Big Guns and Annihilation

The capability of a state viewed through power at the international system level is only part of the story. How policy makers in one state view internal characteristics within another state also reflect a perceived deterrent capability. Nuclear deterrence relies upon the threat of annihilation as retribution for a first strike nuclear attack and the belief that we are all evil at heart and incapable of finding solutions to conflict without violence. A discussion on the traditional aspects of deterrence and a consideration of how deterrence is sought by new nuclear nations today offers insight into the changing face of nuclear deterrence and the possibility that nuclear deterrence is a policy paradigm whose time has come to an end.

“If the radiance of a thousand suns were to burst at once into the sky, that would be

like the splendor of the Mighty One.... I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds.”

Policy makers and diplomats often attempt to put limits on waging war. Nuclear weapons blew through those limits. Even before the first nuclear weapon exploded in Japan, scientists recommended advance warning with the hopes of coercing the Japanese into surrender. Nevertheless, almost all actors in the government and the nuclear program agreed with the plan to use nuclear weapons on Japan (Morton, 1993). Yet, it was the unified effect of a possible three front war (U.S., U.S.S.R. and China), domestic collapse, and the spiritually depressing effect of the atomic bombs that forced Japan into surrendering (Morton, 1993). Anything less may not have had the same results. Doubt exists on the true cause that ended WWII in the Pacific and on the presumption that the cold war was a reflection of the nuclear age. In other words, the possibility exits that nuclear deterrence, as perceived by policy makers, differs from the deterrence viewed at the international systems level. The capability of a state viewed through power at the international system level is only part of the story. How policy makers in one state view internal characteristics within another state also reflect a perceived deterrent capability (cultural level, domestic politics, intent of leaders, etc.). Therefore, even if nuclear deterrence worked in the past, new nuclear states may not achieve the same deterrent capability as did the two Cold War superpowers. Internal characteristics beyond nuclear capabilities in one state may influence the perception of deterrence by policy makers in the other. Furthermore, nuclear deterrence relies upon the threat of annihilation as retribution for a first strike nuclear attack and the belief that we are all evil at heart and incapable of finding solutions to conflict without violence. A discussion on the traditional aspects of deterrence and a consideration of how deterrence is sought by new nuclear nations today may shed light on the need to look within a state in determining how policy makers perceive deterrent capabilities of other states and the possibility that nuclear deterrence is a policy paradigm whose time has come to an end.

Deterrence has long been considered part of the balance of power in the international system. A balance of power is achieved when states develop their capabilities to the degree that states successfully deter other states from taking aggressive action, resulting in peace. Gergorin (1993) puts forth a liberal theory of deterrence: “To deter is to attempt to prevent a person or group of people from committing certain kinds of actions by persuading them that if they do so, they will be so severely punished that the disadvantages of the act will outweigh its advantages” (447). As states seek to increase their power in an anarchic “self-help” system, deterrence is the relationship that develops when one state attempts to keep another state from actively obtaining power held by the first state (land, resources, strategic position). Gergorin’s analysis helps set up the conflicting perspectives on deterrence. Yet, he is vague in his structure of deterrence: is deterrence an act in itself, or do specific acts create a deterrent relationship between two or more states?

While Gergorin’s (1993) theory of deterrence pertains to policy makers and their decisions on international relations, it lacks specificity in relating strategy or in explaining the international system. As the realist view of the world explains an international system based on anarchy, the lack of an international sovereign and the support the status quo in the balance of power (those who already have the most power want to keep it that way) makes mutually supportive policies between states unlikely (Jervis, 1993). Rather, states will attempt to keep the balance of power stable while searching for defensive capabilities. One state’s development of defensive abilities is seen as a threat by other states. This is the security dilemma outlined by Jervis (1993): “many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of the others” (37). In response, the other states then must develop their own capabilities, which then threaten the security of the first state. The total outcome in the international system is less security and more threat. This policy of developing capabilities appears to fail a test of rationality. The security dilemma reflects the structural security of the state (technology, geography and relative power), or the perceptual security (perception and misperception of states’ power) (Snyder, 1985). Furthermore, distinguishing between offensive and defensive weapons is difficult. Offense is often seen as an advantage, and many weapons can have both defensive and offensive aspects. Indeed, Gergorin (1993) asserts, both offensive and defensive capabilities deter. Therefore, states arm themselves on a “one-up-manship” development program in order to protect against the offensive and defensive capabilities of other states. Yet, Jervis (1993) counters, there is no defense for nuclear weapons, “a triumph not of the offense, but of deterrence. Attack makes no sense, not because it can be beaten off, but because the attacker will be destroyed in turn” (49). Neither side can keep the other from obliterating them except for the knowledge that each will be obliterated in return.

Jervis’s view of nuclear deterrence offers important insight into the actions of policy makers. If nuclear weapons are obtained, there is a chance they could be seen as a threat by other states. Yet, if Jervis is correct, and nuclear weapons only deter, other states have nothing to fear. This is a flaw in Jervis’s view, for states do fear the proliferation of nuclear weapons, not for their ability to deter, but for their ability to destroy offensively. This fear increases with the sometimes (perceived) unpredictable actions of new states seeking nuclear weapons and WMD technology. Otherwise, states would not actively fight and guard against another state’s nuclear development. A weapon created to deter would not be seen as an offensive or defensive threat, but merely as a way to guard against another state’s grab for power. The question shouldn’t be whether nuclear weapons are offensive, defensive, coercive or deterrent, but rather whether they’re used to kill and a state’s commitment to use them. In an international system where each state attempts to gain more power, nuclear weapons would not make a difference if they simply canceled each other out in a strategy to create deterrence.

