990).  Realists view the structures of power and states’ interests at the international level of analysis.  Capability or power reflects structures that suggest actions the state may take, say the realists.  Changes in the international system do not necessarily mean changes of the international structure (Waltz, 1979).  Although a state may change its placement within the system, the structure of the system, based on power, remains.

Yet, the motivation behind any action becomes meaningful at the individual or group level.  The “reductionist” view operationalizes characteristics that make the measuring of power easier (Hollis and Smith, 1990).  Even though all states react to an international crisis, how they act may differ (Jervis, 1976).  The question being asked determines the level of analysis used.  Answering the questions about motivation behind the use of power, observed through the decisions of the policy makers, must occur through the analysis of individuals and groups of individuals.  Decision making unfolds through the personality of the individual, the general perceptions of clusters of people, and the behavior of groups.  Power may be shared between individual leaders of bureaucracies (Destler, 1974), groups of policy makers, or held by a single leader. In addition, the actions of one state influence the decision making of another state (Buzan et al., 1997).  Patterns indiscernible at the system level take shape when viewed in individual action.

Furthermore, the anarchic system depicted by the realist perspective contends with the idealist view of Woodrow Wilson after WWI (Morgenthau and Thompson, 1952).  Although power still reigns supreme in international politics, the changing structure of power may limit nationalistic tendencies, allowing for the development of a world community.  Just as the confederated states of the colonies found it necessary to unite in order to limit inter-state power struggles,[5] so too can states in the international system unite in order to limit international conflict.  The coming together of states in the European Union exemplifies the ability of countries to contain nationalistic calls for sovereignty in order to gain mutual benefits of a larger structure.  Supporting the United Nations’ role in international relations and the judicial supremacy of a world court would create a new system of state interaction that limits the influence of a superpower and allows for stronger smaller states.  A united effort from states in a world community removes the need for power politics from one state acting alone in making another state bend to its will.  While power and national interests still hold importance in international relations, the world community needs supersede those of any one state and create a structure through which inter-state conflict is resolved.  Thus, the barbaric form of power politics called war would be limited to a united police force enforcing international laws. 

Deterrence    

Yet, power relationships continue in the international arena, including the ability to create

deterrence  between  states.  A balance  of power  between  states  includes  the  ability  of  policy makers to further the interests of the state without harming deterrent positions.  A main goal of a state includes the deterrent ability to other states from taking its power (Gergorin, 1993).  Deterrence fails when war occurs. The power and peace sought by a state reflect in part its deterrent capabilities.  A state’s interests include keeping its place in the international arena.  The ability to retain its international placement depends on creating a solid deterrent position thereby protecting the interests of the state (Jervis, 1993). 

The realist view suggests that deterrence develops through a cost/benefit analysis of the balance of power between states, resulting in a perceived high that the state must maintain in order to limit any threat against its national interests (Schelling, 1966).  Conventional weapons create deterrence based on the wealth of a state and its ability to direct funding to military capabilities.  Weapons of mass destruction are less costly and can balance power inequalities.  Nuclear weapons produce the ultimate deterrent capability as a state will not willingly subject itself to total destruction as a result of nuclear retaliation (Jervis, 1993).  The cost of nuclear use outweighs the benefit of using such weapons in an offensive move against another state, if the opposing state also has nuclear weapons (Bundy, 1982).  Thus, it is in a nuclear state’s best interests to limit those states seeking or acquiring nuclear weapons, while smaller states will likely seek nuclear capabilities.

As a part of the influence they had over smaller states in their spheres of influence during the Cold War, superpowers extended their nuclear deterrent capabilities over client, or dependent, states (Huth and Russett, 1988 & 1993).  Therefore, any state challenging the balance of power of an ally or dependent of a larger power must consider the possibility that the larger power will involve itself in the altercation.  Once the Cold War ended, those states under the influence of the Soviet Union could no longer count on the extended deterrent capabilities of the Soviets, forcing the dependent states to look elsewhere for deterrence, often through the development and acquisition of WMD.  Preston (1997) argues that new nuclear states change power relations in the international system.  Since nuclear weapons produce parity between states of different sizes and capabilities, superpowers lose their position as the controllers of military might (Preston, 1997).  Thus, viewing the development of nuclear and other WMD capability in smaller or developing states becomes important.

Yet, some states successfully keep their borders in tact without the use of nuclear weapons or a large military.  In addition, some states known to be seeking nuclear weapons fail to feel the bombs of war while others are bombed indiscriminately.  The realist view of deterrence from a strictly international system level fails to explain why such variances occur.  In every instance where a smaller state seeks nuclear weapons, the nuclear state would act to stop such capability with force.  Anything less that the use of force suggests a value within a state to consider, making an analysis within the state important.  Furthermore, rather than “the state” making decisions, it is the policy makers perceiving the situation and the relative placement of the perceived state within the system that affects international policy making.  How much a perceived state is a threat reflects the perceptions of the policy makers.  Therefore, a theory considering the perceived threat or opportunity of a state better addresses the ability for states to repel an attack and secure its national interests than a strict systems level theory of international relations.