There are four uses of force to consider in the international balance of power system and the build up of military strength. Art (1993) labels these defense, deterrence, compellence, and swaggering. Defense is used “to ward off an attack and to minimize damage to oneself if attacked” (4). Deterrence stops “an adversary from doing something that one does not want him to do and that he might otherwise be tempted to do by threatening him with unacceptable punishment if he does it” (4). Compellence is action which redirects another actor “from doing something that that he has already undertaken or to get him to do something that he has not yet undertaken” (5). Swaggering is the nationalistic parading of the military and the drive to have the newest and best technology. Superiority in one area, continues Art (1993), doesn’t mean superiority in another. A strong defense may deter, but an act designed to deter is not likely to be defensive. Additionally, while a force meant to produce a deterrent situation may need only to keep conflict from escalating in the first place, a coercive force must be able to change the actions of another state after they have occurred. Art’s analysis helps political and military leaders analyze and prepare responses to perceived military threats with some degree of caution. With the problem of determining the various aspects of military strength, Art’s four uses of force may better guard against an escalating security dilemma.

Nevertheless, the technologically advanced weaponry of modern warfare has made drawing lines between offense and defense even more difficult. While some experts believe the deterrent aspects of nuclear weapons are clear, others see nuclear weapons as having the ability to be used offensively or defensively, especially against states without nuclear capability. However, confusion over weapons and the seizing of power tends to be at the conventional weapons level. Policy makers contemplating war or drawing lines in the sand in the post World War II era have never utilized the detonation and rarely the threat of nuclear weapons in an offensive or defensive situation; yet, wars continued, often with the U.S. supplying weapons to one side and the Soviets to the other. It seems convenient that the superpowers employed a strategy of nuclear deterrence to explain why the deaths of “Third World” counties furthered their conflict rather than the deaths of their own citizens, for the most part. Factors other than the use of nuclear weapons and WMD may influence state to state deterrence more than previously thought.

One of two major forms of nuclear deterrence theories, damage limitation explains the strategy where retaliatory attacks are made on military targets and escalate only to the level of those of the attacker. There is an attempt to limit the amount of nuclear destruction on both sides. Schlesinger (1993) discusses the “Limited Nuclear Options” of counter-force and damage limitation. He questions states’ credibility to use nuclear weapons—all out destruction as a retaliation to nuclear bombing of small military targets is not likely to occur in the future. Yet, says Schlesinger, confrontation is still likely between states. A need arises for a “series of measured responses to aggression which bear some relation to the provocation, have prospects of terminating hostilities before general nuclear war breaks out, and leave some possibility for restoring deterrence” (378). A damage limitation response appears as the best possibility for restoring the balance of power to a deterrent position. Schlesinger believes flexibility of response increases in importance as actions meant to create deterrence lack absolute success. To him, targeting cities is wasted swaggering, more beneficial domestically than internationally. Therefore, damage limitation strategy is adequate for responding to nuclear threats and creating a deterrent position.

Damage limitation utilizes the threat of a slowly escalating situation involving nuclear weapons. Schlesinger seems to believe that, as soon as nuclear bombs start falling, states on all sides will be looking for a way out. Damage will be limited. While Schlesinger attempts to find a moral application for the use of nuclear weapons in creating deterrence, he ignores human behavior in a crisis situation. Once escalation has occurred, the perceived obligation of a political and military leader to “win” a conflict, as well as other stresses, may make a “rational” decision impossible. Additionally, Schlesinger assumes perfect information among intelligence, the government, the military, and the opposing state in a nuclear conflict. However, once nuclear weapons have been detonated, the pre-set responses may not be able to be called off; if government officials cannot get in touch with military leaders, they may continue nuclear strikes indefinitely; states may not be able to communicate with each other, making pauses or the ceasing of escalation impossible. Furthermore, Schlesinger is simplistic in his differentiation between military and civilian targets. Military objectives often occur within major populated areas, and “civilian populations” or “non-combatants” are not always clearly defined. In any case, the detonation of a nuclear bomb within a large city would not only destroy the military objective, but the people and places around it for miles. If a state only desires to kill weapons, such as remote missile silos, then deterrence based on nuclear weapons could not exist as these weapons could be destroyed by conventional means. The assumption develops among those accepting this view that a retaliatory strike from a country whose military targets had been hit would only hit similar targets. Yet, if the military targets exist within a populated area, people will die. In addition, if a state’s weapons are targeted, that state may send off its own missiles at the first sign of a nuclear attack before learning where the opposing missiles have landed, or if it is an accidental launch, in order for their missiles not to be destroyed. There is no win in a nuclear war. For Schlesinger to propose that a state should only target military objectives on a damage limitation perspective brings false moralistic rhetoric to a strategy meant to create deterrence by threatening to kill large numbers of people.

McNamara (1993) also supported a damage limitation strategy in 1962, yet one that acknowledges the reality of human behavior and the deterrent factor of a nuclear threat. The contemporary interdependency of states, he maintains, requires closer international relationships. Even though rational states would not take actions that would lead to nuclear war, actors are not always rational. Irrational actors who target cities may start a war of absolute destruction. Thus, McNamara asserts, “principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy’s military forces, not of his civilian population” (376). If necessary, however, McNamara asserts that civilian targets can be destroyed in later strikes. States should utilize a strategy outwardly showing a commitment to ultimate force while inwardly keeping the option of damage limitation a possible response to a nuclear threat. Though it appears that Schlesinger (1993) and McNamara (1993) agree, the specifics of their strategies differ. McNamara promotes an outward commitment to using nuclear weapons on civilian populations in order to present the greatest possibility for deterrence, yet cautions political and military leaders only to utilize a damage limitation strategy in an actual nuclear conflict. Unfortunately, like Schlesinger, McNamara fails to recognize problems of information and communication, and the location of military targets within populated areas.

Brown (1993) agrees with McNamara, explaining a “countervailing strategy” towards the U.S.S.R. that was based on damage limitation. The response to a nuclear threat must be flexible, he cautions. There are five areas needing development in an escalating situation: flexibility, escalation control, survivability and endurance, targeting objectives and reserve forces. Brown appears to recognize the problems that occur in a nuclear conflict, focusing his analysis on those areas. Nevertheless, it is only a hopeful wish that states will be able to invoke his policy suggestions once nuclear obliteration has commenced.

A Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) strategy calls for absolute retaliation in the event of a nuclear situation. Targets are civilians, cities, and places of value. Bundy (1982) observes that an irony of “morality” exists in the discussions on nuclear weaponry and the “immorality” of a state that adheres to MAD if deterrence fails. Bundy believes that what people say they will do in a nuclear war (absolute retaliation) contradicts what they would really do if the event occurs (damage limitation). While MAD is the declared policy in order to create the strongest deterrent position, the actual response taken by policy makers would likely be a Flexible Response—seeking to respond to a nuclear attack through various increasing steps that match the opponent’s actions. MAD ideology appears to be a rhetorical device used to support a deterrent relationship. Bundy explains that nuclear weapons support a deterrent, not defensive, ability. Each state, however, still strives to have the ability to deter its neighbor through nuclear capabilities, falling into the trap of the security dilemma: “the weapons each side has sought have been those its government found necessary in the light of what others had done or might do” (4). Bundy believes that the lack of international unity is a result of this dilemma. On the other hand, Dulles (1993) believes a greater payoff occurs when states unite for a common defense. Yet, even though each state would benefit from unified actions, the need to insure national security still exists. Nuclear weapons, Bundy (1982) asserts, could have brought international unity (by their destructive nature), but “the sovereign state is not about to be transcended” (5). States themselves, not the international community, appear as politically accountable for nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, a state must analyze the balance of power within the system, explains Bundy (1982), then determine who it is to deter and how it should be done (nukes or no nukes). Yet, he goes on, military ability fails as the only cause of deterrence between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. “Détente” must be part of the deterrence strategy in order for each side to “see” and understand the position of its opponent. Bundy doesn’t believe that states who have made an attempt to understand their opponents will likely retaliate with all out nuclear destruction, despite rhetorical statements to the contrary. However, even if détente fails, say the realists, deterrence occurs based only on the threat of mutual annihilation. Khrushchev (1993) stated in 1960: “should any madman launch an attack on our state or on other Socialist states we would be able literally to wipe the country or countries which attack us off the face of the earth” (374). Khrushchev obviously supported a strategy of creating nuclear deterrence through threats of annihilation. Furthermore, Bundy (1982) suggests, just the possibility of an all out nuclear war creates an existential deterrence: “Existential deterrence. . .deters quite impersonally; no provocative threats are needed to support its power. It deters both sides at once, since the unpredictable risk of catastrophe is essentially symmetrical” (10). Existential deterrence stands as a form of self deterrence, as one’s own ability to destroy is perceived as an equal potential in another state, thus making sure that one nuclear state will not attack the other in fear of completely destroying its own population with the act. A State can quite impersonally threaten its own annihilation.

Bundy presents a more realistic perspective of nuclear deterrence. He acknowledges the threat of annihilation as the greatest cause for deterrence, but recognizes the possibility of limiting the absolute destruction of a nuclear war. In addition, Bundy calls for active international unity, as does Dulles (1993), cautioning against the rhetoric of sovereignty that nuclear weapons promote. Bundy’s (1982) theory on existential deterrence places nuclear weapons in their real role as deterrent weapons, that they threaten total annihilation of one’s own state. However, such an analysis of deterrence may not be complete, especially for contemporary nuclear relationships. It is not likely that all states seeking nuclear weapons and WMD will be easily deterred by their neighbors, especially between states with and states without nuclear weapons. With MAD, nuclear weapons achieve importance in the international system; yet, deterrence must be more than the threat of nuclear annihilation as even conventional wars between post-industrial countries have been greatly limited during the cold war era.

The distinctive quality of nuclear weapons is their ability to “hurt” (Schelling, 1966). Having the ability to defend, coerce, or go on the offensive takes military power (in response to an opponent’s ability—security dilemma) that is expensive and resource consuming. Deterrence can be different. Schelling (1966) states that the power to “hurt” is much less costly. A state need only know how much pain its opponent is willing to suffer, and the ability to hurt it just above that level creates deterrence. With MAD, both cities and places of value receive “hurt.” Waltz (1993) believes that, with MAD, “the ‘probable hurt’ need only ‘out balance the probable gain’” (335). Schelling (1966) explains how hurt today differs from that of pre-WWII. Although both bayonets and nuclear bombs kill, the speed and high cost of lives that accompany the use of nuclear weapons produce greater hurt. Schelling sees nuclear war as a “hurting” war. Even though calls for the limitation of non-combatant casualties continues, MAD as a nuclear deterrence paradigm uses each side’s cities and places of value as hostages to a balance of power:

Military strategy can no longer be thought of. . .as the science of military victory. It is now equally, if not more, the art of coercion, of intimidation and deterrence. The instruments of war are more punitive than acquisitive. Military strategy, whether we like it or not, has become the diplomacy of violence. (24)

Apparently, “states” possess greater evil capabilities today than did “states” in the past, as observed through contemporary means of diplomacy. If a state shows that it can hurt its opponent to a greater extent than the latter is willing to accept, a deterrent relationship occurs. States must acquire the ability to create deterrence in kind. Schelling states, “It is the power to hurt, not military strength in the traditional sense, that inheres in our most impressive military capabilities at the present time” (6). The power to hurt as a strategy to create deterrence depends on the relatively low cost of nuclear weapons for states of a variety of sizes. The knowledge that a small state has even one nuclear bomb creates deterrence. Thus, nuclear weapons do not simply cancel each other out, but create the potential for “hurt,” which increases the desire to limit conflicts. With such rationale, small states would actively seek nuclear weapons for deterrence, and large states would allow such actions in order for a deterrent world of peace to exist.