Images

On October 10, 2002 I sat watching the debate on the House Resolution on the Use of Force Against Iraq.  The debate and arguments lacked ingenuity and innovation.  As will be shown, speeches and remarks duplicated those spoken from 1989 to 1998.  The focus centered on Saddam Hussein and his roles as a terror machine who kills his own people, supports terrorist activities, and seeks WMD, specifically, nuclear weapons, and as an outlaw leader who retains the will to use WMD on the civilized world.  According to the speakers, if he obtains a nuclear weapon, he will use it in the Middle East.  These words produce a picture or image of a state acting against the world community, a state lacking the same level of common decency as the great powers of the world—a rogue state with a short fuse.  These images developed over years, starting in the late 1960s with Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr,[6] through the 1980s and 1990s with Saddam Hussein’s[7] rise to power, and during the crisis leading to the bombing of Iraq in the Desert Fox campaign of 1998. 

A short eight days after the debates on Iraq, another state contributing to the “axis of evil,” North Korea, acknowledged that it supported a secret nuclear weapons program.  Observations on North Korea also produce an image placing it in the rogue state category.  It stands as the hermit kingdom with an eccentric leader who may start a war on South Korea at anytime if provoked.  North Korea lacks the development of other states that would keep it from using nuclear weapons on other countries.  As the last Stalinist regime in the world, North Korea strictly enforces its nationalistic policies and its cult of personality surrounding Kim Il Sung and his son, Kim Jong Il.

Realists consider the internal workings of the state unimportant to the interactions between states at the system level.  Yet, the images perceived by policy makers of another state directly influence decision making.  Not only do the military and economic  capabilities of a state

influence policy makers policy preferences, but also the cultural level, observed intent and domestic policy actions of the state’s leaders and citizens.  Image theory considers all aspects of  power, both hard and soft, as perceived by the policy makers.  It is this perception that influences the direction a state takes in a crisis situation, not what an objective observer deems the “truth.”  Thus, as an alternative to the realist analysis of international interaction, viewing policy makers’ perceived images of other states, including rogues, provides insight into the making of international relations.

Images develop in response to information about a state and frame how new information influences responsive actions.  People form schemas, or preconceived groupings, to simplify information processing (Fiske and Taylor, 1991).  Schemas, like stereotypes, are preconceived images of other people, groups, or states based on prior information of the person, group, or state.  Information processed through schemas in turn elicits behavior based on these groupings.  In international relations, policy makers first create images of states, then process new information based on these images.  In other words, the world view that policy makers develop structures how they take action (Cottam, 1994; Fisk and Taylor, 1991). Responses to the actions of a state pass through an image held of that state.  For Iraq and North Korea, an image of a rogue state structures the policy choices of policy makers. 

Where do these images come from, and why do they exist?  What made these two states seek nuclear and other WMD in the first place, and why do we list them as rogue states?  It is proposed that these images come from policy makers’ reactions to the perceived development of deterrent capabilities of states that were once dependent upon the military power of the U.S. enemy, the Soviet Union.  Prior to 1989, and the eventual disintegration of the U.S.S.R., Iraq and North Korea were dependent allies of the Soviet Union.  In the fifties, sixties and seventies, Iraq and North Korea were dependent upon the extended deterrent capabilities of the Soviet Union and were able to keep other states from invading through their relationship with the U.S.S.R.  It will be shown that, despite the taking of U.S. property and people by North Korea and the military involvement of Iraq in the Arab-Israeli conflict and subsequent oil embargo, the U.S. failed to take action against either state.

Once Iraq and North Korea lost the support of the U.S.S.R. and the deterrent capabilities of its military might, Iraq and North Korea sought their own capabilities to deter states from threatening their national interests.  While these measures began before the end of the Soviet Union, they were taken in response to an observed need to create a deterrent capability.  The image held by U.S. policy makers of these two states evolved from that of a state that cannot act on its own accord to that of a rogue state that acts against the desires of the world community.  The seeking of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction is one indicator of a rogue state.[8]  As nuclear  weapons  promote deterrence, new  nuclear  states also seek to deter would be

challengers and maintain the balance of power in their regions.  The fortitude of Iraq and North Korea in seeking the power to create a deterrent capability produces images of a rogue state that threatens the security of the United States and its allies.

Image theory develops through the observation of power politics between states.  The military capabilities, culture, economic strength and observed threat of a state produce images (Cottam, 1992; Cottam, 1994; Cottam and Cottam, 2001).  These capabilities focus on the power relationships between states, but also include aspects other than system level considerations.  Culture,  domestic  policy  and  intent  rise  in  importance  to the perceiver.  While the threat and

capabilities perceived by one state influence the actions taken towards another, the perception of the ability and likelihood of another state taking action, as perceived by policy makers, also is important.  The schema created  by the various aspects of the hard and soft power of another state

structures the behavior of the policy makers within the perceiver state.  Thus, power, hard and soft, becomes the main focus in the relationship between states.  A perceived rogue state seeking nuclear weapons represents a threat and capability undesirable to the perceiver state.  While the rogue state seeks to create a deterrent position available through the attainment of nuclear weapons, such a grab for power threatens the security of other states.  Actions must be taken to reduce the threat and limit the power capability of the rogue state.  Yet, though some similar actions are taken towards both Iraq and North Korea, differences occur as well.  Only by viewing within the state and at the varying aspects of the perceived image can an understanding develop for why these variances occur.