Whether the nuclear capabilities of states are actually important in the international system or not, policy makers deem them to be. Jervis (1993) shows how, even in confrontation, superpowers have kept the situation from escalating (e.g., Cuban missile crisis). Nuclear weapons create a deterrent relationship, he asserts, but there still may be conflict at “lower levels of violence.” Jervis agrees with Schelling (1966) that the threat of absolute punishment is overkill. One only needs the ability to hurt. On the other hand, Schelling does not believe that all states seeking nuclear weapons will obtain the same U.S.-U.S.S.R. deterrent relationship of bi-polarity. Conversely, Jervis (1993) believes that, while the threat of all-out destruction limits long-term security, it does create a deterrent relationship between states. This is especially so in the case of “small” states as the power to hurt “evens up” their limited abilities to militarize. Waltz (1993) supports Jervis (1993), suggests that large armies are not necessary: “Smaller forces, so long as they are invulnerable, would be quite sufficient” (339). Thus, while nuclear weapons capabilities appear influential in the balance of power analysis by policy makers, future deterrent positions may be achieved through cheaper WMD, especially nuclear weapons.

Schelling’s (1966) analysis on the power to hurt as the strength behind nuclear deterrence appeals to theorists. The threat of hurt supports the MAD strategy by acknowledging the achievement of deterrence through threat of pain rather than a threat of military destruction. Yet, deterrence occurs through less pain than does assured destruction. Even smaller states with only one or two nuclear weapons may create deterrence, keeping larger states from attacking their national interests. It is possible, however, that conventional weapons could obtain the same level of deterrence, but it would take a larger number of weapons at a greater cost to the state. Such costs would limit the capability of smaller states to obtain the means for creating deterrence. Jervis (1993) and Waltz (1993) disagree with Schelling’s (1966) suggestion that nuclear deterrence between smaller states seeking nuclear weapons and WMD will differ from the cold war bi-polar system. Yet, Schelling does believe that the ability to hurt is enough to deter. All of these experts assume an anarchic balance of power system where international unity fails. This develops as the one limiting point in their analysis. International or regional unity appears to becoming stronger in the post-cold war era in most area of the world, a situation that presents new problems and solutions for creating deterrence and the ability to hurt.

Blechman and Hart (1993) believe that nuclear weapons have been used successfully for supporting domestic policy. Rarely has the actual threat to use nuclear weapons appeared. Blechman and Hart list the Middle East crisis in 1973 as one of those instances where the “threat” of action coerced the U.S.S.R. and/or created deterrence. Poor communication between Israel, the U.S., and the U.S.S.R. led to threatening moves by the U.S.S.R. in support of Egypt. The U.S. raised its alert status to warn the U.S.S.R. to proceed with care. The U.S.S.R. withdrew its forces. Blechman and Hart suggest that coercion, deterrence, and swaggering were all involved in re-obtaining a deterrent relationship between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. However, Blechman and Hart’s analysis of the Middle East conflict in terms of deterrence does not support nuclear weapons as a deterrent capability solely observed through the international system. The United States used the threat of nuclear weapons as a means of coercion—to alter the actions the Soviet Union had already undertaken. The threat of nuclear weapons did not keep conflict from occurring in the first place, but changed the situation after the U.S.S.R. had begun to act. Deterrence failed, and coercion succeeded. If deterrence was not achieved solely through the existence of nuclear weapons as part of the major power’s arsenal in the Middle East conflict, then an observation or consideration of factors within the states involved must have occurred. The Soviets may have suspected that the U.S. would not consider direct involvement in the war or sought coercive action to get the U.S. to become more directly involved. Either way, the perception of intent by the perceiver state affected the use of nuclear threat. In addition, Blechman and Hart see deterrence as an act in itself, not as a situation that occurs because of actions taken by a state. Thus, deterrence was revealed as an act that changed Soviet actions. What really occurred was an act of compellence with a strong shot of swaggering in order to re-obtain a deterrent situation between the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and the Middle East states. Additionally, since the U.S. stayed out of the Gulf during the stages of escalation taken by the Soviet Union, an argument can be made that the deterrent relationship between the Soviet Union and the U.S. never faltered. The U.S. only employed coercive actions in order to keep the U.S.S.R. out of the Middle East conflict. The danger of conflict arising between the two super powers themselves never really existed; therefore, a deterrent situation was always in place, making the “deterrent” threat of nuclear weapons, as presented by Blechman and Hart, an over-exaggeration and a misinterpretation of the conflict.

In contrast to Blechman and Hart (1993), Bundy (1993) believes that nuclear weapons lack strength as the primary factor in creating deterrence as assumed by policy makers. International relationships since the end of WWII have not supported an influential nuclear bomb, he suggests. Bundy gives examples of Russian and Chinese expansion when the U.S. had a monopoly on the atomic bomb and of the conflict between small states who were superpower allies or clients in “bi-polar” years. Yet, Bundy agrees with Blechman and Hart (1993) that the relationship obtained by the superpowers will differ from the relationships between new nuclear powers and old nuclear powers, and between new nuclear powers themselves. Bundy (1993) believes that “both great governments [during the Cold War] had a profound lack of enthusiasm for nuclear war, and in so doing it reduced the plausibility of nuclear threats of any kind” (434). Recently, nuclear endeavors and the acquisition of WMD by smaller states who feel threatened by other states have increased. The same deterrent relationship observed between the U.S. and the Soviet Union may not occur between new nuclear states. In addition, there could be other factors that led to cold war deterrence which new nuclear powers lack, leading to a new strategy of deterrence. On the other hand, if nuclear weapons are only good for deterring a nuclear threat, then they are neither an advantage nor a disadvantage—it is only the creation of deterrence through the threat of nuclear weapons on both sides that holds meaning. Nuclear weapons, says Bundy, are of little real advantage. Unless states develop new nuclear technologies meant for theater-based conflicts (bunker busters) and for use on both nuclear and non-nuclear states, an offensive/defensive weapon which would negate nuclear deterrence. The development of tactical nuclear weapons for use on suspected underground nuclear development programs supports Bundy’s implied view that new nuclear states lack the same abhorrence to the threat of nuclear destruction and will use nuclear weapons if obtained, suggesting an ethnocentric perspective towards these states. While the exact same relationship may not occur between new nuclear states as existed between the two superpowers, it does not mean they will be trigger happy with their nuclear weapons. Additionally, regions experiencing extended conventional conflict may find nuclear weapons to be a pacifying effect. It seems more rational under a nuclear deterrence paradigm to allow small states to develop nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the creation of a one-world community could produce an international system that negates the anarchy observed in the balance of power system, making nuclear weapons and the threat of annihilation obsolete.

Mueller (1993) promotes the position that “nuclear weapons neither crucially define a fundamental stability nor threaten severely to disturb it” (411). Nuclear weapons weren’t the single force behind cold war deterrence. Mueller continues:

[W]hile nuclear weapons may have substantially influenced political rhetoric, public discourse, and defense budgets and planning, it is not at all clear that they have had a significant impact on the history of world affairs after WWII. (411-412)

In other words, the balance of power may have been similar without nuclear weapons. If nuclear weapons have not been a factor in deterrence, Mueller contends, they have also not been a factor in making international policy. The sureness of nuclear obliteration isn’t a deterrent. The threat of “undefined escalation” is, whether by nuclear, chemical, biological, conventional, or novel measures. He suggests that the contemporary international community doesn’t need nuclear weapons as a deterrent resource—there are many other factors that produce deterrent relationships other than nuclear threat. Mueller supports a future without nuclear weapons. While this view was idealistic and utopist in the past, the end of the cold war and the advent of a world community may allow for fewer violent acts and a move towards international structures (the World Court, United Nations, NATO, etc.) that limit the negative effects of the anarchic international system.

Klare (1989), on the other hand, doesn’t foresee a change in what forces influence a deterrent state, but the level of nuclear destruction per bomb. As conventional weapons become deadlier, and nuclear weapons become more accurate (or more “tactical”), the “firebreak” or pause between the use of conventional weapons and nuclear bombs shortens. In the past, there was a definitive gap between the two levels of violence. Klare believes that this gap shrinks as new weapons are built. Breaching the firebreak becomes easier. The second firebreak is between a damage limitation strategy and absolute violence, but Klare doesn’t believe such a pause can occur. Since “the Department of Defense seeks to acquire a whole new generation of extremely lethal, high-tech conventional weapons” (189),[2] more powerful conventional weapons will be used to escalate conventional wars. Klare also worries about the dual aspect of delivery systems and the confusion such systems bring when opponents try to analyze the balance of power. He believes governments should reduce and limit mid-level weaponry where the firebreak would otherwise occur. Yet, the lack of a firebreak implies the inability of political and military leaders to limit or stop a conflict before annihilation occurs, an irrational move (self-annihilation) in the balance of power system. If nuclear weapons create deterrence, then the increase in the destructive power of conventional weapons may create a greater deterrence for conventional warfare as the “hurt” threshold occurs sooner. Deadlier conventional weapons will create deterrent situations without the need for nuclear weapons.

The development of a deterrent situation and its failure may not rely only on a realist consideration of costs and benefits, but on internal factors within states as well. Lebow and Stein (1987a) suggest that specific cases of deterrence show an escalation in conflict rather than a reduction. While deterrence reflects a cost/benefit analysis on an action, domestic and political considerations may influence policy preferences. A state may not accept doing nothing, as domestic pressure to act forces a conflict. In addition, Lebow and Stein (1987a) believe that a state may take action if the deterrent position of another state appears to threaten its own security. Actions against security threats may take the form of a preemptive strike in order to destroy deterrent forces before they reach their peak (Russet, 1987). The undesirable outcome develops due to the deterrent actions taken. If the attacked state had either hidden its nuclear development program or not sought nuclear weapons as all, an attack by the “threatened” nuclear state would not have occurred. If nuclear weapons are not an offensive threat, but only create deterrence, then they should not threaten those states that already have nuclear weapons unless other internal factors within the state influence the perception of that state. Deterrence also supports the “fundamental attribution error,” which provides that my actions lack free will, being constrained by outside forces, while your actions reflect a rationally chosen position (Lebow, 1987). These perspectives fail to consider that the balance of power and the failure of deterrence depend on the actions of both actors (Krell, 1987). If states choose to develop nuclear weapons for different reasons, then internal factors within the state must affect these differences.

While Lebow and Stein (1987a) do not provide a clear differentiation between deterrence and compellence, they do provide alternatives to the use of force when deterrence fails or a different course of action than military might as a deterrent. “Reassurance” includes forms of action without the threat of using force: 1) reciprocity reflects actions that mimic one’s adversaries action, often referred to as “tit-for-tat;” 2) irrevocable commitment invites reassurance based on the act of the adversary that lacks reversibility; 3) self-restraint reduces the mutual use of force through reassuring language; 4) norms of competition constrain forceful action by constructing agreements on disputed issues; and 5) limited security regimes reflect agreed upon parameters for the use of force, most successful when both sides seek to limit conflict. Lebow and Stein’s (1987a) prescriptions suggest alternatives to the threat of violence in international relationships that reflect a move towards finding real solutions to security issues.