Dissertation Outline

Cognitive theories are important to the study of international relations as these theories attempt to provide structure to our thinking about the cognition of political actors, their use of power, and how their interests frame behavior.  Due to the importance of power and interest in international relations theories, cognition is an important variable to consider (George, 1979; Young & Schafer, 1998).  Herrmann (1988) suggests that knowledge about international relations benefits from cognitive theories:  “In the past twenty years the interest in decision-making, perceptions, cognitive processes and artificial intelligence has played an important part in the development of our theories about world politics” (175).  More recently, Herrmann et al. (1997) underline the growing importance of cognitive theories and their use by academics to explain interstate interactions:  “Many scholars have developed arguments for using cognitive concepts to help  explain foreign  policy  decision  making  and  international relations” (403).  Even those

who argue against considering the motivations of individual actors end up proceeding at the individual level of analysis in policy formation (Herrman and Fischerkeller, 1995: 415).  The decision making literature that considers individuals and groups is large and offers much to the study of international relations (Cottam, 1986: 5).  Determining why policy makers act the way they do shines light onto darkened areas of international interaction.

            Determining the images held by policy makers clarifies and explains policy making behavior, and offers predictions for policy action in the future.  While some researchers may use cognitive theories that look at leaders or group dynamics in answering policy questions, image theory is unique in that it uses “like-minded” individuals to obtain positions on policy choices.  The study I propose adds to the literature by probing the dependent of the enemy and rogue state image categories to determine if policy makers use these images in making foreign policy and to determine if there is some consistency from one image to the other.  Specifically, how does the change from the of the dependent of the enemy image to that of the rogue state image affect policy makers’ decisions.

            The second chapter explores cognitive and image theories and their development over time.  While this literature is rich in theory, there are few studies that look deeply into the dependent of the enemy and rogue state images and what they mean for policy makers.  By creating a connection between the dependent of the enemy image and the rogue state image, I create a consistency between the past, present and future of image theory. 

The third chapter of the dissertation first presents a discussion on the benefits of the qualitative method and its place in scientific research.  The method of research employed depends on the question asked and the cases available.  Next, the research problem is explained, as well as the approach and methodology of the study, including the development of indicators, and the operationalization of variables. 

The fourth chapter goes over the history of Iraq and North Korea, setting up the later discussion on policy makers’ images held of these states.  Iraq begins as the center of civilization in the Middle East, the cultural leader, Mesopotamia. In the modern era, Iraq was formed out of the red lines drawn by French and British diplomats after the end of the Ottoman Empire.  Once oil was discovered in the Middle East, states vied for the right to pump that oil and receive the benefits of cheap fuel.  The nationalization of oil companies brought new international dilemmas as Iraq sought the support of the Soviet Union.  Conflict is the key word for the Iraqi situation in the Middle East since the sixties, with Iraq supporting the Six Day War with Israel, its war with Iran, the Gulf War, and the continuous crises that followed.  North Korea is a state also embroiled in conflict.  Before and during WWII, Japan sought to “free” Korea from the bonds of the Western world.  After WWII, Korea was split at the 38^th parallel with the influence of the Soviet Union in the north and of the U.S. in the south.  The Korean war furthered this divide despite the military actions of the United States and the United Nations.  Several crises followed, including the taking of the USS Pueblo by North Korea, North Korean withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), and its continued disruption of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors.

Chapters five (Iraq) and six (North Korea) present the results and analysis of the data.  I find a connection between the dependent of the enemy image and the rogue state image.  In addition, it is apparent that the dependent of the enemy and rogue state images are salient to policy makers.  Policy makers do use images in their making of foreign policy.  Furthermore, there is a change in how the deterrent capabilities of Iraq and North Korea are viewed through the change from dependent of the enemy image to that of the rogue state image.

In chapter seven, I review the hypotheses, discussing their outcome based on the data.  While in most cases the hypotheses are supported, some discussion reflects possible reasons for policy makers’ policy preferences that do not appear to support the rogue state image category with North Korea.  It is possible that rehabilitative measures provide a more idealistic or “enlightened” response to “bad” behavior, or that some policy makers seek to reward good behavior.  In addition, support for placing Iraq and North Korea in the rogue state categories rather than some other category is presented.

Finally, chapter eight summarizes the results and discusses the implications of the data, including a discussion on the changing view of power and how this is reflected in international relations, how the results suggest research for the future, and a note on the normative perspective of nuclear abolition.