Reactions to Lebow and Stein (1987a) include views both supporting and refuting deterrence as a strategy and a theory. First, theorists argue that Lebow and Stein (1987a) fail to make a connection to the world of nuclear deterrence (MacGwire, 1987; Milburn, 1987; Deutsch, 1987). Most of the conflicts related by Lebow and Stein (1987a) only support deterrence failures when conventional weapons are present and ignore situations reflecting the unique aspect of nuclear weapons. Second, Lebow and Stein (1987a) only focus on deterrence failures and not on successes (Fischhoff, 1987). A deterrence failure is clear, while a deterrence success often produces little data. Still, even if research includes counterfactuals, successes reflect a much needed view of deterrence. Third, reassurance lacks independence from deterrence and may produce conflict between actors (Riekhoff, 1987). The reassurance of reciprocity depends on a position firmly planted in deterrence for possible success (Riekhoff, 1987). Additionally, the act of reassurance may limit the deterrent abilities of an actor (Riekhoff, 1987). Fourth, Lebow and Stein (1987a) fail to stress the importance of underestimating and overestimating an opponent’s fear (White, 1987). Underestimating another actor’s fear often occurs when a state holds a “diabolical image” of the enemy, resulting in a failure to understand the actor’s position, while overestimating an actor’s fear ends with a state taking action thinking that the actor will fail to respond (White, 1987). Fifth, Lebow and Stein (1987a) do not go far enough in condemning the use of deterrence as both a theory and a strategy (Krell, 1987). The political aspects of war and conflict may not be deterred by the threat of violence and the use of fear, while deterrence theory does not explain why deterrence fails (Krell, 1987). Elucidating on those situations where deterrence or reassurance works would benefit theories on the strategy of peace between nations and help policy makers determine the best actions to take.

Threat and opportunity are the basis for determining whether a state takes action, instigating the end to a deterrent situation. Jervis (1985b) relates that the perceived threat to a state’s security produces a conflict needing deterrence. A threat equates to actions going against accepted norms of behavior and produces greater insecurity than simple outcomes. “How” an action takes place attains greater importance than “what” occurs (Jervis, 1985). Threat magnifies through the lens of fear and elicits a prompt response to end decisively the altercation.

Viewing factors within the state provides a better understanding on how deterrence succeeds or fails. Looking beyond the rational view of deterrence uncovers motivations previously assumed and often misperceived (Jervis, 1985a). Policy makers often believe that their actions produce clear understanding by opponents when misunderstanding actually develops. Misperception can lead to a failure in deterrence. Also, deterrence theory suggests that states consider their reputation when contemplating action, living up to and supporting the status attained in previous actions or overcoming less than appealing prior outcomes. Yet, policy makers may actually ignore reputations and base their policy choices on specific circumstances, especially in cases of nuclear weapons (Jervis, 1985a). Thus, looking beyond the assumptions included in rational deterrence uncovers explanations for specific policy choices in a balance of power analysis.

Furthermore, Jervis (1985b) makes an interesting point by suggesting that biases[3] develop in order to process incomplete information and to structure a world view. Patterns of behavior result in observable actions showing how biases affect deterrence. Images of opponents develop through which any new action flows, usually supporting the perceived image, influencing the perception of threat (Jervis, 1985b). As deterrence depends on how a threat reflects the possible actions of an opponent, deterrent responses to a threat depend on the image perceived. The world view of a policy maker structures the response taken against actions disturbing the balance of power. Such “preconceptions” limit the response alternatives available to a policy maker for creating a deterrent position (Jervis, 1985b). Policy makers may not choose restraint when dealing with a state seeking deterrent capabilities if the image of that state suggests irrationality. In addition, an image of the opponent may reflect a policy maker’s frame of mind that runs counter to his or her real position (Jervis, 1985b). The perceived thought process of an opponent based on the held image induces actions that fail to create a deterrent position. Finally, policy makers use analogies to suggest reactions to threatening actions, supporting or negating deterrent responses (Jervis, 1985b). How well a situation fits an analogy influences whether or not the same responses should be used. Thus, deterrence is not solely a rational cost/benefit analysis of capability but rather a perceived analysis of factors within the state being viewed through the lens of a previously held image.[4]

Janice Gross Stein (1985a) enters the argument suggesting that policy makers use cognitive structures to process information for determining whether an action necessitates a deterrent response. Yet, what factors influence decision making and cognitively structured considerations? In a cost/benefit analysis, policy makers consider the level of commitment by both the opponent and themselves, the balance of military strength, and possible actions other than the use of force (Stein, 1985a). Even rational choice relies on such an analysis, but often policy makers supposing a rational decision fail to understand properly an opponent’s position. Misperceptions often lead to a failure in deterrence, limiting the effect of policy action (Stein, 1985b). Furthermore, policy makers undergo tremendous stress when contemplating risky options, only coming to terms with an action once alternatives cease to be an option (Janis and Mann, 1977, cited in Lebow, 1985b). Overconfident policy makers may choose actions counter to information suggesting that such actions will likely fail. In addition, the failure of deterrence first arises with the cognitive analysis of costs and benefits of the challenger (Morgan, 1985). An image develops of the defender supporting or opposing a change in the balance of power. If the image reflects the defender as lacking the will to resist the use of force by the challenger, then deterrence fails. A strong image, on the other hand, suggesting retributive actions if the challenger persists will deter a change in the balance of power. Thus, factors influence the psychology of decision makers that cannot be observed in a realist view of the international system or in a rational understanding of a cost/benefit analysis.

Due to the nature of nuclear weapons, Morgan (1985) believes a policy maker will never determine that the benefits of nuclear war outweigh the costs. One finds it difficult to determine if any benefits to nuclear war exist. Therefore, deterrence through the use of nuclear weapons results in extra caution between opponents, making nuclear states less likely to go to war (Morgan, 1985). Yet, in order to create an image of credibility, a state with nuclear weapons may use greater force when its interests are threatened, even if the situation calls for little response (Morgan, 1985). If the deterring state fails to take action in a minor instance, challenger states may decide that the deterring state lacks the determination to act in a nuclear conflict, making the deterrent aspect of nuclear weapons void. A nuclear conflict may not erupt, but deterrence fails, and the use of force occurs.

Ultimately, while deterrence as a policy takes precedence in a balance of power system, deterrence theory fails to explain adequately interstate interaction. States do not act as the theory prescribes, using more risky or more reserved behavior (Lebow, 1985c). The rational actions of states lack predictability, and often states’ actions may appear irrational. Yet, states continue to seek a deterrent posture against the threat of force by other states. Therefore, a theory must be used that looks beyond the outcome of deterrence and uncovers the motivations behind behavior. In addition, a theory that seeks to explain the misperceptions between states will lead to the discovery of how to overcome such barriers to international unity. The images used to predict behavior will provide insight into past, present and future actions of states. As these behaviors signal state action, future altercations between states become clear and means develop to discover how to end conflict before it begins.

The end of the Cold War ushered in a new era. States dependent upon the
Soviet Union could no longer count on the deterrent power of this superpower’s military might.[5] States feeling a threat to their national security took steps to insure their deterrent capability. As the deterrent ability of superpowers and their extension of deterrence to dependents and allies often included nuclear weapons, states losing a nuclear deterrent because of their loss of association with the superpower seek their own nuclear weapons. Thus, the international community must deal with new nuclear states and their influence on the balance of power.

Preston (1997) argues that new nuclear states change power relations in the international system. Since nuclear weapons produce parity between states of different sizes and capabilities, superpowers lose their position as the controllers of military might (Preston, 1997). The old nuclear powers no longer stand as the top dogs in the world community. Smaller states potentially retain the ability to determine major decisions in their own spheres of influence. Preston (1997) suggests that new power relationships depend on states’ nuclear strength and abilities, the likelihood that states’ nuclear weapons will outlast detection and possible nuclear hits, and the reputation of states that they would follow through with the threat to use nuclear weapons. New nuclear states will attain the deterrent capability of old nuclear states without having to build huge conventional armies. Instead of massive wealth determining the international strength and power of a nation, even a relatively small amount of wealth can produce a nuclear weapons program capable of influencing regional politics. The question arises as to whether old nuclear powers will allow new nuclear powers equality in the international would through the development of nuclear weapons. Excuses of irrationality and moral corruptness in new nuclear states make excellent support for limiting nuclear proliferation actually based on a hierarchical need for power by old nuclear powers.

The question must be asked, will new nuclear states use nuclear weapons in a manner similar to that of old nuclear powers, or will new nuclear states act rashly and detonate a nuclear weapon and subject themselves to retaliation? Members of the U.S. executive branch see nuclear weapons in the hands of rogue states as the biggest threat to international security (Karl, 1996), suggesting a consideration of the pessimist/optimist argument. Schneider (1994) argues that six views of nuclear proliferation exist: pro-proliferationists, proliferation optimists, proliferation pessimists, non-proliferation optimists, selectivists and universalists. Three perspectives suggest that proliferation is inevitable. Pro-proliferationists support proliferation believing it will create deterrence similar to that which occurred between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. If opponents in a region obtain nuclear weapons, then the level of violence will diminish and stability will follow. Proliferation optimists believe that safeguards limiting the sale of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology provide the most realistic path for the future, as nuclear proliferation is inevitable, but manageable. Proliferation pessimists believe that the safeguards against proliferation will fail to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and that these weapons are destined to exist in the international system.

The next three suggest that nuclear proliferation need not continue unchecked and that alternatives exist. Non-proliferation optimists believe non-proliferation activities successfully limit nuclear weapons and even keep problem states from obtaining them. Controls over exports and the cost of nuclear development suggest a couple of areas where non-proliferation has succeeded. Selectivists, like the pro-proliferationists, see a positive side to proliferation. While proliferation to new nuclear states promotes a stabilizing effect in most regions, some rogue and expansionist states should not acquire nuclear weapons and safeguards must limit these selected cases. Finally, Universalists view nuclear weapons themselves as a threat to international security and believe no new nuclear weapons programs need developing. Universalists also strongly support international controls, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty and the backing of the world community, in stopping proliferation.

In the debate over whether nuclear weapons are inevitable or not, optimists continue to cite the deterrent ability of the superpowers and believe that the same deterrent situation can occur in regions with new nuclear states. No state willingly subjects itself to nuclear retaliation, thereby insuring a stable relationship with neighboring states (Karl, 1996). As states seek power and their own national security, they will not threaten their own security and destroy their strength by calling forth the annihilation of their country through the launching of nuclear weapons. Just as old nuclear states were self-deterred, so will be new nuclear states. Regional conflicts become more stable as both sides exercise restraint in order not to escalate the altercation into a nuclear war (Karl, 1996; Schneider, 1994). A nuclear conflict ends in the destruction of both countries, making an escalation of regional disputes unthinkable. In the world of interstate interaction, past nuclear relationships suggest a resulting peace between nations.

On the other hand, proliferation pessimists believe that differences exist between superpower deterrence and the deterrent relationships of new nuclear states. The deterrent positions of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. relied on other military and political factors and not just nuclear weapons (Karl, 1996). While nuclear weapons increased the retributive aspect of a full out war, conventional weapons, political spheres of influence and geographical distance all helped to limit conflict. New nuclear states lack the political stability, national wealth, and technological advancement of the superpowers, making new nuclear states less likely to retain a deterrent position (Fetter, 1991). Due to the close geographic locations of new nuclear states, their long-time rivalries, and a multi-polar region, nuclear weapons will not create stability (Karl, 1996). Pessimists suggest that new nuclear states will fail to develop the same level of organizational control over nuclear weapons as superpowers (Dunn, 1993). This would make new nuclear states more likely to launch nuclear weapons on the whim of those in control rather than as a final step in a process with many safeguards built in.

Pessimists also believe that new states seeking nuclear weapons may have a greater susceptibility to conflict and use nuclear weapons as an offensive act despite the possibility of nuclear retaliation (Dunn, 1993). Newer debates on nuclear proliferation include the possibility “of misperceptions, technical mishaps, and inadvertent actions” (Karl, 1996:95). New nuclear states may take greater chances, not creating the same level of safeguards as the superpowers, and make more likely accidental or unauthorized launches. In addition, states may feel threatened by a neighboring country’s developing nuclear program and take preemptive strikes against it (Karl, 1996). A preemptive strike signifies a failure in deterrence and a rise in conflict between states, and such an act may begin an altercation it meant to limit in the first place. Pessimists suggest that the increase in nuclear weapons means an increase in the likelihood that a nuclear altercation will take place (Nye, 1993). Furthermore, superpowers themselves may feel threatened by new nuclear states and the change in the balance of power they signify, taking preemptive actions to limit new nuclear programs.

While it is easy to look at nuclear weapons and logically deduce their presence in the balance of power system as a force for creating deterrent relationships, the counter arguments bring much needed questioning into the rational/realist arguments. As factors within perceived and perceiving states influence both the perceptions of policy makers and their subsequent actions, a realist or rational actor view fails to adequately explain deterrence. Yet, evidence supports the use of nuclear weapons as a deterrent to other states in the balance of power system. Additionally, the destructive power of nuclear weapons takes the guess work out of determining the type of weapon a country has: the destructive capability of nuclear weapons creates a form of “hurt” that other states do not want to feel. Whether a state has 2,000 nuclear bombs or 20, it is unlikely that one state will be able to destroy all the weapons of an opposing state, making the likelihood of nuclear retaliation high. Questions remain, however, on the motivation behind the desire to acquire nuclear weapons, the internal factors influencing the likelihood of their use, and the perceived image of the “other” in a deterrent relationship. Deterrence sometimes fails, even in the face of a nuclear threat, and policy makers sometimes go to great lengths to avoid the use of violence, even if no nuclear capability exists.

Nuclear weapons do influence deterrent relationships in the anarchic international system. Beliefs that new nuclear states will fail to obtain the same nuclear deterrent relationships of the superpowers hints of ethnocentric and arrogant attitudes towards those smaller nations that seek nuclear capabilities: new nuclear states are not as “grown up” or as capable of utilizing nuclear weapons strictly in a deterrent manner. Currently, it is the lone nuclear superpower that seeks to change the nuclear deterrent world with a national missile defense system, the desire to obtain smaller tactical nuclear weapons, and a policy proposal outlining the use of nuclear weapons in a first strike action against nuclear and non-nuclear states. The U.S. appears to be setting up for a nuclear first strike stance, not new nuclear states. Whether nuclear weapons capability creates stability in a region or presents an imbalance of power situation (as when one state has nuclear capability and the others do not) may be a more relevant question.

Nuclear weapons are in the international system. New states are continuing their production of nuclear capabilities with or without international supervision. While the U.S. and other western nations would like to keep a monopoly on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, they will appear throughout the globe unless radical changes occur. If those who support and enforce the nuclear non-proliferation treaty continue to deny smaller states the ability to develop their own programs, either small states will do so secretly, or nuclear states will have to protect actively those states threatened by new nuclear states. Still, the perceived threat exists: a leader of a rogue state who feels that the end of his reign is near may strike out with a nuclear weapon. If his power is so threatened that he sees a likely end to his role as the leader of his country, then no reason to worry about nuclear retribution exists. Furthermore, the more nuclear weapons, the more likely an accidental launch may occur or that terrorists may obtain nuclear material to use in a “dirty” bomb.

Yet, the idealist in me hopes that the proliferation of nuclear weapons will be limited, or even reversed. States such as South Africa and Brazil stand out, as they reversed their nuclear programs, and many other states exemplify the search for a non-nuclear ability to insure their national interests. A world community that creates an over-arching governing structure for the international system may achieve political equilibrium at the inter-state level. Nuclear weapons may not be necessary to create deterrence, or deterrence may not be necessary to the international system. If the international political controls continue with the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, the United Nations,[6] and other world community efforts, possibly the need for nuclear weapons will cease. Furthermore, the current threat to many states arrives in the form of terrorist weapons via personal means of transportation (cars, buses, the use of a plane as a bomb, etc.). Nuclear weapons lack a deterrent capability against terrorist weapons, even if those terrorist weapons include WMD. Yet, states will resist giving up power and sovereignty to a world community effort. Currently, the literature suggests that states seek nuclear weapons in part for a deterrent capability. Yet, factors other than military capability affect the perceptions policy makers hold of other states and their deterrent ability. Furthermore, deterrence through nuclear weapons may be no longer necessary in the post-Cold War era when rogue states and terrorism threaten state and international security. If globalization and democratization make states more interdependent and transparent, states are less likely to need the threat of annihilating others and themselves to get what they want. Nuclear deterrence is a policy of the past. New ways of thinking that promote global security without the threat and use of violence and fear are “enlightened” and “civilized” policy preferences needed for creating not a world of deterrence, but a world of peace. By viewing the images of other states that policy makers perceive and their subsequent policy preferences, a better understanding of the interaction between states develops, leading to a more beneficial global environment.

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[1] In Choose Hope: Your Role in Waging Peace in the Nuclear Age. 2002. David Krieger and Daisaku Ikeda. Originally quoted in Wayne Saslow, “Letters,” APS News June 1999.

[2] “Extremely lethal.”— “Isn’t dead dead?” (As suggested by Thomas Preston in seminar courses.)

[3] “Motivated” biases refer to affect-based thought structures while “unmotivated” biases mean strictly cognitively-based thought structures.

[4] For more on Image Theory, see Martha Cottam’s work and work by this author.

[5] For a discussion on extended deterrence, see Huth and Russett (1988).

[6] A necessary reformation must occur of the United Nations into a more democratic institution, however.